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Abstract 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
After the repeal of the Corn Laws ended the policy of protectionism 
which had enabled Britain to feed herself from within her own 
resources, free trade resulted in domestic food production constituting 
only 30% of the British diet. This study looks at the political discourse 
from 1880 to 1939 when the ‘empty countryside’ became a symbol of 
agricultural decline. Emerging radical and socialist narratives put 
forward approaches for rural regeneration and increased food 
production. Other narratives suggested that agricultural decline was one 
manifestation of national decline whereby a self sufficient and proud 
nation was being betrayed by Capitalism. Both Left and Right offered up 
the prospect of different solutions predicated upon shared perceptions 
of ‘Englishness.’ The experience of Irish famine failed to inform political 
action or policy making. 
The study notes the importance of War upon the development of food 
policy. Increasingly, the State joined forces with the NFU in a corporate 
endeavour which sought to manage, rather than increase, food 
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production and created structures which became increasingly important 
in the context of rearmament. Increased food production was rejected 
upon defence grounds in that free trade and a navy were seen as 
appropriate safeguards. Those countries which sought to follow self 
sufficiency – or autarky – are portrayed as warlike in their intentions; by 
1939 all mainstream political parties rejected the notion of artificially 
increased food production. 
Those who continued to press for increased food production 
concentrated either upon earlier pre Capitalist societies or were 
attracted by Fascism and strong leadership. After such searches 
became increasingly problematic there was emphasis upon the soil, 
with the adoption of an approach which was both practical and mystical. 
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‘Ill fares the Land?’ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Introduction 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This work examines sixty years of food self sufficiency in political 
discourse.  The main focus of this work is to allow those who have 
advocated food self sufficiency to speak and to foreground the books, 
pamphlets and speeches written between 1880 and 1939 and place 
them in the wider political discourse. Many of the voices presented in 
this work have been forgotten or, critically, put forward reasoned 
arguments for growing more food in this country at times when the 
supply of food from the rest of the world was taken for granted. Clearly, 
the Second World War is most often associated with the notion of self 
sufficiency through ‘Dig for Victory.’ However, that notion is problematic 
given that it does not take into account the extent to which the country 
had become dependent upon imported food or the fact that such 
dependency might have been seen as being in the national interest. For 
sixty years a number of people and organisations argued that 
dependency upon imported food either imperilled the nation or was 
symptomatic of national, imperial or moral decline. 
The first chapter moves outside of the chosen time frame of 1880 – 
1939 in order to ascertain the extent to which successive Irish famines, 
but especially the major one from 1845 onwards influenced the political 
discourse.  Whilst the brief treatment of the politics of the famine does 
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not do justice to the scale of the tragedy, any work which seeks to 
examine food self sufficiency must identify the extent to which such a 
famine was important in having influenced the view of food provision. 
In order to locate those voices, the principal focus of the work has been 
to carry out extensive archival research. This task has been made 
easier by the comprehensive collection housed at the Working Class 
Movement Library in Salford at http://www.wcml.  The material in Salford 
is complemented by the nearby Manchester resources, the Co-
operative archive at www.archive.coop/ and the People’s History 
Museum at www.phm.org.uk. 
Locally, the West Yorkshire Archive Service branches in Halifax and 
Huddersfield (http://www.archives.wyjs.org.uk/) have yielded important 
background information. 
The works for non violent social change collected by the Commonweal 
Collection at the University of Bradford, 
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/library/libraries-and-collections/commonweal-
collection/ show the breadth of thinking that has taken place on food 
and society. 
More generally, the study presents the voices of those engaged in 
Parliamentary Debate as recorded in Hansard at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ or through local and national 
newspapers at http://gale.cengage.co.uk/product-
highlights/history/19th-century-british-library-newspapers.aspx or 
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through significant material on organic gardening and health gathered 
together at http://www.soilandhealth.org/index.html.  
There are some excellent agricultural histories of this period notably 
that of English Farming Past and Present by Lord Ernle (1936), a 
respected historian, agricultural expert, politician and administrator 
whose work has the mark of authority. Similarly, the many works of C.S. 
Orwin and E.H. Whetham cover the technical and scientific changes in 
agriculture in some detail, and explain how successive Governments 
have endeavoured to influence agricultural policy and practice. Two 
particular works by Whetham, the Agrarian History of England and 
Wales 1914 – 1939 (1978) and The Economic Background to 
Agricultural Policy (1960) have been essential to an understanding of 
the period. Works such as History of British Agriculture by Orwin and 
Whetham (1964) also sought to challenge the underlying assumptions 
contained in such an authority as Lord Ernle. The ‘official’ histories of 
the Second World War – Agriculture by K.A.H. Murray (1975) and Food: 
the Growth of Policy by R.J. Hammond (1951) – contain important 
summaries of the events which shaped food policy and production in 
wartime. Both make explicit the close links between the brief period of 
food control in the last year of the First World War and the 
comprehensive approach of the Second World War. The politics of 
agriculture are well covered in The State and the Farmer by Self and 
Storing (1962) but the authors concentrate more upon the 1947 
Agriculture Act and beyond rather than the formative period covered 
here. British Agriculture 1875 – 1914 by Perry (1973) offers a different 
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interpretation of the Great Depression in that he describes not decline, 
but a period of re-adjustment from which a leaner domestic agriculture 
emerges.  
The extent to which that adjustment has enabled Britain to feed herself 
in wartime is well recorded by Barnett in British Food Policy during the 
First World War (1985) and much of the output of Dewey, especially 
British Agriculture in the First World War. (1989)This emphasis upon 
wartime has benefited from the recent international perspective offered 
by Collingham in the 2011 work The Taste of War: World War Two and 
the Battle for Food. The work of Martin, The Development of Modern 
Agriculture: British Farming since 1931 (1967) is authoritative in 
exploring the relationships between agriculture and the political 
discourse and is detailed and perceptive about the 1930’s. 
Harris’ biography of William Beveridge (1977) and Food by Fielding 
(1923)both express the degree to which administrators felt that the 
return to market conditions after 1919 could only be seen as a missed 
opportunity to both enhance diet and work towards a fairer society. 
Middleton offers a more detached perspective in Food Production in 
War an officially endorsed work appearing in 1923. 
These works place food production and distribution in the broader 
political context and the 2012 work of Edgerton –Britain’s War Machine: 
Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War builds 
upon that by emphasising the degree to which food policy was integral 
to rearmament and war preparation from 1935 onwards. Equally, the 
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2001 work of Wilt – Food for War: Agriculture and rearmament in Britain 
before the Second World War – casts a different light on the growth of 
State intervention in agriculture in the 1930’s. In a complementary 
approach, The First World War: an agrarian interpretation by Offer 
(1989) emphasises the extent to which the ‘scramble for Africa’ and 
other colonial adventures were important contributory factors in the lead 
up to the conflict. Chapter 3 of this study, along with a more detailed 
appendix, looks at the 1905 Royal Commission on Food and Raw 
Materials in Time of War. This Commission was set up on the back of 
the perceived humiliation of the Boer War and the rise of German naval 
power and dismissed any possibility of increased domestic food 
production as being essentially unpatriotic, given that it would cast 
doubt upon the ability of the British Navy to defend the country. The 
campaign for this Commission to be set up and the critique of the 
outcome was well covered by publications as diverse as The North 
American Review, Transactions of the Royal History Society  and, 
above all, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal. Indeed, 
articles in the Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural History 
Review, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society and Rural History 
have all offered up detailed work of relevance to this study.  
The degree to which the experience of famine in Ireland has shaped 
political perceptions of food security has been assisted by the 
impressive works of Famine, Land and Politics (1999) by Gray and 
Black ’47 and Beyond  (1999) by O’Grada in addition to the detailed 
work of The Great Hunger (1962) by Woodham Smith. It is worth noting 
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that whilst historians marked the 150th. anniversary of the famine in 
1999 it received rather less attention in political circles. 
However, if the question of domestic food self sufficiency had already 
been covered by the many books and journal articles produced then, 
arguably, there would have been no need for a study such as this. The 
truth is that many of the proponents of food self sufficiency were 
considered to be on the margins in both political and agricultural circles. 
In 1939 the NFU expressed the view that no ‘sensible’ person had ever 
advocated such an approach. 
In his work English History 1914 – 1945 A.J.P. Taylor wrote that 
‘agriculture provided a strange story, in which emotion played as much 
part as economics’ (1965:341) before concluding that the interwar years 
did see moves towards food self sufficiency. In general histories of the 
period, agriculture is often little more than a footnote, although the work 
of Hobsbawm, particularly The Age of Extremes 1914 – 1991(1994) and 
Industry and Empire (1990) ensures that agriculture is placed in the 
context of a developing market economy. 
If agriculture itself is marginalised then it is hardly surprising that the 
voices of those advocating food self sufficiency are seldom heard. The 
Origins of the Organic Movement by Conford (2001) and Early Green 
Politics. Back to the Land and Socialism in Britain 1880 – 1900 by 
Gould (1988) both provide excellent introductions to those who put 
forward visions of England based either on the merits of past societies 
or the creation of future societies based upon self sufficiency. 
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The inspirational work of William Morris, Edward Carpenter and Peter 
Kropotkin sits alongside a whole range of pamphlets and election 
material in which working people have argued for a future where human 
fulfilment might be best achieved not just by Socialism but by alternative 
forms of society which have food production at the core. Whilst the 
Fabian Society and the Labour Party sought to marginalise such 
characters in favour of dour Managerialism and the joys of managed 
Capitalism, the Independent Labour Party, The Clarion and other 
groups saw the possibilities of more local and democratic forms of 
society with enhanced appreciations of human dignity. Increasingly, the 
vision of a self sufficient Britain came to be associated with the Radical 
Right, particularly the works of Christopher Turnor, who moved from 
being a mainstream Conservative in works such as Land Problems and 
National Welfare in 1911 to an advocate of the use of force to defend 
the countryside in 1923 in Where are We Going? A manifesto to all who 
live on or by the land of England. He also went on to write appreciations 
of Fascist agriculture, especially in Italy, and to call for an end to ‘usury’ 
and the return of the peasantry in his 1939 work Yeoman Calling. 
The study will also explore the complex links between the development 
of the Organic movement, the Radical Right and Fascism in the 1930’s. 
The work of Eve Balfour has considerable contemporary resonance in 
her appreciation of the centrality of food, as illustrated by two extracts 
from The Living Soil first published in 1943. 
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‘Agriculture must be looked upon as one of the health services, in fact 
the primary health service’ and, ‘If fresh food is necessary to health in 
man and beast, then that food must be provided not only from our own 
soil but as near as possible to the sources of consumption.’ (1943:147) 
These tenets are very much at the heart of much contemporary thinking 
on issues of Local Food and at the heart of the Transition Town 
movement, well articulated in works such as Local Food: How to Make 
it Happen in Your Community (Pinkerton and Hopkins 2009) and The 
Transition Handbook. (Hopkins 2008) However, the supposedly ‘non 
political’ stances of such voices in the 1930’s seemed drawn to the 
attractions of Fascism or the assumption of the need for the leadership 
by ‘strong men.’ Conford (2001) touches upon such links but Copsey 
and Renton in British Fascism, the Labour Movement and the State 
(2005) Griffiths (1983) in Fellow Travellers of the Right: British 
Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany and Webber in The Ideology of the 
British Right 1918 – 1939 (1986) cast considerable doubts upon the 
political ‘naivety’ of many of the advocates of food self sufficiency. 
Stephen Dorril’s comprehensive work on Oswald Mosley – Blackshirt – 
(2007) identifies the contradictions in the bringing together of the need 
for a ‘modernised’ agriculture with ‘traditional’ English values. It is the 
career of Jorian Jenks which epitomised many of the contradictions in 
the proponents of food self sufficiency. The author of an important work 
on health and organics in 1959 – The Stuff Man’s made Of. The 
Positive Approach to Health Through Nutrition – founder member of the 
Soil Association and Journal Editor for many years but also the author 
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of the British Union of Fascists agricultural policy – The Land and the 
People – in 1937. One might say that for most of the Right, the founders 
of the Organic Movement and for food policy generally, what a 
difference the war makes. 
In the interwar years both the main political parties adopted pragmatic 
approaches, with the development of the Conservative Party being well 
recorded in Andrew Cooper’s British Agricultural Policy 1912 – 1936: a 
study in conservative politics (1989). For Labour, it is necessary to look 
at both the succession of political pamphlets setting out their aspirations 
and the continuing adoption of Land Nationalisation as the primary 
policy for agriculture. However, this needs to be compared to the 
establishment of Producer Cartels and the more ‘businesslike’ approach 
adopted by the party when in office. Such changes are well chronicled 
by Tom Williams, who became the Agriculture Minister in 1945, and 
Christopher Addison in the works The Autobiography of Lord Williams 
of Barnburgh: Digging for Victory (1965) and A Policy for British 
Agriculture (1939).  Whilst not all on the Right were attracted to 
continental Fascism it is worth noting the preferences for strong or 
‘natural’ leadership contained in the works of Viscount Lymington1 such 
as Horn, Hoof and Corn the Future of British Agriculture in 1932 or Lord 
Northbourne in Look to the Land in 1940.  
Although Kropotkin was denounced by those who argued for ‘State 
Socialism’ his detailed knowledge of agricultural production and his 
                                               
1
 Earlier Gerald Wallop & then Earl of Portsmouth 
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insistence upon the maximisation of output through the application of 
scientific knowledge meant that virtually all the adherents of food self 
sufficiency acknowledged a debt to him. Works such as the Conquest of 
Bread, Fields, Factories and Workshops and Agriculture (1913, 1968 
and 1896) constituted a body of knowledge which left little doubt that 
this country could, easily, feed itself to a high standard if it possessed 
the will to do so. However, Kropotkin’s solution of a local, democratically 
controlled society based upon meeting human needs above all, gained 
little following on the Left. The consequence of that is the Left remained, 
in the words of G.D.H. Cole, like ‘a fish out of water’ (1980:60) when it 
came to agricultural matters. In addition, self sufficiency predominantly 
became a narrative about ‘traditional’ values rather than feeding people. 
This is reflected by the choice of the title of Ill Fares the Land? This 
poem by Oliver Goldsmith contained imagery of an ‘empty’ countryside 
and a dispossessed peasantry which, as this work shows, remained 
part of the political discourse until 1939. 
The conception of food policy today owes much to works such as Food 
Policy Old and New2, Food Policy. Integrating Health, Environment and 
Society (Lang T. Barling D. and Caraher M. 2009) and Plenty and Want 
written by John Burnett in 1989. 
Lang et al. point out the extent to which food policy emerged, ‘in a 
serious and consistent way’3 from the 1970’s and is now a considered 
                                               
2
 Maxwell S. & Slater R. Development Policy Review Vol. 21 Issue 5 -6 September 
2003. pp. 531 - 553 
3
 Above p.27 
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discourse. Recent works such as Eat Your Heart Out by Felicity 
Lawrence (2008) and Hungry City4 by Carolyn Steel (2009) have 
examined the centrality of food to modern society. This built upon the 
earlier works such as Ill Fares the Land by Susan George which 
examined food hegemony in 1990. 
For this country, much of the current discourse is based upon the 
experiences of the Second World War, the 1947 Agriculture Act, and 
membership of the European Union and questions of food security and 
energy and water supplies. 
This work examines the work of those who argued for greater food self 
sufficiency from the ‘Great Depression’ through to 1939, their 
relationship to mainstream political and agricultural discourses and the 
tentative beginnings of food policy from 1935 onwards. There are five 
specific aims of the work; 
To ensure that all voices are represented and their relationship to 
mainstream political discourse fully explored and analysed. 
To explore the detailed arguments offered by the advocates of food self 
sufficiency. 
To evaluate the extent to which the Irish famine influenced the political 
discourse in the period under study. 
                                               
4
 Both works 2008. 
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To critically analyse the strategies of the main Political parties in the 
interwar period in respect to agricultural policy and managed 
Capitalism. 
To determine the degree to which War has been an important factor of 
food policy. 
This work rests upon considerable archival and other research in order 
to uncover the voices of those who advocated food self sufficiency in 
the period 1880 – 1939. 
It is crucial to ensure that the books, speeches, pamphlets and news 
reports which this work presents are analysed in the specific social 
political and cultural conditions which prevailed at the time.  
Many of those who argued for food self sufficiency took up positions in 
which they argued for fundamental changes in the organisation and 
priorities of the society in which they lived. They were individuals and 
organisations that saw the question of the country producing either all 
or most of the food required for the population as being of such 
fundamental importance that they produced detailed plans for how that 
might be achieved. Most of those perspectives saw the realisation of 
food self sufficiency as only being possible through the creation of 
radically different forms of society. 
This made most of them marginal both at the time and in subsequent 
historical and political analyses. However, as E.P. Thompson noted, it is 
often the case that ‘the blind alleys, the lost causes and the losers 
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themselves are forgotten’ (1991:12.)The overall methodology of this 
work, therefore, is to foreground those voices but also to ensure that 
sufficient detailed work has been undertaken in order to place them into 
their political, social and cultural contexts. 
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Chapter One 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
‘Everyone Forgets Ireland.’5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify the extent to which the 
experience of famine in Ireland, and particularly that of 1846 onwards, 
influenced political discourse on food self sufficiency. 
By virtue of the Act of Union of 1801 Ireland became the ‘responsibility’ 
of the Westminster Parliament and was in a free trade relationship with 
England. Woodham Smith (1962:16) commented that the primary object 
of Union was ‘not to assist and improve Ireland but to bring her more 
completely into subjection.’ The possible use of Ireland by Napoleon as 
a ‘back door’ into England and the supposed constant threat of rebellion 
served as the reasons why ‘Union’ was necessary. More 
opportunistically, given that there was ‘internal free trade and monetary 
integration between Ireland and Britain by 1826’ (Gray 1999:16) the 
Irish economy was open for development, with the assumption being 
that the Irish population would benefit. Between the Union and 1845 ‘no 
fewer than 114 Commissions and 61 Special Committees were 
instructed to report on the state of Ireland.’ (Woodham Smith 1962:36) 
Before the 1846 Famine the Poor Inquiry Committee had ‘stated that 
2,385,000 persons in Ireland were in a state of semi – starvation every 
year.’ (1962:62-63) 
                                               
5
 Pat Barker 
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Ireland in 1845 was both a Parliamentary responsibility and a country 
which had been much studied and discussed. The predominant position 
in Parliament was that England had managed to feed itself under the 
Corn Laws through enterprise and that Ireland was ‘empty’ and 
available for capitalist development.  
Discussions about possible and then actual famine took place in that 
context, and increasingly the ‘Irish question’ and the ‘Anti Corn Law’ 
debates became entwined. Before the famine, the state of Irish 
agriculture and, especially, the perceived need to reform land 
ownership were subject to highly politicised debates. As Prime Minister, 
Peel took the view that ‘peace and security for private investment were 
vital prerequisites of any real improvement’ (Gray 1999:55) but 
acknowledged that Irish landlords were largely either not up to the job, 
not interested or simply greedy. The establishment of the Devon 
Commission (1843 – 1845) was intended to enquire into the existing 
state of the law, property rights, and taxation and how to improve 
agricultural practice. It concluded6 that landlords should be ‘responsible’ 
and expressed the wish that ‘a ‘yeoman’ farmer – proprietor class would 
emerge.’ (Gray 1999:70) This view was at variance with the more 
radical proponents of change in England, who envisaged a more full 
scale capitalist agriculture imposed upon an ‘empty’ Ireland. The 
                                               
6
 The conclusions of the Devon Commission need to be seen alongside that of the 
Drummond Commission which produced a Report in 1840. It had been set up to 
inquire into ‘The Condition of the Agricultural Classes of Great Britain and Ireland. 
Volume 1 – The State of Ireland – appeared in 1842 published by John Murray in 
London and with a preface by Henry Drummond. 
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Economist7 ‘condemned landlord ‘monopolists’, but pointed to free trade 
in food rather than any state interference in tenurial relations as the sole 
panacea for the ills of the Irish and British masses.’ 
Whereas the Corn Law debate in England was conducted along the 
lines of ‘liberating’ manufacturing in order to bring about prosperity, for 
Ireland the possibilities of free trade were more concentrated upon 
agriculture, given the proximity of the English market.  
However, the barriers to a more Capitalist agriculture were perceived to 
be both the Aristocracy and the Irish people generally. Thus, emerged a 
division between those seeking to remove the landowners and impose 
‘English’ farming practice in the use of mixed farming and extensive 
pasture and those who saw change resulting from making existing 
landowners live up to their moral responsibilities to bring about 
improvement. What was common to both of those visions was that the 
State should not interfere with Irish agriculture. For Peel, ‘the role of the 
State was confined to removing obstacles to investment and educating 
the rural classes to recognize their own best interests.’ (Gray 1999:81-
82) The Times commented8 at a time when news of the famine was 
reaching England that the Irish were too dependent on their own soil but 
that ‘England, on the contrary, the laws of commerce operating fairly ... 
will preserve us from this horrible affliction.’ In what is an extremely 
important statement, The Times says of the Irish that they are  
                                               
7
 Issue of August 9
th
 1845. Referenced on p.75 of Gray 1999. 
8
 November 3
rd
. 1845 
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‘Breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature and 
consequently the laws of God.’  
This is perhaps the first, and certainly not the last, exposition of 
Providentialism about the famine and one which appropriated God’s 
approval on specific trading arrangements. ‘Ireland’ and the ‘Corn Laws’ 
became examples of the workings of providence in that both constituted 
artificial restrictions of commerce. 
Gray (1999:102) quoted an anonymous ‘dignitary of the English Church’ 
as warning that ‘the Corn Laws were impeding the providential destiny 
of the Empire’ and the famine attracted many such explanations. The 
Times9expanded upon the notion of providence by publishing an 
editorial which states that ‘For our part, we regard the potato blight as a 
blessing’ in that it will ‘assist’ the Irish to adopt a more varied diet and 
other ‘good’ habits. Gray (1999:331) saw English politicians as 
‘grasping the heaven – sent ‘opportunity’ of famine to deconstruct Irish 
society and rebuild it anew’ in the context of seeking to ‘impose a 
capitalist cultural revolution on the Irish.’10 
The effect of the mixing of Corn Law and Ireland in political discourse 
was to ensure that warnings and reports of famine were discredited as 
the manoeuvrings of political opponents. Peel sought to persuade his 
own Party of the gravity of the famine, but most of his own MP’s ‘chose 
                                               
9
 September 22
nd
. 1846 
10
 There is a very interesting parallel between the uses of the phrase ‘cultural 
revolution’ in this context (one which seeks to overthrow the aristocracy in favour of 
the bourgeoisie) with the launching of the Cultural Revolution in China through the 
Declaration of August 8
th
. 1966 which sought to purge the countryside of ‘bourgeois’ 
elements. 
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to believe the continuing claims of the Irish Tory Press that the crop 
failure had been exaggerated for political purposes and that Ireland 
faced no real danger.’ (Gray 1999:109) This line of argument was then 
carried over to discussions about the need to provide famine relief. Not 
only was the famine not as grave as portrayed, it was also the case that 
intervention was inappropriate, given that ‘help would shift resources 
from the more to the less deserving’ predicated on the belief that 
‘famine was nature’s response to Irish demographic irresponsibility.’ (Ó 
Gráda 1999:6) Although The Times is credited with having first informed 
the nation of the famine, it campaigned throughout against the 
rebelliousness, dishonesty and subterfuge of the Irish people. The 
Economist11 provided a summary, 
‘To convert a period of distress, arising from natural causes, into one of 
unusual comfort and ease, by the interference of government money, or 
of private charity, is to paralyze the efforts of the people themselves.’12 
Against a backdrop of hostility towards expenditure on Irish relief it is 
necessary to understand the operation of the Poor Law which is 
predicated upon the principle of local intervention. In Ireland, the Poor 
Relief (Ireland) Act replicated the provisions of the 1834 Act in England, 
thus throwing the responsibility back upon the very landowners 
denounced for not accepting their responsibilities as landlords in the 
first place. There is also a broader point, which is that the State on a 
national level did not have the responsibility for the health and welfare 
                                               
11
 January 16
th
. 1847 
12
 Ó Gráda  1999:77 
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of its citizens. It is interesting to note that this is a point which is re-
iterated by the 1905 Commission on Food Supplies in Time of War13 
and by the actions of the British Government from 1914 – 1916. It is 
only as a result of the mounting evidence of poor working class health 
and the re-armament strategy in the mid 1930’s that such a 
responsibility is deemed to be appropriate. 
In order that the Tory and Whig administrations of the famine period did 
not fall into the position of ‘last resort’ provider of relief, successive 
Prime Ministers argued that they did not have the requisite powers to 
intervene. This line is reinforced by the constant output of English 
newspapers which ‘conveyed an impression of the Irish poor as 
devious, violent, and ungrateful’ and of famine relief ‘as a bottomless 
black hole.’ (Ó Gráda 1999:83) Indeed, for much of the period England 
has the ‘excuse’ of a substantial financial crisis based upon the end of 
the Railway Boom, irresponsible lending and large scale bank failures.14 
The other obstacle to radical reform of agriculture was an assessment 
of the degree to which the populace might resist such changes. 
Parliament gave as much time to debates about imposing control on 
Ireland as it did to famine relief. Indeed, there were a number of 
debates which identified that capital would not be invested in Ireland 
owing to the climate of ‘uncertainty’. The resistance of Irish people to 
clearances and their concomitant demands for land reform resulted in 
                                               
13
 Chapter 3 and Appendix 1 
14
 Accompanied by Bank of England inactivity, ended by the 1840’s version of 
quantitative easing – the printing of bank notes in a secret and not strictly legal 
manner in order to reflate the economy. 
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the passing of Coercion legislation15 and the continuing campaign of 
The Times to demand armed protection for landowners. 
However, the position of landowners was ambiguous in that whilst the 
‘reforming’ examples were praised in Parliament it was not clear 
whether compulsion should be employed for those who were either not 
interested or too heavily indebted to invest. The deployment of the 
moral argument that they should reform raised the question of what 
should happen if they did not.  
It is not until the Second World War that the State has confidence that it 
was appropriate to intervene in private property rights on a large scale. 
In 1845 – 1850, the newly emergent Free Traders and traditional 
Landowners are both clear (although for different reasons) that the 
State should not either remove land from rightful owners or undertake 
work on that land from the public purse.16 The contradiction lies in the 
fact that in order to attract capital investment then a trade in land must 
take place in order to produce a new generation of farmers. Gray 
(1999:197) noted that reformers ‘saw a connection between free trade 
in food and the liberation of the land market.’ In opposition to that, the 
Earl of Glengall in the Parliamentary Debate on Encumbered Estates17 
spoke of ‘confiscation of property’ and ‘a principle of communism and 
socialism of the deepest degree.’(c.1351) 
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 Under different guises and titles, one of a series of such Acts. 
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 At the same time, noting the important contribution of the Public Works schemes. 
17
 HC Deb June 11
th
. 1849 Vol. 105 cc 1336 - 1367 
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Critically, this debate impinged upon detailed questions of famine relief 
in that ‘it was held that the reason why dealers and import merchants 
had so signally failed to replace the potato last season had been the 
Government’s purchases.’ (Woodham Smith 1962:106) If traders were 
to be undermined by the Government, then they would not become 
involved in importing food supplies into Ireland18. In the critical Debate 
on Famine Relief19 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Wood had 
defended the Government on the grounds that then there had been 
Protection but now that Trade was free then now it would not be 
replicated. Mr. Browne MP commented that ‘it would be dangerous to 
make the people of any country dependent upon anything other than 
their own exertions.’ (c.780) and that it was necessary to avoid any 
action which would ‘depress them from a condition of honourable 
freedom20 and self reliance.’(c.780) 
The Debate also considered arguments that people starving would be 
disadvantaged by Government intervention in that market prices would 
increase and supply decline ‘because legitimate speculation was 
checked by the interposition of Government.’ (c.780) In the same 
Debate, Mr. Labouchere MP commented that now free trade has 
arrived then ‘nothing can be more fatal to the interests of the country 
than that the Government should undertake the business of the 
                                               
18 The Government had, through the services of Baring Brothers, secretly purchased 
‘Indian Corn’ for famine relief the previous year. It had chosen that product and that 
method in order to cause the least disruption in the market. 
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 ‘Distress in Ireland – Measures of Relief’ HC Deb August 17
th
.1846 Vol. 88 cc 766 – 
799. 
20
 My emphasis. I cannot think of any appropriate comment other than to highlight the 
words. 
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merchant’ (c.782) and emphasised his point by referring to ‘the evil 
consequences by Government either with the import trade or with the 
markets of the country.’ (c.783.) 
In a later Debate21 the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke of his 
conviction that ‘the free trade principle had contributed very largely to 
the preservation of life in that country by cheapening the food that was 
imported’ (c.983) 
Some MP’s continued to argue against free trade and to assert that 
both England and Ireland would benefit from protection: Charles 
Villiers22 pictured that ‘Ireland has been laid – a – side of England, for 
the purpose of feeding her – the finest agricultural country in Europe, 
united to the largest manufacturing and wealthiest commercial 
community in the World’ (c.104) but such a portrayal was distinctly out 
of favour. 
 
The relevance of the Irish Famine to this work is firstly to note that 
whilst a million or more people died in a country ruled by the English 
Parliament the majority of the political debate focussed upon the 
providential nature of that famine and the requirement that Government 
expenditure and intervention be strictly limited. Gray (1999:332) noted 
that, as the Famine got worse, ‘identifying and eradicating ‘abuse’ 
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 HC Deb January 31
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acquired a higher priority than saving lives.’ This was reinforced by a 
concerted campaign by the then influential Times newspaper. 
The Free Trade ambition for Irish agricultural reform greatly exceeded 
that of England because Ireland could be regarded as ‘empty’ given the 
evident neglect of owners of Irish land, and their lack of moral and 
political force. There was also a sense of confidence that reforms could 
be imposed through the deployment of physical force allied to assisted 
emigration. Large scale evictions and comprehensive land clearance 
took place on a large scale from 1847 onwards.  
Until the changes in land ownership after the First World War, 
landowners in England had sufficient political power to defeat or water 
down significant land reform, therefore the Irish famine afforded an 
‘opportunity’ for wholesale reform of agriculture under free trade. The 
political discourse in England from 1880 onwards took place in the 
context of how to avert agricultural decline, not the amelioration of 
starvation. The debate was therefore less concentrated, less urgent and 
more open to discussions about Free Trade, Protectionism, Empire and 
land reform. Many of those in Parliament or associated with the Times 
and the Economist saw the Famine as an opportunity to both argue for 
Corn Law reform and provide an immediate example of the benefits. 
J.S. Mill offered a more nuanced approach in that whilst he accepted 
that ‘property in the soil has a sort of magic power of engendering 
industry, perseverance and forethought’ (Gray 1999:157) he opposed 
wholesale clearances and concentration of land ownership in favour of 
11 
 
the development of a class of yeomen23 who would have a measure of 
security unknown in Irish agriculture.24 
The essential point to grasp is that within the political discourse in 
England there was little sense of the humanity of the Irish people and 
the extent of the suffering. Where it was accepted that people were 
suffering, contributions from both Government and Private sources 
were discouraged on the grounds that it would undermine local 
responsibilities. The Duke of Argyll in a Parliamentary Debate on the 
later Orissa Famine25 spoke of the necessity of Government not to 
‘supersede local efforts and local charity’ (c.1068) but also added that 
‘the value of human life is a thing comparatively unknown in the East – 
it is the product of Christian civilization.’ (c.1069.) It is interesting to 
evaluate that remark in the context of English political discourse at the 
time of the Famine. 
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 Morning Chronicle October 14
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 Woodham Smith 1962:24 ‘In Ireland alone, the whole agricultural population can be 
evicted by the mere will of the landlord.’ 
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 HL Deb April 24
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of the ‘Mother Country’ despite the contribution of Indian volunteers to the British 
Army. 
12 
 
 Chapter Two 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Radical and Socialist Perspectives on Agriculture 1880-1900  
‘Since we left the land in the hope that the factories would feed us 
better, why not go back to the land if the factories fail to feed us at 
all?’26  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This chapter seeks to identify and evaluate a number of Radical and 
Socialist perspectives in the 1880’s and 1890’s which although arising 
out of the specific conditions of the time continued to be a significant 
part of political discourse on the Left and were heavily borrowed by 
many on the Right. 
In his Report on Guild Socialism in 1920 G.D.H Cole commented that 
‘socialists applying themselves to rural problems have usually breathed 
in the manner of fish out of water.’ (Cole 1980:60) 
Whilst he acknowledged the contribution of a number of thinkers to the 
development of Socialist perspectives, specifically O’Connor, Owen, 
Blatchford and Kropotkin, he concluded that such influences have still 
left Socialist or Labour Parties generally ‘without a clear, practical and 
constructive policy capable of being applied to agricultural production.’ 
(Cole 1980:60)  
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The Land Question 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The consideration of agricultural matters in the late 1870’s was shaped 
by the understanding that British farming could not withstand foreign 
competition. Even if later agricultural historians cast doubt upon 
whether the period leading up to the Boer War constituted a 
‘depression’ it seemed at the time as if agriculture was in such decline 
that it might just disappear in favour of imports. In many European 
countries tariffs were the only answer to afford protection to agriculture, 
the hope being that ‘they would render the nation self sufficing, and to 
that extent invulnerable to foreign attack.’ (Hayes n/d: 205) 
A number of possible explanations for agricultural decline were 
explored and on the basis of such analyses, solutions put forward. 
Martin Crick, charting the rise of the Social Democratic Federation 
(SDF), noted the diversity of land related reformers developing out of 
the Radical tradition. The Land Question was primarily considered from 
the perspective that the decline in agricultural output arose from the 
neglect and / or greed of landlords. Crick (1994:19) noted  ‘a long 
standing Radical tradition (which) held that the land was capable of 
supporting all and that the masses of urban unemployed were, in effect, 
labourers turned off the land by grasping landlords.’ Even amongst 
Radical thinkers there was no consensus as what the main failings of 
landlords might be; certainly neglectful, but also irresponsible or 
grasping or being content to settle for the status of being a landowner 
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without accepting attendant responsibilities. Certainly, Britain did differ 
significantly from the rest of Europe in that ‘only 12 per cent of the land 
was owned by its farmers and 88 per cent of the holdings were farmed 
by tenants.’ (Offer 1989:107) The landowners in turn took a significant 
percentage (44%) of the output produced by their tenants.27 
 A later (1907) Fabian pamphlet placed the blame on landlords who 
‘escaped public burdens.’ (Carpenter et al. 1907:67) and failed to 
exercise leadership expected by their status.  
The figure of Henry George, the author of Progress and Poverty in 
1881, emerged as one who attempted to move away from locating the 
precise nature of the blame to the adoption of a workable policy 
proposal. The ‘single tax’28 was presented as a solution which would fit 
all the possible manifestations of neglect, and result in increased 
farming output. Crick (1994:19) characterised the approach of George 
as being built on ‘ideas of natural rights, Ricardo’s and Mill’s theories of 
rent, and the schemes of Thomas Spence29.’  The single tax proposal 
came largely from Spence who advocated common ownership of land 
not by the State but by self contained parishes run on a democratic 
basis.  He envisaged such a tax as constituting virtually the only tax 
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Economic Progress.1952 and C.H. Feinstein National Income, Expenditure and 
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 Henry George based the proposal on Thomas Spence (below) but also Adam 
Smith. In brief, the value that land had was due to the work carried out on it by the 
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 Thomas Spence (1750-1814) Radical and land reformer who was an advocate not 
of the nationalisation of land but of self governing self contained parishes. Initiator of 
the ‘single tax’ proposal, he was imprisoned for both treason and sedition. His work 
was publicised in the 1880’s by Hyndman, who changed the emphasis of his work to 
suit ‘modern’ conditions. 
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levied in a future in which ‘free trade and manufacture, a flourishing 
agriculture, and completed democracy would unite the nation to a high 
moral level.’  (Beer 1920:2) 
The predicted impact of the single tax proposal was to open up a way 
forward in which every landlord had a clear incentive to actively 
promote the growing of food on their land30. In a series of articles in 
1877 Annie Besant had put forward the proposition that land owners did 
not have the right to not cultivate and the State must intervene ‘as the 
trustee of the nation.’ (Besant 1970:5) Having so intervened, the State 
must then act in order to feed British people adequately from within our 
own resources whenever possible. 
The notion of a ‘self sufficient’ Britain emerged in the light of both a 
substantial increase in imports and the linked evidence of uncultivated 
land. This notion was coupled with the asserted existence of a ‘golden 
age’ of landownership and social responsibility. The exact time period of 
the golden age would vary according to the prejudices of the argument 
but what was clear was that it contained those elements which had 
made Britain a uniquely great country. For Annie Besant the features 
were ‘a large number of peasant proprietors (who) are the safeguard of 
a State’ coupled with ‘a steadiness, a dignity, an independence, about 
the men who cultivate their own little farms that no other employment 
seems to give.’ (Besant 1970:8) It must follow that if one re-created this 
class of peasant proprietors they would fulfil their role of working 
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 Note a contemporary debate on the question of a ‘Land Tax’ which would 
incentivize landlords to ensure that houses were occupied. 
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tirelessly for the public good accepting little in return except a pleasant 
but restricted life. Whilst the main benefit would be enhanced cultivation 
such a move would also ‘offer a reliable guarantee of steady 
progression without hasty revolution.’  (Besant1877:8) 
For both Besant and George, and many other Radical thinkers and 
advocates of Land Reform, what is being asserted is that the land is in 
some way different from or / outside of the rest of society. To produce 
as much food as possible can be achieved by the simple starting point 
of exempting agriculture from the general commercial functioning of 
society. In any consideration of food self sufficiency in Britain this 
argument is always present, but there is little development of how this 
could be achieved. For Radical and early Socialist thinkers of the 
1870’s and 1880’s this thinking hinged on understanding that land was 
either natural, so that people being on the land were asserting a ‘natural 
right’, or the view that ‘no man made the earth’ commonly attributing 
such a statement to J.S. Mill31. 
But those very advocates for maximum use of the land would assert the 
right of people to be on the land without then paying any attention to the 
practicalities of what should be grown and for what reasons. It seemed 
sufficient for people to ‘be on the land’ but not to consider whether their 
produce should be equally exempt from commercial considerations.  
Generally, common ownership was seen as a solution in its own right. 
Once it had been obtained, then the failures of landlords and of a 
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Government wedded to free trade would be exposed. Higher production 
would follow and, having escaped the burden of the landlords, it would 
be at a competitive price. This being an obvious outcome, little detailed 
agricultural work was carried out by most reformers. Henry George 
succeeded in presenting his arguments to the public; Progress and 
Poverty sold incredibly well, and even those who did not share his 
analysis acknowledged his important contribution. E. P. Thompson 
noted the books’ ‘mixture of libertarian and Christian rhetoric with 
chapters of closely argued political economy.’ (Thompson 1996:291) 
Marx read the work and wrote that it ‘is significant because it is a first, if 
unsuccessful, attempt at emancipation from the orthodox political 
economy.’(Thompson 1996:29132 ) 
George tried to argue that his proposal of a single tax would not just be 
additional taxation but enable reductions in other taxes with the 
proceeds from the land shared amongst the population, rather than just 
going to the landlord. This was designed to appeal to Governments 
which feared that any intervention in agriculture would entail either 
higher taxes or dearer food. Annie Besant incorporated another 
approach into her essays and lectures, which was that the decline in 
agricultural output produced not just ‘rural issues’ but the emigration of 
rural labourers deprived the country of its’ best stock and resulted in 
burdening ‘the State with weaker and more helpless citizens.’ (Besant 
1877:3) 
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 Industrial productivity would decline as a result of this physical 
deterioration and the social consequences might become as serious as 
to lead to the eventual decline of Britain itself. The physical act of 
farming, of being in contact with the earth in a ‘natural’ way was, it was 
argued, the way of life of many other nations who were healthier as a 
result. Asserting that neglect of agriculture is a precursor of the decline 
of the race, as George and Besant did, is also linked in with the 
responsibility of the British to the rest of the Empire. If the ‘mother 
country’ is unhealthy then imperial decline will follow. This argument 
was not fully developed until the 1930’s when the superior physical 
attributes of the people of Germany and the Nordic countries were 
contrasted with the lack of care taken with ‘white’ stock both in Britain 
and in the Empire. Land Nationalisation written by A.R.Wallace in 1882 
linked the questions of physical and moral decline in Britain and 
asserted that land monopoly and increasing competitive behaviour 
would result in both, unless Capitalism was tackled in order to change 
current priorities. 
 John Galsworthy in his pamphlet ‘The Land’ argued that the profound 
weakness in Britain was failing to produce our own food, to the degree 
that ‘we have become more parasitic than any other nation’ and ‘the 
blood in our veins is sucked from foreign bodies.’33 He also complained 
of the decline in English stock; having drawn upon a sample of 1650 
town dwellers to ascertain how ‘ugly he adjudged people to be’ 
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compared with either Australian soldiers or country people. He 
commented upon the ‘squashed in, stunted, disproportionate, 
commonized look of the bulk of our people.’34 His proposal for national 
security through home food production emphasised this ‘decline in the 
stock’ argument. 
To sum up the main non – Socialist arguments before 1883 it was clear 
that the State was urged to intervene on a number of grounds – it was 
in the self interest of the State itself, maintenance of the Empire, it 
produced a healthier population, less revolutionary tendencies and was 
‘morally’ appropriate. At the heart of all Land Question positions, and 
there were a wide variety of them, agriculture had to be considered 
‘different.’ If not, in the words of Annie Besant, Britain would consist of 
‘Barren lands; Scanty food supply; Idle arms.’ (Besant 1880:6) 
 
Agriculture as a Success? 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proponents of reform considered that such arguments were just too 
fundamental to be ignored, too illustrative and too accurate a 
summation of Britain to be brushed aside. The weakness was that they 
failed to show any appreciation of just how successful British agriculture 
had been up to that point. For the first thirty years after the Repeal of 
the Corn Laws, British agriculture had adjusted to the new 
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circumstances and had fed a rapidly expanding population in the towns 
and cities.  
‘The limitless expansion of the urban and industrial sectors’ demand for 
food’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 196) had been met by the same landlords now 
deemed to be idle. Agricultural productivity had increased and a greater 
variety of food stuffs had been introduced into the British diet. Despite 
that, wheat imports increased substantially after the abolition of the 
Corn Laws35 
Some explanations rejected the increase in imports as problematic 
either for Britain as a whole or for British farming. They started from the 
position that whilst Britain was undercut on price, the imported wheat 
tended to be from countries whose agricultural productivity was quite 
low and whose use of land was based on poor long term practice. 
British farmers claimed higher quality, higher yields and better farming 
practices.  
Even the amount taken from the tenant’s output by the ‘grasping’ 
landlord was seen to be generally beneficial in that the farmer did not 
have to worry about the purchase of land and was able to concentrate 
fully on farming. ‘High cash rents induced good practice and gave rise 
to the best agriculture in the world, or at least the highest yields.’ (Offer 
1989:107) and this contributed to British agriculture, under free trade, 
being dynamic and innovative at least until the end of the de facto 
monopoly. In the period since the Abolition of the Corn Laws, capital 
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investment had increased substantially, the railways offered an effective 
but pricy means of distribution and Victorian ingenuity brought about 
higher yields per acre. Although true that labourers had left the land, 
those remaining on it saw modest increases in wages because 
landowners had to take note of what might be earned in the towns and 
cities, as well as the distinct possibility of skilled workers emigrating.  All 
the above factors contributed to a feeling in the farming community that 
whilst imports were clearly rising and they were losing market share, 
they were doing little wrong. 
For proponents of Free Trade, those positive predictions for British 
agriculture argued for in the debates about the Corn Laws in the 1840’s 
had come about. In the work of the National Anti Corn Law League36 it 
is important to look back upon the advantages that were foreseen for 
free trade when British agriculture was protected by tariffs. One 
particular work published by the Anti Corn Law League in 1842 
captured well the expectations that many had for the reform. 
In his prize winning essay, George Hope wrote that the role of farming 
was to promote ‘the welfare of the largest possible number of 
consumers’ but that it would not be achieved by foreign imports 
because there is no other country in the world ‘where labourers bring 
the same spirit, activity, and intelligence to their work such as they do in 
Britain.’ This is an acknowledgement that competition might damage the 
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ability for Britain to remain self sufficient but such a potential problem 
will be overcome by virtue of the exceptional British character. Hope 
then added an interesting rider which is that if manufacturing and 
commerce is ruined by protectionism, then farming will not escape 
anyway. The prosperity of British farming should be considered 
secondary to other commercial interests and ‘free and unrestricted 
commerce is the only means that can give Britain a chance to continue 
to progress; without it we must even go back.’ Even in the words of a 
tenant farmer in 1842 we have the summary of the argument which is 
that “competition is good for Britain, it might result in decline for British 
agriculture, but working people have to be fed as cheaply as possible 
and, anyway, it will bring about peace.” 
Whereas the above statement appeared a clear and unequivocal 
appeal for free trade from the vantage point of a tenant farmer in 1842 it 
also served to explain much of the drift of Labour party policy 
throughout most of the twentieth century, recalling the ‘fish out of water’ 
remark of G.D.H. Cole. The Labour Party did little to move away from 
an insistence of the ‘right’ of working people to benefit from ‘cheap food’ 
under the efficiencies of Capitalism. Indeed, it is worth noting how the 
essayist linked ‘trade’ and ‘peace’ in an association not generally 
challenged until the 1930’s. 
The other important element which was in the literature of the Anti Corn 
Law League was that of ‘the selfish landlord’ under protectionism. W.R. 
Grey argued that since the end of the French Wars every factor had 
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been in the favour of the farmer and the landowner – more customers 
with more money, less taxes, more legal protection – but with all those 
advantages the result has still been agricultural depression. This voice 
from one of eras which might constitute the ‘golden age’ of British food 
self sufficiency identified the self interest of the producer as the cause 
of British ills, on the grounds that they failed to deliver either price 
stability or lower costs. Instead, as Morse emphasised in the third of the 
essays, the landlords had made large profits and passed as much of 
the burden as they could on to the tenant farmer. 
 Grey concluded that ‘like all consumers the agricultural labourer has a 
paramount interest in cheap food’ in an interesting assertion of the 
primacy of consumer rights over any other interest. 
These three prize winning essays concentrated on the importance of 
the consumer and the need to secure all goods as cheaply as possible.  
The large scale farmers in the South East of England may have felt they 
had little reason to change from traditional outputs, but others were 
adjusting to new conditions in the 1880’s as they ‘profited from growing 
domestic demand and better prices,’ (Pugh: 1994:7) by growing fresh 
produce which was not undercut by competition from the United States, 
Canada and Argentina. This was led by the small farmers who, 
although often derided for their conservatism, had to rely on farming for 
their living and were more responsive to market needs. 
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However, the tide of imports after 1870 reached the point that even 
knowing the market or switching from arable to pasture was not 
sufficient to continue working the land for many landowners. The 
development of refrigeration and canning left Britain only specialising in 
‘high end’ meat and whilst sugar consumption – to give but one 
example - was 80lbs per head per annum by 1900, little of it was home 
grown. The market which might have been one for domestic agriculture 
–the urban poor – remained undeveloped owing to continuing poverty. 
Working people did not benefit greatly from the availability of local fresh 
food and tended to have to purchase cheaper cuts or canned meat from 
abroad. Those foods which were imported were those which constituted 
a significant percentage of the working class diet.37 
  
When Radical and Land Reform arguments did not seek to question the 
primacy of the consumer (i.e. the market) they ran the risk of the 
criticism that any proposed intervention would raise prices or would be 
unsustainable in the long term because the market would not permit 
‘artificial’ manipulation. In fact, and it was never fully articulated, they 
were arguing for growing more food or striving towards self sufficiency 
for other reasons; predominantly non – economic ones. What is critical, 
therefore, is the degree to which the emerging Socialist organisations 
utilised radical arguments or found new approaches to the question of 
food production. 
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Socialist Perspectives? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Many Radical proponents of land reform subscribed to views which 
incorporated the moral superiority of working on the land as opposed to 
the privations of working in factories and living in cities. This assumption 
was shared, either in their personal lives or in policy formulation, by a 
number of influential individuals in the early Socialist movement.  Those 
who saw Socialism as an expression of compassion, of whom William 
Morris might be the best example, brought with them clear perspectives 
on city living. The rather dogmatic of view of Morris espoused by Engels 
- ‘a very rich artist-enthusiast but untalented politician’ (Lindsay 
1985:27338) came to be shared by many in the Socialist movement.39  
Until he became irritated with the Anarchist manoeuvrings in the 
Socialist League which he had been instrumental in setting up in 1884, 
Morris was prepared to encourage perspectives with which he did not 
fully agree. His overall philosophy focussed upon the question of 
balance in society and his vision of the future was that of ‘a society 
which has reached a position of equilibrium’ (Lindsay 1985:35) in 
contrast to the current state of insecurity. Equilibrium might be achieved 
in a number of ways but above all depended on building a society from 
the bottom, from the smallest possible unit of production; one based on 
the production and distribution of food. Anything that was produced to 
meet ‘artificial’ needs led to a society which was out of control, with the 
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resultant ‘horrible burden of unnecessary production.’(Redmond 
1992:79) Morris was able to amalgamate such a vision with the Marxist 
interpretation of the ‘final’ classless society after a transitional Socialist 
phase, by arguing that this vision has the ‘most exact precedent in the 
myth of the golden age.’ (Morris 1992: xxv)40 
The focus on what was ‘missing’ in contemporary Britain was an 
influential strand in demands for Land Reform; it was not just the lack of 
access to land which had to be addressed but the re-population of the 
countryside. Land Reform was a transitional demand, once it had 
started then more people would want to follow. The very proliferation of 
so many groups demanding land reform, communal ownership or 
nationalisation showed the degree to which the ‘empty space’ was open 
to different interpretations. These hopes took little account of why 
working people had left the countryside in the first place, but it was 
asserted that this time they would be there as owners or yeomen. For 
some, the magic of private property would be transformative and would 
not just attract farmers but artisans, small workshops, new industries. In 
the Socialist perspective, people would be productive because they 
were growing food on behalf of the people, which alone would lead to 
greater satisfaction. In return, the State would offer better housing, 
schools etc. to further improve the quality of their lives and the 
attractiveness of rural life. 
 
                                               
40
 Introduction by Redmond J. Editor of the 1992 edition. 
27 
 
Such examples of successful country life might even offer a challenge 
to the factory system itself. Robert Blatchford, who offered a very broad 
interpretation of Socialism, framed this debate in works such as Merrie 
England (1893) and Britain for the British (1902) by advocating the 
abandonment of the current basis of commerce by imposing an upper 
limit on industrial production. Both works sold incredibly well [some 
reports suggest that Merrie England sold over a million copies] and 
along with The Clarion popularised the view that both being in the 
countryside and earning a living from it were both the most positive 
expressions of Englishness. 
 As a result, a new balance would come into play in which given that we 
(Britain) did not need to sell manufactured goods overseas then neither 
did we need to import food. Therefore, Britain became self – sufficient 
in all important aspects by virtue of only serving the home market.   
It was the work of Peter Kropotkin, particularly Fields, Factories and 
Workshops, which influenced Blatchford to be confident that not only 
was self sufficiency possible, it was workable. Kropotkin convinced him 
that ‘there is no natural obstacle to our production in this country of all 
the food our people need.’ (Blatchford 1902:114)  
Kropotkin stressed this point in a pamphlet published in 1896 entitled 
‘Agriculture’41 in which he argued that that there was sufficient 
knowledge within the agricultural community to produce far more food. 
The principal factor which stopped that happening was the ownership of 
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the soil by a combination of landowners and financial interests. The 
latter, because of their attachment to profit, did not understand 
agriculture and thus promoted large scale and intensive farming ‘which 
takes the soil from nature without seeking to improve it.’ (1896:7.) What 
might have been profitable in the short term offered no long term future 
for agriculture. 
Market gardeners and smallholders showed how it could be done, as 
they understood how soil can be ‘made’ using natural processes and 
how extensive use of greenhouses can increase production utilising 
surplus energy from industry. The ILP endorsed the ‘small scale’ 
approach, being active in demanding smallholding and allotment reform 
as well as seeking to promote market gardening both as a way of 
increasing domestic food production and to improve the working class 
diet. The ILP pamphlet ‘Socialism for the North’42 argued for public 
ownership in order to make more fresh food available to the urban poor 
and ‘Municipal Socialism’43 declared that ‘no nation has flourished that 
has allowed its agriculture to decay.’ The proposed solution – farming 
by municipal socialism – was based on utilising sewage waste as a 
resource and challenged the capitalist neglect of farming generally. The 
author optimistically declared that so efficient would this method be that 
‘the competition of the Municipality would speedily extinguish all its 
rivals.’ (p.10.)  This belief in the power of the State, either nationally or 
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locally, was challenged by others. J.L. Green44, writing in 1896, 
accepted the initial analysis of capitalist farming and was convinced by 
small scale solutions, but felt that municipal or any other State 
intervention would bring in unskilled operatives who would fail. He 
advocated an extension of the provisions of the 1892 Smallholdings Act 
in order to promote farming in rural areas utilising urban waste. To 
make a living from farming a high level of individual skill was required, 
enhanced by collective organisation. He concluded that ‘by all means 
let us help men on the land, but let the men be men who understand the 
land.’ (Green 1896:115) 
These approaches did not rely upon rural nostalgia; they were positions 
(despite disagreements on the role of the State) which utilised the 
application of modern farming methods. The additional tool of scientific 
farming, the bringing together of idle land and idle workers would 
produce a level of productivity which could match American or French 
levels45. Land reform, in this context, sought to build upon the notion of 
the idle, non – investing landlord to show how wealth can be created to 
benefit the whole population. The unemployed will become wealth 
producers ‘and no longer starvelings or paupers.’  
Rural Socialism and love of the countryside were presented as being 
equals and as Gould (1988:37) noted ‘it was a Socialism ... in which 
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material betterment of the working class had a subordinate place, 
ultimately, to the quality of life available.’ 
 The limiting of industrial output to what was needed for use in this 
country would be a way to end the ruin of Britain both environmentally 
and morally. It would also be an attack on what a Clarion pamphlet of 
1898 46 called ‘monopolist obstruction’ which led to people not being fed 
properly. It was not agriculture which was the real victim, but the diets 
and health of working people. Landowners demonstrated their power by 
taking action ‘to prevent the workers from producing ten times more 
food’ and by encouraging the development of useless occupations 
when we need more ‘producers of necessaries – more and better 
market-gardeners, fruit-growers, foresters, general farmers, wool-
workers, builders, and useful workers generally.’ (Both p.3) 
The Clarion was clear that higher British food production would follow if 
there was common ownership. The restrictions were not from nature, 
but from the inefficiencies of commercial production. The pamphlet 
concluded that  
‘by laying waste to our own land, and throwing ourselves upon the 
mercy of the foreign food producers for our supply of eatables, paying 
them for food with artificial manufactures, we have been truly buying in 
the dearest market and selling in the cheapest.’ (p.11) 
                                               
46
 Hall L. Land, Labour and Liberty; or the A B C of Reform. Clarion: London 1898 
31 
 
The Clarion consistently argued that Britain could produce more food 
simply by looking after the soil better and favoured ‘organic’ production. 
A pamphlet of 1896 by W. Sowerby47 argued for intensive work on soil 
and subsoil improvement using human and other waste from the towns 
and cities. In the same year W. Jameson48 argued that the myth of 
needing food from abroad had been spread by The Manchester 
School49 to the degree that most British people ‘believed that even the 
present population could not be fed without foreign supplies.’ (p.2) For 
both of these writers, public ownership would ensure both higher 
production and better stewardship of the land. 
Resources currently deployed in industry could be moved to agriculture 
in order to improve communal health and wellbeing. The title ‘Britain for 
the British’ ascribed to Blatchford’s collection of Clarion articles 
published in 1902 summed up his patriotic perspective. Not a pride in 
Britain as the ‘workshop of the world, but the building of a country which 
is wholly independent and secure.’ British agriculture, if left alone in its 
current state will perpetuate ‘the evil of our dependence upon foreign 
countries for our food.’ (Blatchford 1902:98) Without drastic intervention 
to save British agriculture Blatchford argued that the ‘commercial 
system’ will only intensify the factory system to the degree that future 
conflict for the resources of the world will result. It is the pursuit of the 
                                               
47
 Clarion pamphlet Number 12. ‘The Agricultural Deadlock and how to overcome it by 
rational means.’ 1896. 
48
 Clarion pamphlet ‘the coming fight with famine: Can Britain feed herself?’ 
49
 The Manchester School was a phrase attributed to Disraeli to those committed to 
free trade from the mid 1830’s. Generally taken to include Cobden and Bright amongst 
others and suggesting a higher moral purpose than mere accumulation of wealth. 
Used in Marxist writing generally as a term of abuse. 
32 
 
goals of ‘commercialism’50 which is the reason why ‘we have sacrificed 
our agriculture and endangered the safety of our empire.’  (Blatchford 
1902:102) 
Blatchford identified the broader justification for his approach; ‘since we 
left the land in the hope that the factories would feed us better, why not 
go back to the land if the factories fail to feed us at all?’ (Blatchford: 
1902:104) This key element of The Clarion manifesto brought together 
moral and environmental bases and the ending of working class poverty 
and national vulnerability.  
 
Blatchford gave full backing to the campaign of S.L. Murray for a Royal 
Commission to examine ‘Our Food Supply in Time of War’ because, he 
argued, it must inevitably reach the same conclusion on all grounds he 
had identified. This rather ignored the fact that Murray was largely 
motivated by fear of how the working class might react and the degree 
to which ‘they would use hunger as a weapon.’(Offer 1985:213)51   
Blatchford expressed great faith that the interests of the nation and the 
empire were so obviously best met by looking after agriculture that, 
were there to be an inquiry, such an interest would override any other 
consideration.  
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In opposition to this sensible move he identified a ‘few landlords, coal 
owners, and money-lenders (who) wax fat upon the vitals of the 
nation.’(Blatchford 1902:118.) The article ‘Can Britain Feed Herself?’ 
concluded that the opponents of self sufficiency offered only a false, 
self-interested patriotism to set against the real interests of the nation. 
The arguments put forward by Blatchford rested upon the bringing 
together of the needs of the people for a simple productive life with a 
demand that ‘the State’ assert the national interest. This type of 
nationalism rested upon the assumption that the people of the country 
are let down by the pursuit of selfish aims by industrialists and 
financiers.  
Three main difficulties arose with this emphasis upon the plea for state 
intervention, the principal one being that it assumed the existence of 
such a body which either had the will or the means to act in such a way. 
Secondly, and of equal importance, was the fact that Blatchford, 
although armed with the informed scientific work of Kropotkin, took little 
account of other analyses. Specifically, with his assumption that a Royal 
Commission would inevitably conclude that British agriculture needed 
saving, he ignored the findings of Commissions held to consider 
successive agricultural depressions in 1879 and 189352. Both had 
concluded that little could be done to improve matters - with poor 
seasons being partly to blame.  
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Blatchford had also, along with many other thinkers, been taken with 
the ‘empty space’ imagery of the countryside and had seen his proposal 
as being a logical way of filling it. The Clarion and others sought to 
increase access for health and recreational purposes and to revive rural 
crafts and countryside skills, whilst at the same time envisaging the land 
being intensively farmed. How could these two visions of the ‘empty 
space’ be reconciled? 
 Thirdly, Blatchford exhibited no critique of Capitalism beyond its impact 
in bringing about environmental damage and moral decline. Engels 
looked from a distance at many of these assumptions of ‘England being 
different’ with a wary eye and growing frustration. 
Back to Nature Analyses and Plans 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Whilst it is acknowledged that Blatchford and The Clarion greatly 
contributed to the development of Socialism, most of the content 
actually celebrated a potential world of spiritual improvement, the 
natural world and outdoor healthiness. That anyone should promote 
such possibilities in the context of industrial processes, domestic 
poverty and an unhealthy living space is entirely understandable but 
this was often ‘mingled with patriotic sentiment and a romanticised view 
of the past.’ (Gould 1988:38) Although Kropotkin and his evidence was 
often deployed to show that such schemes were practical, Blatchford 
overlooked the intensive nature of the agriculture he proposed and the 
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degree to which it should be concentrated very close to town and city 
centres. Kropotkin was no sentimentalist in this matter and his work 
showed that self sufficiency required single minded endeavour; farming 
being effectively an industrial operation which substituted the soil for a 
factory. 
Whether this scale of farming equated to creative work carried out in 
beautiful surroundings and with the full dignity of manual labour which 
Blatchford and William Morris envisaged is not clear. But, many 
individuals felt that they had at least to try, given their analyses of a 
morally bankrupt, despoiling country quite possibly in terminal decline.  
However, it was not necessarily the case that individuals looking to 
settle on the land were proposing alternative forms of societal 
organisation. What many required from the countryside was ‘sincere 
and simple living, direct contact with nature’ leading to the ‘necessary 
condition of honesty, directness, simplicity, and trustfulness, 
transparency of life and cleanliness of thought found among fishermen 
of coast, toilers in field, labourers in quarries.’ (Gould 1988:20)53  Whilst 
an undoubtedly impressive list, it contained nothing about working 
together in communities or what ‘outputs’ might emanate from the 
honest work.  
Edward Carpenter, in works such as Towards Democracy, shared many 
of the above sentiments and concentrated not just on the physical 
labour, but also emphasised the importance of the act of growing and 
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selling food. It was the experience of growing food in the local 
community that led directly to the visions of a future more local, closer 
to nature and based on collective work. From 1883 Carpenter offered a 
future based on co-operative work stressing the importance of ‘personal 
actions and ideals’ (Tsuzuki 1980:55) rather than schemes which ‘had 
been proposed mainly for the institutional regeneration of society.’ As 
the disputes continued in the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the 
reaction of Carpenter was to emphasise even more the importance of 
the personal in political settings.  
Whilst he subscribed to the need to overthrow capitalism his preferred 
solution was based on individual moral change - ‘the new ideal of 
dignity of man and labour was something that would transcend and 
even surpass even Socialist laws and institutions ’ -(Tsuzuki 1980:59) 
rather than spending time on theoretical positions. In many respects this 
wish represented a kind of rugged individualism more associated with 
conservative perspectives; the ‘co-operative aspect’ being rather 
underdeveloped. It looked forward to a society which has been 
transformed through small scale individual and collective example.  
This had some links with the movements in the 1880’s and 1890’s to 
increase smallholdings and allotments because there was an emphasis 
upon self sufficiency, contact with nature and allowing working people a 
creative outlet.  
Those who visited Carpenter on his smallholding outside Sheffield were 
expected to consider the value of manual work and the moral 
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superiority of a simple life, but to reflect more broadly that this small 
scale model might serve as a blueprint for society as a whole. This 
demand for higher moral behaviour in response to the disease of 
civilization was notably rejected by the Fabians in 1889. The hostile 
response to Carpenter at a Fabian Society meeting in that year [with a 
theme of Communism + nature] from a number of influential thinkers 
indicated the extent to which Socialism was starting to move on from an 
attachment to a model of moral improvement. George Bernard Shaw 
commented that such a lecture, if given to outsiders, ‘could only bring 
contempt on the Socialist cause.’54  Sidney Webb in his 1894 lecture 
Socialism True and False55 spelled out the extent of the rejection of 
moral improvement and other approaches in a very broad denunciation 
‘If our aim is the transformation of England into a Social Democracy, we 
must frankly accept the changes brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution, the factory system, the massing of population in great cities, 
the elaborate differentiation and complication of modern civilisation, the 
subordination of the worker to the citizen, and of the individual to the 
community. We must rid ourselves resolutely of those schemes and 
projects of byegone Socialisms which have now passed out of date, as 
well as from the specious devices of Individualism in a new dress. All 
these I class together as Spurious Collectivism making, in my view, not 
for social progress, but for reaction.’ (Fabian Tracts Nos. 1 to 202. 
1923: Tract 51:10.)  
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Carpenter hoped for the unity of all ‘socialists’ and expressed the view 
that there were common factors such as increasing human happiness 
shared by all such political positions.  But the vehemence of Fabian 
denunciation indicated that Carpenter posed a threat to their highly 
centralised and controlled view of change. Carpenter ‘wanted not just a 
change in the way power was held and wealth distributed, but a 
transformation in men’s and women’s ways of feeling, in the ways in 
which they related to other individuals and in the natural world.’(Brown 
1990:7)  
The act of working collectively on the land would enable human beings 
to value each other and make provision for their own food and survival. 
Whilst this characteristic of Carpenter has been interpreted as one 
seeking salvation56 or part of a deeply held Christianity not really 
abandoned, what is clear is the central role which Carpenter assigned 
to food production. He took the view that not being involved in food 
production or healthy outdoor work led to proliferation of diseases of 
affluence, because the wealthy would demonstrate their riches by 
opting out of physical labour. The compartmentalism of Capitalism 
would result in some being paid to undertake healthy physical work and 
others being trapped in unhealthy factories for all their working lives. 
Towards Democracy expressed the sentiment; 
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‘To feel downwards and downwards through this wretched maze of 
shams for the solid ground – to come close to the Earth itself and those 
that live in direct contact with it.’(Brown 1990:5)57  
Carpenter, despite believing in individual change, still argued for ending 
the monopoly of land and for the people to take it over for the common 
good. He subscribed to the need for either State or municipal land 
ownership and, to that degree, should have been welcomed by the 
Fabian Society.  
Where Carpenter had to be presented as a marginal or crank figure was 
in his insistence upon both the centrality of food and the retention of 
personal autonomy.58 Whilst the State might be in close control for a 
transitional period, this should pass. 
Carpenter ‘is convinced that the danger of collectivism is almost as 
great as that of capitalism, if it does not give people responsibility.’ 
(Cachin 1990:63) The Fabian Society sought to marginalise the figures 
of William Morris and Edward Carpenter and to castigate Kropotkin on 
the grounds that notions of personal freedom and of ‘non – 
governmental society’ challenged the concept of the ‘good state.’ 
 
In the 1894 lecture Webb also went on to attack the ‘amiable 
enthusiasts’ working on ideal communities and identified the aim of 
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Socialism as ‘not to enable this or that comparatively free person to 
lead an ideal life, but to loosen the fetters of millions who toil in our 
factories and who cannot possibly be moved to Freeland or Topolo-
bampo.’ (Fabian Society Tract 51:10)   
Webb argued that the approach of isolated communities serving as 
examples to others had failed as well as all the approaches which 
envisaged ‘opening up the land’ to the unemployed or city dwellers 
generally. Such colonies would not be self supporting, would pay low 
wages and would rely on the belief that ‘a heterogeneous collection of 
waifs and strays, without a common acquaintanceship, a common faith, 
or a common tradition, could be safely trusted for a single day to 
manage the nation’s land or capital.’  (Fabian Society Tract 51:12) 
For the Fabians the fact that agriculture is afforded a lesser role in 
Britain as a result of the market system and the international division of 
labour is a ‘given.’  
Later in the same lecture Webb said ‘the steam engine, the factory and 
the mine have come to stay; and our only choice is between their 
management by individual owners or their management by the 
community,’ (Fabian Society Tract 51:17)  
To conclude the lecture Webb identified those who wished to settle 
more people on the land, or even enhance the role of the peasant 
proprietor, as being proponents of ‘economic individualism’  whose real 
aim was to bolster the forces of reaction against the march of progress. 
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In adopting this position, the Fabian Society followed the analysis of 
Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 
‘The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It 
has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban 
population as compared to the rural, and has thus rescued a 
considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.’ 59 and 
the subsequent point made which relates not just to the ‘idiocy’ of rural 
life but the backward nature of rural workers;60 
‘Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the 
proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay 
and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its 
special and essential product.’61 
There is a considerable distance between the Fabian Society in the 
1890’s and the Marxist position of 1848, but if one examines the points 
made by Webb in the Fabian Lecture there is a clear acceptance of the 
‘feudal phase’ in the development of society. From that it must follow 
that Socialists must do nothing to assist in returning to ‘pre Capitalist’ 
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modes of production. As rural workers are not chosen to be the 
transformative force in society, then the formation of agricultural unions 
or attempts to improve conditions and wages is to be welcomed by any 
Socialist but are not be seen to be critically important. The needs of 
rural workers must in every aspect be subordinate to those of the 
industrial vanguard.  
Food production, in turn, must be primarily for industrial workers and no 
logical barrier to imported food acceptable, given the ‘elaborate 
differentiation’ or the international division of labour which Fabians 
argued that socialists ‘must accept’. Quality of life, when considered by 
Fabians, will improve because what is now run for individual profit will 
henceforth be for the benefit of the community.  
 
Both the SDF and the Fabian Society wanted to distance themselves 
from any association with utopianism or the natural life.  Increasingly, 
the Socialist League, which had broken away from the SDF in 1884, 
came under Anarchist control and critics were able to utilise ‘Anarchist’ 
as a wide term of abuse. G.B. Shaw in the 1893 Fabian Tract ‘the 
Impossibilities of Anarchism’ attacked the philosophy for excessive 
individualism and undue emphasis on land and soil issues. Shaw stood 
instead for the efficiencies of the cities, the rationality of commerce and 
above all the transformative potential of the State against vague notions 
of personal freedom and expression. 
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Colonies and Communities 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The most common accusation levelled at co-operative colonies and 
other forms of ‘utopianism’ was that those involved had opted out of the 
‘hard work’ needed to bring about political change. To a degree, they 
were ‘the result of frustration at the Socialists’ failure to effect a moral 
and social revolution.’ (Gould 1988:49) and a growing distrust of 
perceived Socialist disdain for the individual.  
The ‘spurious collectivism’ of the participants was dismissed as being 
self – indulgent and often such groups were damned by their alleged 
association with a wide range of sexual and behavioural practices which 
was seen to be their ‘real’ purpose62.  
Horticulture was at the heart of many of these endeavours, owing to the 
influential position of Kropotkin, the example of successful intensive 
horticulture in the Channel Islands and the assumption that to achieve a 
simple life required no particular level of skill. Kropotkin especially 
promoted the use of horticulture using the by-products of industrial 
processes, the availability of urban human waste and proximity to 
markets. This led to a number of colonies close to towns and cities 
where working people would be able to visit and see the attractive 
nature of the lifestyle. 
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Clousden Hill, close to the centre of Newcastle-on-Tyne,63 was one 
which endured long enough for some lessons to be learned on methods 
of operation. The English Land Colonisation Society (ELCS) envisaged 
a co-operative chain of small-holdings ‘as the possible beginning of an 
entire alteration in our economic system.’ (Todd 1986:14) With the 
scientific work done by Kropotkin there was confidence that such 
colonies would prosper both agriculturally and as examples of the 
advantages of co-operation over wasteful competition. The colony 
would not be run as a retreat but in such a way as to integrate 
horticulture and industry. The advantages of new technology would be 
applied to both sectors. Clousden Hill started in 1895 on 20 acres of 
reasonable land and was given a tentative welcome by Kropotkin 
although he did warn of the need to understand how hard the work 
would be, and the need for effective control over incomers. The outlined 
approach for Clousden was based upon intensive agriculture using 
‘advanced principles of scientific research and instruction.’ (Todd 
1986:23) and was eagerly promoted in a number of Anarchist 
publications as well as in the more mainstream press such as 
Horticultural Review. Whilst the Fabians might have seen the 
experiment as a failure, it did for a while prosper, led to other (non – co-
operative) smallholdings and built links with more mainstream Co-
operative Societies. The major difficulty was the amount of attention 
received, which led to an influx of International Anarchists and 
Tolstoyans some of whom rejected the concepts of ‘work,’ which rather 
                                               
63
 Full title ‘Clousden Hill Free Communist and Co-operative Colony’ 
45 
 
clashed with the needs of both horticulture and animal husbandry. As 
the Anarchist movement declined after 1896, new members did not 
come forward and, although some early participants went on to other 
smallholdings, the Colony was generally considered to have failed. The 
SDF, through the publication Justice, was alleged to have printed 
rumours about the Colony and few Socialists mourned the passing of 
the colony around 1899. However, many of those involved used the 
experience of co-operation to become involved in political and trades 
union action.  
It also exposed the fact that ‘the Co-op’ in its retail and wholesale 
manifestations had ‘begun to accept more of the ideology of Capitalism 
and saw the enlargement of their own organisations within the market 
economy as a criterion of ‘progress’’ (Todd 1986:36) Local criticism 
sparked off the purchase of farms by Co-operative Societies in the 
North East of England on the basis of bringing together producer / 
consumer64.  
Other colonies and smallholdings were directly influenced by Clousden 
Hill, especially that of Daisy Hill near Blackpool set up by Allan Clarke 
and the Northern Weekly based in Bolton. Clarke was a prominent critic 
of the factory system who acknowledged a debt to Robert Owen and 
the Chartists. He held strong views on food and diet – he opened a 
vegetarian restaurant in Bolton in 1904 - and set up the ‘Daisy Colony 
Scheme’ to promote a healthier diet and to ‘form a communistic colony 
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and natural holiday resort .... to start market gardening.’ (Northern 
Weekly May 21st. 190465) The local branches [31 in 6 months] 
undertook political discussion, held classes on horticulture and raised 
funds for the purchase or rent of land. Clarke published a pamphlet 
‘Can we get Back To the Land?’ in 1905 and acquired two acres of land 
in Bispham, with prospective settlers having spent time previously 
working on allotments. As with Clousden Hill, and the later Girlington 
Klondike in Bradford, many visitors and onlookers had to be 
accommodated, making practical horticulture difficult. Unlike Clousden 
and the many other Anarchist or Tolstoyan colonies of the period, the 
Daisy Colony spent little time on group interaction as Clarke envisaged 
full time food production taking up most of the time and energy. The 
failure of the Colony came in 1907 and the Northern Weekly shortly 
after. Clarke had proposed ‘a co-operative allotments scheme ... as an 
alternative’ (Salveson 1984:35) but  attracted little support. Whilst 
Clarke (who went on to have a long history in various movements) 
wanted to return to ‘former times’ in one sense, the Daisy Colony above 
all represented his conviction that practical ways forward could be found 
for working people to live healthier lives both as producers and 
consumers. 
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Conclusions 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Britain, after the Repeal of the Corn Laws, had become a country in 
which commerce was celebrated as ‘the grand panacea, which, like a 
beneficent medical discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy 
and saving taste for civilization all the nations of the world.’66 The 
benefits of Capitalism were evident in the factories and mines and 
manifested in impressive machinery and the application of technology. 
Before 1880 there were notable thinkers and movements which 
questioned this form of progress and when they invoked the countryside 
they did so as the expression of some essential English character, now 
lost or struggling. Wiener coined the term ‘the Southern Metaphor’ 
which explained the success of Capitalist Britain ‘not so much to 
continuing effort as to their unique cultural inheritance.’ (Wiener 
1981:42) In this reading, Britain is a uniquely great country not because 
of the outputs of the factories but owing to the links with the soil and the 
village.  
Britain had a distinct landowning class which had adapted to the needs 
of the economy and the rising population by expanding agriculture, 
whilst cutting labour, in order to feed the towns and cities. Imports of 
food tended to be confined to specialist items not generally consumed 
by most of the population. From the 1870’s food imports were rapidly 
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increasing as a result of opening up new lands, refrigeration, shipping 
improvements and, above all, price advantage. This was despite the 
fact that many countries which opened up ‘new lands’ did so in a way 
which resulted in much lower productivity levels than Britain and 
substantial environmental damage. Therefore, British agriculture was 
undermined by less efficient production because such imports were the 
only way to pay for manufactured goods from Britain. What really 
mattered for the economy was ‘industry, trade and finance’ (Hobsbawm 
1990:199) and farming could be sacrificed to that end. By the period 
1880-1890 ‘the countryside was ‘empty’ and available for use as an 
integrating cultural symbol.’ (Wiener 1981:49) Those who might have 
suffered from the empty countryside – the landowners – ‘were not 
prepared to do more than make a nominal protest, for if their income 
was not already diversified into urban real-estate, mining, industry and 
finance, it could easily be so salvaged.’ (Hobsbawm 1990:199) 
Instead of adopting measures of protection, which most of Europe did 
intermittently in this period, British agriculture went into areas of 
production where foreign competition seemed impossible; horticulture 
and pasture. This led to lower rents, shedding of labour and reductions 
in acreages, as agriculture tried to obey the same laws as other 
Capitalist enterprises. The large landowners were able to get through 
this period owing to the lack of substantial unrest in England67 and the 
fact that they had diversified their investments. Unlike in Denmark, 
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farmers did not co-operate their way out of a crisis, rather more they sat 
tight given that ‘no alternative existed between the individual farm and 
the intervention and planning of the state.’ (Hobsbawm 1990:201) 
Most Radicals and early Socialists therefore targeted state intervention, 
through nationalisation or other form of common ownership, as the only 
possibility for change. The Labour Party maintained land nationalisation 
as policy until 1945 but then decided not to pursue the matter after the 
‘successes’ of State controlled wartime agriculture. Whilst much of the 
output of the Fabian Society, and later Labour Party material, offered 
self congratulatory words on the displacement of ‘cranks’ such as 
Kropotkin, Morris and Carpenter, the more serious long term 
consequence was that the Left generally68 had isolated itself from those 
seeking self sufficiency or local and autonomous ways of working. 
Emerging Socialism had failed to build links with those within farming or 
who had agricultural expertise, so they acquired no compensatory 
knowledge. Many smallholders and small farmers were assumed to be 
similar in outlook to the cranks, rather than producers who were able to 
operate flexibly and supply local markets. The particular expertise that 
would have assisted the Labour Party in the following century was an 
understanding of the extent to which agriculture had to be sustainable, 
with there being an enduring policy assumption that agriculture could be 
run on industrial lines for the benefit of working people. This ‘industrial 
scale’ agriculture demanded large farm sizes, and Labour Party policy 
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in the twentieth century relentlessly pursued such aims at the expense 
of smaller producers. Indeed, little support was given to the extension of 
smallholdings as a consequence of the assumption that it would only 
encourage a reactionary formation. 
This failure to engage with smallholders and small farmers, and to 
understand rural concerns, left the notions of ‘Englishness and the 
countryside’ much more in the hands of the Right in the twentieth 
century, particularly during times of economic and political hardship. 
With the Left having portrayed the possibilities of ‘back to the land’ as a 
reactionary or crank demand, the Right was able to establish the 
concept of ‘peasant proprietors’ or ‘yeomen’ as being the backbone of 
England and a bulwark against Socialism or the threat from the 
Communism of the Soviet Union. More immediately a concentration 
upon land ownership served to allow little thinking about food policy.  
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Chapter Three      
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
The Royal Commission of 190569  
‘A foodless people cannot go to war; a foodless people cannot 
support a war.” 70 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Royal Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of 
War reported its findings in 1905. It had been established two years 
earlier with terms of reference which invited wide ranging consideration. 
 ‘To inquire into the conditions affecting the importation of food 
and raw materials into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
in time of war, and into the amount of such supplies existing in the 
Country at any given period; and to advise whether it is desirable to 
adopt any measures, in addition to the maintenance of a strong Fleet, 
by which such supplies can be better secured and violent fluctuations 
avoided.’  
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The work of the Commission is important to this study in that it was the 
only opportunity, until wartime preparations started in the 1930’s, to 
carry out a systematic appraisal of the extent of suffering that might 
occur in the event of dislocation of food supplies. (The evidence 
presented to the Commission, and the attendant Parliamentary and 
public debates are to be found in Appendix One.) It was also an 
opportunity for a number of those who felt that the high level of imports 
and lower domestic agricultural output were two factors which, taken 
together, created a level of national vulnerability. This was not just 
thought to be the case in the event of any future war, but also an 
expression of anxiety regarding the conduct of the Second Boer War 
(1899 – 1902) and the dislocation of trade brought about by the Spanish 
American War of 1898. 
With active consideration of Free Trade, Protectionism and Imperial 
Preference also happening, this meant that the deliberations of the 
Committee took place at a vibrant political time. In addition, the Royal 
Commission would permit an assessment of the extent to which two 
decades of Radical and Socialist interpretation of food policy had 
entered mainstream political discourse as well as the more generalised 
anxieties about the future of British agriculture. 
The Commission spent little time in consideration of ‘any measures’ in 
the terms of reference which might have increased domestic food 
production, but did note the extent of the exposure to imports. It 
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managed to identify that strategic weakness without suggesting an 
effective remedy. 
Where it did exceed the terms of reference was in spending time in 
assessing the likely reactions, especially of working people, to 
restrictions in supplies or fluctuations in price in the event of War. In the 
earlier Commons Debate which was called to urge the establishment of 
a Commission, particular emphasis was placed upon the apparent 
suffering of working people. Significantly, most of the contributors to the 
debate71 represented large towns or cities. Howard Vincent (Sheffield 
Central c. 1125) noted this fact ‘showed (it) was in no sense an 
agricultural question, and that it had nothing to do with bringing arable 
land into re-cultivation, but it was a question which vitally affected the 
welfare and interests of the masses of the people.’  What this 
intervention showed was that, even before the Commission had begun 
its work, informed opinion was anxious to separate availability of food 
from any concern about sources of supply. 
In order to assess the operation and conclusions of the Committee, 
there are important areas which require further examination. The 1905 
Report might well have very largely avoided consideration of increasing 
domestic food production, the uncertainties brought on by the Boer War 
(which might have induced a more reflective position on British military 
might) and Tariff Reform, but the recommendations were influential 
because they formed the basis of Government Policy until late into 
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1916. That over two years of hardship in the Great War had to elapse 
before the twin pillars of free trade and laissez faire were seriously 
challenged indicated the importance of the 1905 Report. Regularly, any 
M.P. wishing to question naval power and the ‘food question’ would be 
referred back to the 1905 Report and its apparent settled conclusions, 
including the idea that increased domestic food production was not in 
the best interests of the country.  
The proceedings of this Commission seemed to lack any focus upon 
the state of agriculture in Britain, even though it could have done so as 
part of the brief it was given. To some extent the agricultural industry 
had moved on from the worst of the sustained depression of the 1870s 
to the 1890’s and had reached a level below which it could not 
realistically fall. The concentration upon products which could not easily 
be imported, such as fresh fruit, vegetables and fresh, better quality, 
meat had taken the place of wheat once it was clear that it was not 
possible to compete with cheap food from abroad. Although the twenty 
year period was a depression it was also a period of change based on 
increasing the use of pasture and the growth of market gardening. In 
addition, two Royal Commissions specifically established to look 
agricultural depression had offered little in terms of a way forward.72 
Running parallel to the sessions of the Royal Commission in 1903 – 
1905, the proceedings of the unofficial Tariff Commission on Agriculture 
had also failed to concentrate on the state of the industry, preferring to 
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find ‘the best ways of harmonizing any conflict of interest between 
agriculture and manufacturing.’(Marrison 1986:174) The Tariff Reform 
Campaign might have appeared to assist the British farmer by the 
erection of tariff walls to provide some shelter, but agricultural opinion 
was not generally in favour. Many farmers were aware that any form of 
Imperial Preference would bring them into competition with the largely 
untapped resources of the Empire. Any encouragement to Canadian 
agriculture, for example, would have led to rapid opening up of new 
lands and the recruitment of additional labour – especially farmers and 
farm labourers from Britain.73  
The 1905 Royal Commission took the view that bounties or other forms 
of inducements to farmers should be discouraged. Therefore, if home 
production could not be incentivised and it was not clear whether 
farming would gain from protection at all, no viable alternative 
agriculture change was envisaged. The working class and trades union 
delegates, attracted to the Commission by the efforts of S.L. Murray, 
were disappointed that poverty alone did not seem sufficient to the 
Commissioners as to require action. The Commission concentrated 
upon wheat, deciding that this was the decisive product and could not 
be effectively stored. The spread of supplies from around the world 
once again ensured that Britain had the resilience to avoid any hardship 
in wartime. The free trade argument also prevailed, with the dominant 
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view being that Protection would lead to higher prices and less certainty 
of supply. 
 
 Those working for Tariff Reform were also aware that they were 
vulnerable to the line of argument that Protectionism would make future 
war more likely. Germany had introduced some protective measures in 
1879 which had increased prices and led to demands for higher wages 
for the industrial working class and the stopping of the flow from the 
countryside.74 Strategically, without the benefit of a large empire, 
Germany risked bringing about retaliation through protection and this 
was recognised by the actions of Chancellor Caprivi who upon election 
in 1890 re-introduced free trade. Substantial rural pressure brought 
about a reversion to protectionism in Germany from 1894 onwards. The 
justification for protectionism, which was tightened by von Bulow in 
1900, was that ‘without large domestic grain production the country 
would be unable to survive a blockade; without a strong agricultural 
population the man power of the German army would be sapped.’ 
(Gerschenkron 1966:54) 
Protectionism in Germany embedded the Junkers and thus gave more 
power to the same kind of people who had proved so ineffective in 
maintaining domestic agriculture in Britain. The debates in Germany, at 
the same time as the Royal Commission upheld free trade, centred 
upon the degree to which Free Trade would result in war. The British 
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rearmed to ensure the continuation of free trade and the Germans did 
so because free trade with Britain – with all her colonial advantages – 
would inevitably lead to war. The promotion of food self sufficiency in 
Germany was utilised to help the population adjust to the distinct 
possibility of war as part of ‘Wehrwirtschaft’ [war preparedness] 
Later Interpretations 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) considered the impact of 
the Commission in 190975 and largely accepted that dependency on 
imported food was inevitable and that the possibility of war was 
increased as a result. One exception to that was the contribution from 
Harry Quelch76 who re-iterated many of the demands of Socialists in the 
1880’s and 1890’s. His line of argument was that ‘all countries become 
more and more dependent upon foreign sources for their food.’ (Owen 
1909:1565) and what must follow is that all markets for manufactured 
goods must diminish. Every industrial nation will have to re-discover 
ways of producing more food.  
The lack of agricultural focus to be found in both the findings and the 
detailed evidence of the Royal Commission is hardly surprising, given 
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that the Commission had little room to manoeuvre and little pressure 
exerted to consider domestic food production more seriously.  The 
Commissioners concluded that ‘they accepted the decline in food 
production as an incontrovertible fact’ (Hurwitz 1968:206) As the 
evidence showed, agriculturalists either declined to give evidence of 
how production might be increased or were poorly represented, most 
reasonable people having accepted that their position was politically 
unsupportable.  The lasting legacy was the concentration upon the 
assessment of working class reactions to interruptions in food supplies. 
In 1909 RUSI commented that the question of panic had not been fully 
addressed, with fear of interruptions in supply being the main issue 
which they should have tried to understand. One contributor to the 
discussion – Lord Ellenbrough of the Royal Navy – offered the 
following; 
‘If our food supply is interrupted it is not the poor alone who will suffer, it 
is the weakest who will starve first. Law and Order will disappear. Bank 
balances, investments, jewels, furniture, and motor cars are not edible, 
and force and violence will be made us of to obtain food for the 
strongest.’ (Owen 1909:1563)77 
Harry Quelch countered that by pointing out that currently only the poor 
starve and in the event of war ‘the rich would be fairly well able to take 
care of themselves, as they are now; that is to say, unless the anger of 
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59 
 
the populace in consequence of the mismanagement of the affairs of 
the State, and the starvation in which they found themselves, came to 
be such that the rich had to suffer at their hands.’ (Owen 1909:1565)  
To ensure that the spirit of the Radicals and Socialists of the earlier 
period had not entirely disappeared Quelch offered the members of the 
Institution the following ways forward – National granaries, a survey of 
public land with a view to public ownership of farms and the promotion 
of widespread co-operation. From the perspective of 1909 a number of 
speakers commented on those issues which the 1905 Commission had 
neglected to consider. Referring to a newspaper campaign in 1909 
Captain Osborne of the Royal Navy pointed out that recently the Prime 
Minister had turned down a request for another Commission owing to 
the ‘long and thorough investigation so recently as 1905’ (Owen 
1909:1571) Osborne concluded that another inquiry was required 
because ‘a foodless people cannot go to war; a foodless people cannot 
support a war.’ (Owen 1909:1570) 
 This emphasis could have been increased further had the 1905 
Commission, or any of the witnesses, made the link with interruptions to 
the export trade. Given that free trade depended upon the exchange of 
goods then the failure of the Navy to protect shipping would have also 
have affected exports and led to a substantial rise in unemployment. 
This might be have been seen as exceeding the brief of the 
Commission but was a major component of the campaign conducted by 
S.L. Murray and was one of the reasons why it was possible to put 
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together a coalition of interests. The concentration upon working class 
and their propensity to riot or stage an organised revolt did however 
confirm one point; ‘that poverty had become a key issue of strategy and 
of national survival.’ (Offer 1989:222) 
Many of those who joined the campaign of S. L. Murray thought that the 
argument for increased domestic food production was so strong that the 
Commission was bound to conclude that it was an urgent necessity. 
Instead, the question was largely re-cast as being about questioning the 
power of the Navy, the loyalty of the Empire and impracticalities of 
growing or storing more food.  
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Chapter Four  
Conservatism, Agriculture and the First World War.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Introduction  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In 1923 the former Conservative, substantial landowner and agricultural 
writer Christopher Turnor wrote off the Conservative Party as having 
‘one time represented these (rural) people, but it has abandoned them.’ 
(Turnor 1923:86)  
This chapter examines the development of a Conservative position on 
agriculture in the light of the failure of the 1905 Royal Commission to 
offer any prospect of increased domestic production either on strategic 
or cost grounds. Given that the emerging Labour Party had effectively 
cut itself off from Radical and Socialist perspectives on agriculture in 
favour of land nationalisation and the Liberal Party remained 
preoccupied with the ‘Land Question’, the Conservatives shifted their 
policy towards a more pragmatic appreciation of how agriculture might 
be managed.  
The default political position of the Conservative Party was to support 
the landowner and to be seen as best representing the rural voice. 
Liberal attempts at land reform, including settling more people on the 
land, were not opposed in principle, but on the grounds of cost to the 
public purse or in defence of the principle of private property. 
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The paradox is that it was the Conservative Government of Peel which 
took on the vested agricultural interests in order to repeal the Corn 
Laws in 1846.  The Anti Corn Law League mounted a successful 
campaign but one which so strongly attacked the selfishness of the 
farming and landowning interests that most Conservative MP’s felt 
compelled to defend them. In February 1846 ‘two thirds of the 
Conservative Party in the Commons voted against their leader’ 
(Gash1974:54) and Peel had to rely upon Liberal support to repeal the 
Corn Laws. Until the beginning of the twentieth century the 
Conservative Party felt itself to be so divided on the issues of 
agricultural protection and free trade that little policy formulation took 
place. The only ‘policy’ was to support the landowner. Conservative 
historian Norman Gash referred to 1846 as being ‘the most spectacular 
party disruption in British political history’78 and although some effort 
was made to restore Protectionist policies in 1852, the Conservative 
Party broadly favoured free trade until the end of the century.  
For most of the intervening period the Conservatives, along with the 
Chambers of Agriculture, campaigned on issues of local taxation and 
other rural ‘burdens’ upon landowners such as the Poor Laws. Whilst 
the Liberal moves towards the extension of small holdings were not 
actively opposed there was resistance to the charge to be made on the 
local rates and opposition to the compulsory nature of land acquisition. 
Increasing the number of owners of agricultural land was generally 
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considered to be of benefit to the maintenance of stability, but there was 
no linking of such a development with a concomitant increase in food 
production. That arable farming was declining, land under populated 
and under cultivated was taken to be as a result of the greater needs of 
manufacturing. ‘Cheap food’ through imports was beneficial to the 
efficient functioning of society and might also assist in keeping industrial 
wages low. Writing in 1901 J.W. Martin79 portrayed the neglect of the 
countryside by the main Political parties as ending in rural depopulation, 
moral and physical degradation and substantial loss of rural wealth. 
Governments, in pursuing free trade, were not being patriotic and 
needed ‘to make the country far more self supporting than it is today.’ 
(Martin 1901:248)  
Martin urged the Conservatives to become more assertive and dictate 
to foreign countries (they are dependent upon us) and financial 
interests. It is the latter who have exposed us to the grave danger of 
dependency upon foreign food, the result of which could be that ‘our 
Empire would be broken at one blow.’ (1901:258.) Martin then identified 
that Britain and her Empire might be brought down despite (quoting 
Lord Roseberry) the existence of ‘the hand of God in our history.’ 
Moving the hyperbole up further Martin warned that God works in such 
ways, we might lose our leadership as ‘at one period of the world’s 
history it was Israel, now it is England’ which could be laid low.’ 
(1901:266) 
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Martin in 1901 offered what might be seen as an extreme analysis of 
the state of the nation, but what he did do is question whether the 
supposed benefits of free trade were accruing to Britain. His analysis 
suggested that the wealth of Britain was built on the back of agriculture 
and it was that wealth which built up industry home and abroad. Now 
(1901) imports far exceed exports, Britain lives upon banking, finance 
and shipping, but Martin posed the question where does that money 
go? Whilst this theme was not expanded upon until later in the 1920’s, 
and then linked with conspiracy theories about Jewish interests, it 
portrays landowners as having been uniquely threatened. This threat 
came from ‘the rise of speculators, financiers and industrialists’ (Cooper 
1989:11) and, later, from death duties and taxation. This assertion 
rather ignored the fact that it was large landowners who financed much 
of this speculation80, but it is worth noting that the feeling of being 
victimised. 
The deliberate under cultivation of large estates during the Great 
Depression, particularly in the Eastern Counties is largely portrayed as 
being the responsibility of Government by many Conservative thinkers. 
Martin (1901) presented the 1870’s as a time of sturdy folk, self 
supporting communities and robust populations contrasted with money 
leaving the villages, old men left behind and a residue of poor 
labourers. The existence of a golden age, this time only a few years 
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before the agricultural depression, is contrasted with the current state of 
the nation; ‘truly the English are an imperial race of the soft, generous-
hearted type: they have bossed the world so long that in commerce as 
in politics they gave all the advantage away.’ (Martin 1901:105) The 
strength of feeling is compounded by the conduct of the Boer War – ‘our 
military incompetence in the South African War’- (1901:267) but Martin 
conveyed a sense of conspiracy, although its nature is not specific. 
Martin saw the decline of agriculture as being related to decline 
generally, but at various levels of analysis – Imperial, moral, military, 
even spiritual. This would seem to offer fertile ground for political 
expression on behalf of those seeking to defend and promote the 
national interest. In addition, one would have expected some of that 
feeling to have emerged during the Royal Commission of Food in 
Wartime (chapter 3) given that such an inquiry had a remit to look at 
national security. Close examination of the evidence shows surprisingly 
little organised political input into the process, although the efforts of 
S.L. Murray in setting up the Inquiry were widely supported.  
For the Conservative Party an acceptance of the principles of Free 
Trade, despite two distinct periods of flirting with Tariff Reform, gave 
them little room to manoeuvre. Bowley’s statement that ‘our foreign 
trade is to a great extent an elaborate machinery for supplying us with 
food,’ (Bowley 1905:133) helps to understand why this might be. In 
importing £470 million pounds of goods (nearly three quarters food or 
raw materials) this represented interest on capital invested abroad, thus 
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identifying a financial imperative for imports. Secondly, if we did not 
import, then nobody would buy our exports and damage our economic 
interests. Thirdly, the decline in the price of imported foodstuffs lowered 
costs for a considerable percentage of the agriculture industry, giving a 
farming benefit. Finally, Bowley argued that the whole ‘elaborate’ 
process did not end up with funds leaving the country but is a shift in 
which money ‘goes to the artisan or the factory hand instead of to the 
agricultural labourer’ (Bowley 1905:137) thus offering (on balance) a 
political benefit.  
For the Conservative Party, unless serious questions were raised 
regarding national security, the maintenance of free trade was not to be 
challenged. Protection in order to allow farming some space to adapt to 
new markets or take advantage of some of the scientific progress might 
have been feasible. Amongst many in the farming community81 it was 
thought that protection would only benefit the large farmers in the 
Eastern Counties. The campaign of Joseph Chamberlain for Tariff 
Reform also did not seem to offer any possibility of vastly increased 
production, given the enthusiasm with which the colonial benefits were 
pursued. The prospect, therefore, was of a ‘policy which benefited only 
industrial and colonial interests’ (Marrison 1986:173) and coupled with 
an increase in food prices which many would blame on farmers.  
 
                                               
81
 See Marrison A.J. The Tariff Commission, Agricultural Protection and Food Taxes 
1903 – 1913. Agricultural History Review 1986. Vol.34 No.2 
67 
 
The Tariff Commission82, which met at the same time as the Royal 
Commission on Food in Wartime, struggled to put together a coherent 
policy for agriculture. Above all, the Conservative Party had suffered a 
number of crises during the Tariff Reform struggle and this was followed 
by the heavy electoral defeat of 1906, one which was largely attributed 
to a divided party. Despite a strong attachment to Free Trade the 
Conservatives arrived at a compromise after 1906 in which they 
maintained a token commitment to small amount of duty on foreign 
corn. Some elements in the Conservative Party did remain committed to 
some assistance for agriculture83 before a formal abandonment after 
the 1910 General Election. 
Austen Chamberlain noted that ‘we grow so little wheat in these days 
that even the farmer in most parts of the country is to be reckoned a 
consumer rather than a producer of wheat.’ (in Marrison 1986:183) The 
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embedding of the ‘defeat’ of agriculture into Conservative thinking did 
cause a backlash84 and created a group of thinkers who were of some 
influence before the War and of prime importance once food policy 
changed at the beginning of 1917. It would be wrong to infer that the 
Conservatives did not have a food policy; Joseph Chamberlain 
expressed the central question clearly – ‘why should the British working 
men pay more for their food?’ 85(Gollin 1965: 121) To reinforce that, in 
1903 the influential Daily Mail campaigned against ‘stomach taxes’ 
although it later modified its position to both oppose food taxes and be 
broadly in favour of protectionism. Again, Joseph Chamberlain posed 
the essential question in respect of possible Imperial Preference; ‘why 
should they [‘the working men] sacrifice their own precarious standard 
of living for the sake of agriculturalists living in the great Colonies 
thousands of miles from Britain’s shores?’ (Gollin 1965:121) 
Chamberlain thought that such reform would repair the damage done to 
agriculture and reconnect many people in Britain with the soil. Being 
self sufficient in agriculture would help people understand what 
constituted a proud nation or empire. 
It was the persistence of the Liberal Party in continuing to address the 
‘Land Question’ that caused the Conservative Party to re-assess their 
position on agriculture. Whilst the Tariff Reform debates were meant to 
produce an advantage for agriculture, they were no substitute for 
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actually focussing on a role for the industry. The Land Enquiry 
Committee of 191286 produced an overview of rural life which moved 
beyond some of the crude anti landlordism of Lloyd George. Above all, 
it invited the Conservative Party to move away from an instinctive pro 
landlord position in favour of a national perspective.  In doing this, ‘it 
drew upon the older tradition of Liberal – Unionist land reform 
associated with Joseph Chamberlain and his lifelong follower Jesse 
Collings, the cardinal features of which were an emphasis on the creed 
of self – help, social justice and rural utopianism.’ (Cooper 1989:7)  
For the Conservatives the emphasis was upon encouraging land 
ownership in the shape of yeomen. These were not the urban 
unemployed or the ex – servicemen favoured after 1918, but those in 
and of the countryside already who would assist in promoting rural 
stability through the benefits of owning a stake in the land. This was to 
be brought about ‘by instilling a spirit of self reliance, enterprise and 
pride of personal possession’ (Cooper 1989:8) into people who would 
contribute to social stability. This approach was in line with the 
manifesto contained in ‘Land Problems and National Welfare’ written by 
Christopher Turnor in 1911. The introduction to this work was provided 
by Lord Milner87 who wrote that ‘we have to get back to the old 
conception of the paramount importance of production and of a healthy, 
vigorous and moral race.’ (1911 vi-vii) This conception of ‘back to the 
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70 
 
land’ differed significantly from most of the Radical proponents in that it 
was envisaged to be greater in scope; nothing less than the primacy of 
agriculture above all other considerations. Lord Milner concluded that 
the underlying issue is that of obtaining and sustaining greater 
production of food in Britain.  
In pursuance of the ‘non political’ tone of the work Turnor cited the 
figures of Horace Plunkett and Peter Kropotkin as showing how co-
operation and intensive husbandry could transform Britain. Cooper 
(1989) noted the influence of a group of agriculturalists around Turnor 
and Lord Milner who developed from around 1910 and who possessed 
substantial farming knowledge.88  
In 1911, Turnor was already calling for a National Party which would 
move away from the pettiness of Party politics. Whilst the proponents 
wished to deploy their expertise to improve agricultural output generally, 
they above all saw a role for themselves as offering leadership as 
enlightened landlords.  What they could demonstrate is how the 
Country could benefit from the application of modern farming methods 
under the direction of themselves who were self evidently special 
people with a historical role to perform. 
Turnor cited a series of articles in the Morning Post by the German 
agriculturalist Von Zelter in which he identified a pressing need for 
Britain to increase the number of farmers who own – rather than rent – 
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their land as part of ‘an endeavour .... to create afresh a peasantry, and 
a new class of landowners occupying an intermediate position between 
them and the great landlords.’ (1911:50) 
Whilst criticism of free trade is that which most engages Turnor in his 
analysis in 1911, it is accompanied by an attribution of the problems of 
farming to the actions of ‘middlemen’ or ‘financiers’ who make money 
out of food producers without delivering any real value to the consumer. 
Wealth had become too centralised, too dependent on financiers who 
took advantage of the ‘tenets of that derelict school of political economy 
which emanated from Manchester.’ (1911:211)  
The main focus of any National Party should not be to take part in the 
Free Trade / Tariff Reform debate but to assert that the Mother country 
should produce as much food as she can, and then import the rest 
required from her dominions over the seas.’ (1911:211) The notion that 
the Empire could be the ‘self supporting unit’ was one which the 
Conservative Party had advanced in the past, most notably through 
Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform movement.  
Whilst the  Turnor / Milner group wished to present themselves as 
acting in the national interest and offering practical and moral 
leadership, much of their approach was based on the countryside as 
being ‘different’ from the towns and cities. Whilst such a view rested 
upon their own role in becoming leaders of the countryside it also 
incorporated a sense of a corporate rural policy. Although the primary 
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requirement was for the introduction of efficiency into farming it should 
not be done by the copying of industrial methods. To move away from 
the rural equivalent of the industrial working class could be avoided by a 
substantial increase in land ownership allied to extensive co-operation 
between small producers. Alongside that co-operation would be a 
comprehensive recreation of English village life; the bringing together of 
improved housing, better farming practice and modest sized industry in 
rural settings. In contrast to the discussions on Tariff Reform, which had 
never fully engaged agriculture, the Conservative Party had by 1912 
what was close to a comprehensive Rural Policy. The only requirement 
for any protection might be that for produce which would be the 
specialism of the smallholder: fruit and vegetables and dairy produce.  
The encroachment upon traditional Liberal territory which this policy 
encouraged did not win complete support in Conservative ranks. After 
all, the Liberal policy ‘caused concern in Conservative circles because 
its proposals incorporated most of the goals for which Radical land 
reformers had been campaigning since the 1840’s’ (Green 1996:289)  
The success of the Liberal Policy89 led to Conservative concern that 
they would lose votes in the countryside and Lord Malmesbury wrote to 
the Conservative leader Bonar Law that ‘the working classes are 
growing more and more concerned that the Unionist Party is not sincere 
in its attempt to deal with the Land Question.’ (in Green 1996:291) To 
draw up the response – A Unionist Agricultural Policy - the 
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Conservative Party turned to Christopher Turnor and others who had 
previously been seen as ‘land cranks’90 (Green 1996:291) 
The Conservative Party as a whole did not embrace many of the 
notions advanced by Turnor, Lord Milner and others even though there 
was general acceptance that they might lose out to the Liberals in the 
countryside. The opposition was based on the fact that all of the reform 
options were predicated upon the intervention of the state. Given that 
England had prospered by laissez faire policies and free trade, why 
should the State now intervene with powers to compulsorily take away 
land from landowners on the grounds of either social policy or non 
cultivation?  Such a possibility was at odds with Conservative thinking in 
that it interfered with property rights and treated agriculture as being 
something different or special for no clearly thought out reason. By 
1914 the compromise position adopted by the Conservative Party was 
to do nothing but Cooper noted that the balance had shifted in that ‘the 
hegemony of the landed interest in defining the limits of agricultural 
policy had, for the first time, been seriously challenged within the 
Conservative Party.’ (Cooper 1986:19) On the other hand, the question 
of possible Government intervention in agriculture and rural life 
generally had been fully aired as part of an examination of how the 
Party might best win rural votes. However, the fact that the 
Conservatives pursued tariff reform at all in the period leading up to the 
War was based not on support for agriculture but to ‘pay for social 
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services and reduce unemployment’ (Grainger 1974:174)91 The Party 
pursued the possibility of politically unpopular food taxes without any 
benefit for agriculture. The Conservatives attempted to appeal to the 
farming interest on the grounds ‘that agriculture traditionally fared better 
under the Unionists than the Liberals’ (Marrison 1986:184) without any 
substantial evidence to support that statement. 
The importance of identifying in detail the position of the Conservative 
Party in the period before the War lies in the fact that it helps to 
understand how agriculture in general, and increased home food 
production in particular, could be abandoned so soon after a clear 
political consensus by the end of the War that vulnerability to imported 
food should never be repeated. Many of the agriculturalists who tried to 
shape Conservative agriculture policy played a leading role in Food 
Production in 1917 – 1918 and anticipated a continuation of wartime 
priorities. The consequence of the subsequent ‘betrayal’ was that from 
1921 onwards there emerged a disparate group of knowledgeable 
agriculturalists who not only felt that the Conservatives had no rural 
policy but that democracy was incapable of protecting the country as a 
whole. Rural revival and the plea for national (or imperial) self 
sufficiency were advanced as the key indicators of the future of Britain. 
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The conduct of the War 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
‘Food Production in War’ by T.H. Middleton92 is one of the series of 
works entitled ‘Economic and Social History of the World War’ which is 
part of a ‘scientific and objective study of war economics’ (1923: vi) The 
opening chapter ‘The ‘Waygoing’’ serves as an assessment of the state 
of agriculture upon the advent of War and the tone is established from 
the beginning;  
‘When on the 4th.of August 1914 this long lease of peace terminated 
abruptly, the ‘waygoing’ found the farmer quite unprepared. The 
conceptions of his calling, so familiar to his forefathers, were wholly 
novel to him. The conditions tacitly read into all the farming covenants 
of 1815 had been forgotten. The rules of good husbandry took no 
account of the one canon supreme a century before; in 1914 the farmer 
was no longer the warden of the nation’s food, and agriculture, far from 
occupying the ‘lordly’ position among our industries accorded to the 
‘loaf provider’ when the nineteenth century opened, had become a 
minor contributor to the food supply, and to the country’s wealth.’ 
(1923:1) 
That the role of agriculture was indeed ‘minor’ was emphasised by 
Middleton who produced the calculation that it fed the British people ‘for 
one hundred and twenty five days out of three hundred and sixty five’ 
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or, as he also expressed it ‘from Friday night until Monday morning.’ 
(1923:1-2) At the same time, Lord Ernle, the Agricultural historian and 
Conservative politician had identified that ‘in the first place we must 
recognise that the industry is at present sound and prosperous.’ (Ernle: 
1936:392)  
Middleton’s account rested heavily upon the role of the Navy in 
maintaining imports of food and identified that as being the principal 
reason why intervention in the first two years of the War was limited. 
The author, along with the ‘official’ interpreters of agricultural 
administration in War such as Fielding, Rew and Beveridge, sought to 
convey the impression of a thought out, orderly and balanced set of 
moves. That agriculture was now prosperous after the Great 
Depression meant that it must be doing something right and any 
change unnecessary. Henry Rew93 used the argument that ‘a larger 
quantity of food was being produced at the outbreak of war than at any 
previous period. The food was not the same in kind as it was forty or 
fifty years ago, but it was greater in quantity.’ (Middleton 1923:7)94 This 
rather strange assertion, perhaps only justifiable in the sense of better 
quality and variety of output, is used to assert that agriculture was best 
left untouched because farmers would try and increase production 
through patriotism.  
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That they were unable to increase production95 was as a result of forces 
beyond their control – loss of fertilisers, much of which came from 
Germany, large price increases on foodstuffs and the indiscriminate 
loss of skilled labour to the Army. In addition, it was generally assumed 
that the War would soon be over and to plough up grassland on the 
basis of speculation might leave farmers nursing heavy losses as prices 
fell. For Rew (1920:49) ‘the simple fact that the State assumes the 
power of settling the market value of any commodity must inevitably 
tend to check the enterprise of the producers of that commodity’ meant 
that the market must be permitted to operate in any circumstance. If the 
State did not intervene when the large increases in imports happened 
and home production declined, why should it in wartime?  
Harking back to the 1905 Royal Commission Rew noted that it did not 
recommend any action on the grounds that there was no evidence that 
State action would be achievable. He concluded that ‘success or failure 
under the artificial economic conditions of war furnishes no final 
evidence that similar results would follow under normal conditions.’ 
(1920:62) This clear statement served to show that whilst the 
administrators were keen to assert that wartime food production and 
distribution benefitted from civil service administration, there was limited 
support for further State intervention elsewhere. Further evidence of this 
emerged in the reactions to the Milner Committee in 1915 which had 
been set up in order to ‘consider ways to maintain and if possible 
increase food production in England and Wales.’  
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Despite all Party and agricultural representation Milner noted that ‘a set 
of men more absolutely divided, not only on first principles, but in their 
appreciation of the facts with which they had to deal’ (Barnett 1985:51) 
he had ever met96 The Milner Report’s difficulty lay in that fact the 
proposal of a guaranteed price for wheat seemed to imply that the Navy 
might be unable to continue to protect imports and also that to plan in 
such a way implied that the War might continue longer than the public 
anticipated. The complacency which lay at the heart of the 1905 Report 
(and repeated at a time of actual conflict) allied to the upholding of 
laissez faire principles and no backing for State intervention meant that 
1914 – 1916 saw little progress in food production. The rather stark 
illustration of this is in the table below, 
Table: Home Production of Basic Commodities 1914 and 1917, 
1918.97 
[Expressed in thousands of quarters] 
  1914   1917   1918 
Wheat           7804   8040   11643 
Barley           8066   7185   7760 
Oats            20664            26021   31196 
Potatoes98    7476   8604   9223 
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In terms of such basic commodities, very little operational change came 
about until the concerted intervention of 1917 following the Submarine 
campaign. (Oats is a slightly different case in that it has a wide range of 
uses in livestock farming and was used for feeding horses, which 
played a significant role in the conflict itself.) Some of the explanations 
for the policy of non intervention were rooted in the fact of good 
harvests in the early part of the War and a continuation of a substantial 
amount of imports.  
The ‘administrator’ view is one in which there was a period of taking 
stock, controlling the very limited amount of food which was exported 
and weighing up the possibilities of further action. Early intervention 
was confined to sugar where the State intervened to take over the trade 
and this was done on the basis that sugar was important to the British 
diet.99 It was believed that sugar offered the highest return in calories 
and that it was essential for the working classes. Barnett (1985:30) 
noted that ‘it was commonly believed by the working classes that 
children would die unless they ate a pound of sugar a week’ and 
recorded that members of the Royal Society in 1918 ‘railed against the 
government’s ‘stupidity’ in shipping in cereals when they should have 
been concentrating on sugar.’ (1985:31)100  
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Aside from sugar, and the need to make proper provision for securing 
military food supplies, the first two years of the War was marked by 
‘business as usual’101 and the conviction that ‘food imports would be 
best ensured by leaving merchants and traders free to obtain supplies 
in the normal competitive way.’ (Burnett 1983:244) When voluntary 
measures for restraint were urged, they tended to be based on a lack of 
understanding of what constituted the working class diet (beyond bread 
and sugar) or the effect that large price increases were having. In the 
case of the latter, 1914 – 1916 was marked by substantial amounts of 
industrial unrest and rent strikes. Some sections of industry were 
affected by short time working102 and the loss of the breadwinner 
brought about substantial hardship, exacerbated by profiteering.103  
Problems with distribution also caused difficulties in many parts of the 
country from late 1916 onwards and the Government became aware of 
the extent to which working people felt that they were missing out.  
Barnett (1985:142) recorded how the Herald newspaper had exposed 
the nature of ‘voluntary’ rationing by purchasing a six course meal in the 
Ritz and the widespread phenomena of queuing was said to undermine 
the war effort. Three million working days were lost in the second half of 
1917 and a general strike appeared a distinct possibility (Barnett 
1985:142-145.)104 Whilst this might seem to constitute a ‘reasonable’ 
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level of industrial unrest (it was less than that for 1910 – 1914) in the 
context of War and the Russian Revolution it took on the character of 
something more sinister. The Times claimed that it amounted to ‘the 
conscious revolutionary movement aimed at the complete overthrow of 
the existing economic and social order’105 and claims were made of 
foreign money seeking to undermine the war effort in order to bring 
about a negotiated peace. Soldiers were said to be unhappy at the 
degree to which their families were not being properly looked after. 
Whether by virtue of pressure from the working classes, because the 
administrative machine finally moved into action or through high profile 
sackings carried out by the Lloyd George Government, by the Spring of 
1918 there had been substantial improvements in food supply and 
distribution.  
The intervention of the State in the detail of farming practice and in food 
production and distribution became the subject of analysis after the War 
had ended. For William Beveridge and many Fabians the intervention of 
the State and of a professional bureaucracy constituted a model for the 
future. Beveridge criticised the way in which private industry had 
attempted to continue with business as usual when the national interest 
clearly demanded otherwise. Beveridge wrote in 1917 after the 
accession of the Lloyd George Government that ‘not only the last 
Government, but the whole Civil Service and much of the subordinate 
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government of the country is in the hands of amateurs.’  (Harris 
1977:235)106  
The role of the professional administrator was to ensure that policy was 
carried out in a fair manner, rather than let market forces perpetuate 
inequalities. The introduction of rationing and State control of nearly 
90% of food supplies led to what Beveridge called ‘a ruthless 
equalitarianism’107 and the statement from his biographer that ‘he 
wanted to subject the whole of social and economic life to bureaucratic 
control.’ (Harris 1977:243)108 For many others, including colleagues of 
Beveridge, the wartime experience led to different conclusions. The 
intervention of the State in wartime was appropriate to those such as 
Rew and Middleton; the latter having summed up the equation well – 
‘agriculturalists took up the wholly reasonable attitude that if their 
farming was to be dictated by the nation’s needs, and not by their 
ordinary business considerations, the nation should share the risk.’ 
(Middleton 1923:271-272)  
In return for making an investment on behalf of the taxpayer it was 
proportionate for the State to exercise some oversight on the principle 
that ‘without some form of public control, public money must not be 
expended.’ (Middleton 1923:272) Middleton concluded that wartime 
Food Production expenditure was a form of insurance and at ‘only’ £9 
million for the whole of the War a good deal.  But the Corn Production 
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Act 1917 represented an attempt to extend that insurance from 
intervention in wartime only to improving security against future wars. 
The Selbourne Committee on Agricultural Reconstruction 
recommended in 1917 that the price guarantees in the Corn Production 
Act should continue long after the War in an attempt to substantially 
boost production in staple foods and enhance security. Above all, the 
farmers required such a guarantee in return for their willingness to 
make changes during the war; they needed to be shown that they could 
trust State intervention. The Act also recognised the contribution of the 
farm worker by introducing a minimum wage to go alongside the 
minimum price for the farmer and afforded further protection against 
rent increases for tenants. Such a balanced approach was, however, 
upset by the subsequent Corn Production (Amendment) Act 1918 which 
broke significant promises made only the previous year and embodied 
intervention only previously made under D.O.R.A.109 It now appeared 
that the farmers would be ‘subjected permanently to a form of control 
which, however designed to improve efficiency, might involve the loss of 
their land, their homes, and their livelihoods, a form of control which 
was not to be imposed on any other industry.’ (Marrison 1986:41)  
The Fabian vision of a state controlled, nationalised and, above all, 
planned agriculture might have been what Beveridge thought had 
emerged from wartime, but the reality was very different. Middleton 
made the assessment that England could produce significantly more 
food based on wartime experience. It required a greater business sense 
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from farmers, much more deployment of advanced scientific methods 
and the removal of what he termed ‘unwise’ politicians. Self sufficiency 
could be achieved without great difficulty ‘if the people of this country 
were content to place themselves under the direction of some all-
powerful Food Controller, who would feed them with what was 
necessary, as a farmer feeds his cattle.’ (Middleton 1923:323) This 
vision of permanent rationing he declared to be both impractical and 
expensive, but he offered some scope for change in that ‘between 34% 
of food requirements supplied by our land in 1909-1913 and 100% there 
is a wide margin.’ (Middleton 1923:324)  
Even to achieve 40-50% would require State control in order to change 
consumer habits and it was preferable to allow the market to provide 
cheap and abundant food rather than such interference. Henry Rew 
reached the same broad conclusion and added the fact that increased 
demand from working class people for an improved diet would have to 
be met after the War and only increased industrial production could 
guarantee that. He concluded that ‘the millionaire as a rule eats less 
than the miner’ (1920:122) to emphasise his point.110  
From the vantage point of after the conflict, it was possible for Rew to 
conclude that it was ‘the difficulty of distribution, and not the non-
existence of supplies, that was the real trouble.’ (1920:127) Rew 
backed up the conclusions of the 1905 Royal Commission that little 
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could have been done in advance of the war and that the submarine 
threat could not have been foreseen.111  
Christopher Turnor wrote two significant works during the War which 
argued that Britain must learn from the conflict and ensure that ‘never 
again’ will the security of the country be imperilled by low domestic 
production. His emphasis, however, was upon building up the 
countryside by the spread of independent ownership and linking this 
with expansion of colonial agriculture. By way of evidence he suggested 
that the ‘white agricultural population’ of the UK, Australia, Canada, 
South Africa and New Zealand was only 13.4 million compared with the 
20 million Germans so engaged. It was the case that ‘unpeopled and 
undeveloped land in our Overseas Dominions is a source of great 
weakness from the point of view of defence.’ (Turnor 1917:76) The war 
had exposed the neglect of agriculture which should have been the 
primary source of wealth, moral probity and good health. After the war 
there must be a strengthening of Empire and the re-direction of capital 
from the rest of the world. The Government should step in to ‘prevent 
any British citizen from settling outside the British Empire.’ (1917:126) 
The different conclusions reached about wartime and food production 
are manifested in perceptions about the role of the State, both in 
relation to the responsibility to the citizen and to the need to intervene in 
the market. It is generally not clear how the State is able to carry out the 
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competing responsibilities. The position was complicated by the fact 
that wartime intervention had brought about improvements in nutrition 
and substantial reductions in infant mortality. This might be attributed to 
rationing but was largely a product of full employment and women in 
relatively well paid employment. However, the poor state of health of 
potential recruits112 emphasised that the fact that the State needed to 
take some responsibility for future generations. 
Turnor argued for drastic intervention in some affairs whilst warning off 
the state in interfering in farming matters. Rew wanted the re-assertion 
of the market after the war but then put forward a comprehensive 
scheme to get more people on the land as a national priority. This was 
on the grounds that it was better ‘for the physical, moral and mental 
health of the community’ (Rew 1920:168) and sustained the soul of the 
nation for ‘without roots in the soil the country will become soulless and 
effete.’ (1920:168.) The manifesto also incorporated one of the main 
elements of earlier radical interpretations, which was that the land had 
been stolen from English people. 
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The Aftermath. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The varied and contradictory interpretations of food production in the 
War were reflected in the legislative confusion around the Agriculture 
Act. Lloyd George had set out the ambition of the Government in a 
speech in November 1918 that identified the £300 million food imports 
‘that could have been produced here’ and he anticipated that controls – 
if not rationing proper – could be in place for some years. Barnett wrote 
that ‘it would seem to have been settled that the food control apparatus, 
both domestic and international, would be maintained virtually intact for 
some time, possibly years.’ (Barnett 1985:210) Indeed, it appeared 
possible that, with some reservations, all mainstream Political Parties 
shared that view. This moment passed both as a consequence of 
international pressure and financial hardship as the cost of the War 
began to be met. 
The United States led the way in dismantling these controls and 
domestically, decontrol measures were ready to be deployed after the 
armistice. The only way forward was assumed to be the restoration of 
the free market with industry being permitted to move on without 
Government interference. For the agricultural industry, the lesson was 
that ‘the war had revealed the extent to which a policy designed to 
secure the maximum production of food in the national interest was 
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incompatible with their own ability to operate in the market place as they 
wished.’ (Cooper 1989:42)  
Overseas trade needed to resume in order to encourage growth and to 
counter what was feared to be a resurgent Germany. Despite 
enthusiasm from those who had seen the benefits of increased 
domestic food production, the legislative emphasis was placed on 
getting people, especially ex-servicemen, back on the land through the 
Land Settlement Facilities and Acquisition of Land Acts. Once again, it 
became more important to bring life back to villages by increasing land 
ownership (rather than necessarily increasing food production.) The 
continuation of guaranteed prices to farmers were promised at the time 
of the ‘coupon election’ in November 1918 and consolidated in the 
Agriculture Act 1920. Following the re-establishment of international 
trading in 1921, however, world prices in staple products fell 
considerably and would have left the British government with a 
substantial bill for compensation, hence the immediate repeal of the 
1920 Act provisions113.  
With the winding down of the Ministry of Food in 1921 the official end of 
substantial State intervention in farming had been reached. Barnett 
(1985:214) recorded The Times editorial which acknowledged that in 
wartime the Ministry of Food had been necessary but that ‘the net result 
of its history was to furnish an overwhelming argument against state 
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trading in normal times.’114 The ‘great betrayal’ amounted to a breach of 
trust between farmer115 and the state, and left the feeling that for their 
‘sacrifices’ in wartime they received little. 
But the legacy of the wartime experience for food production went 
beyond the concerns of farmers. Middleton, in his official account, 
finished the work with a plea for unity of all interests and Charles 
Fielding in his work noted that we could 
‘produce practically the whole of our food requirements. We have the 
area; We have the good land; We have the suitable climate; We have 
ample population and ... we can produce as cheaply as other countries’ 
(in Burnett 1983:255)  
but a strong sense of purpose and central direction was required. 
Engendered by ‘a strong suspicion (which) grew that the government 
never intended the Act to operate at all,’ (Cooper 1989:55) Many of the 
Conservatives and agriculturalists who had attempted to change Policy 
before the war now considered their options alongside those who 
questioned both Party politics and democracy itself. They were closely 
allied to those who wanted to re-cast England as a country which 
‘based the national economy on agriculture, not industry’ (Conford 
2001:23) and sought inspiration from ideas of Social Credit and Guild 
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Socialism. The latter116 described as ‘not an alternative to Socialism, 
not some new doctrine ... but a new interpretation of Socialism, an 
attempt to make it a more complete and balanced doctrine, more 
completely expressive of democracy.’ This became linked with a revival 
of the ‘Social Imperialism’ of the Tariff Reform period in what has been 
called the ‘Fabian – Liberal imperialist strategy of national efficiency.’ 
(Dorril 2007:37) 
For many in the Conservative Party, state intervention had been 
discredited by the wartime experience, if only on the grounds of cost 
and the need to leave the market to operate on its own terms. The 
Conservative Party position on the role of agriculture had, after the War, 
become intertwined with rural revivalists, re-definers of Socialism, anti - 
Bolshevism and the beginnings of a reverence for the ‘soils of England’ 
based on the primacy of agriculture and self sufficiency.117 For a brief 
period there existed the possibility of the Party being influenced by 
agriculturalists such as Turnor, but by 1923 much of that had been 
discarded. Ironically, the pragmatic way forward for the Party between 
the Wars was influenced by Labour legislation and the adoption of 
Protectionism where the State might play a limited role in promoting 
agriculture.  
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Chapter 5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1919 – 1923 A New Age? 
‘The present order is doomed’118 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This chapter looks specifically at the analyses of the War which opened 
up the possibility of different forms of society with self sufficiency at the 
core. This came about as a result of a current of thought which saw the 
atrocities of War as leading to the need to re-think the essence of 
society and how one might live. 
Guild Socialism 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The re-emergence of Guild Socialism had much to do with the moral 
lessons to be drawn from the conduct of the War. The revival owed 
much to New Age magazine under the editorship of A.R. Orage and the 
work of A.J. Penty, both of whom used earlier works from the mid 
1900’s. The position of Guild Socialism was based on the perceived 
need to challenge the emerging Labour Party on the grounds that  it 
was necessary to look at how a ‘Socialist‘ society might look  after any 
political transformation. The argument pursued was that if a simply 
crude mechanistic solution was sought – the State taking over industry 
on behalf of the working class – then little substantive progress would 
have been made. Instead, it was argued that it was necessary to pursue 
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different co-operative solutions where the State would underpin, and be 
subordinate to, comprehensively organised groups of trades or 
Guilds.119 
The specific aim of Guild Socialism was ‘an attempt to apply the organic 
conception of society to modern conditions’ (Martin 1967:200) and 
based on limiting capitalism on the one hand and the power of the State 
on the other. Other political perspectives failed to understand the 
‘organic’ nature of society as they are predicated upon taking ‘our 
industrial system for granted as a thing of permanence and stability.’ 
(Penty 1921:14) The indictment of Labour Party aspirations came in the 
assessment that if they achieved power then they ‘would be subject to 
the same economic laws to which employers are subject today’ (Penty 
1921:20) and would be running the same system with the addition of 
considerable State power. 
Penty examined alternative forms of societal organisation in the light of 
his analysis of the causes of World War 1, which he saw as an 
extension of an inevitable trade war with competition for raw materials, 
Capitalist economic expansion and colonial conquest. Further, the cost 
of the War itself resulted in Britain selling investments abroad and 
entering into a cycle in which it would be unable to sell into foreign 
markets and therefore be unable to afford food and other raw materials. 
This was illustrative of the short future life of the industrial system as the 
War had exposed the contradictions of arrangements ‘whereby goods 
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are produced at one end of the earth and food at the other (which) does 
not possess within itself the elements of permanence.’ (Penty 1921:21) 
In arguing for a more ‘organic’ society which would move away from the 
inherent conflicts within capitalism, the Guild Socialists asserted the 
primacy of agriculture above all other endeavours. Penty wrote that 
‘agriculture is fundamental, since the price of food determines the cost 
of everything else.’ (Penty 1921:23) In addition, New Age put forward 
the need for a reformed society to avoid the ‘Marxist dictatorship’ which 
had already afflicted the Soviet Union. This built upon the earlier work of 
Penty himself in 1906 but also incorporated the notion of the ‘Servile 
State’ which Belloc120 had deployed to ‘describe a beneficent despotism 
whereby the working classes sacrificed their freedom in exchange for 
social welfare measures.’ (Martin 1967:193)  
British vulnerability to the cyclical nature of Capitalist production was 
enhanced by its dependency upon overseas food supplies, which 
constituted a fundamental weakness in itself but Penty used food policy 
to illustrate that Capitalism was short sighted and unable to plan for a 
sustainable future.  From within Socialism itself those elements of 
mutual aid and co-operation could be harnessed to run a society based 
upon the primacy of the Producer expressed through Guilds. The State 
would underpin the Guilds, would assist them but generally allow them 
to organise their own production, welfare and levels of output. A society 
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run on morally appropriate lines such as this would be the expression of 
a moral economic theory in turn based on a self sufficient society in 
which agriculture is paramount. The role of industry would be to supply 
the domestic market and work alongside agriculture. Penty summed up 
this approach as ‘the corollary of the substitution for international 
competition of international co-operation is the revival of agriculture, for 
it implies a return to the idea of communities that are as self contained 
as circumstances will allow; and such communities inevitably rest upon 
agriculture.’ (Penty 1921:74) 
This general analysis of society was shared by the Social Credit121 
movement which was equally promoted by the New Age. The chief 
proponent was Major Douglas who argued that the increase in 
productive capacity during the War indicated that the needs of 
manufacturing industry exceeded the capacity of the planet to provide 
raw materials. ‘The factory system of the world is prepared, to a degree 
transcending anything dreamt of in the past, to flood the market with 
any article on which a profit can apparently be made.’ (Douglas 1918: 
429-430)122 it followed that even the provision of food had to be 
subordinated to the need to make profits in industries or spheres of 
activity unrelated to agriculture. 
 Douglas argued that Britain was capable of producing its own food 
from within its own resources but was prevented from doing so by 
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international trade and the needs of financiers. Any farmer, but 
especially the small producer, has to contend with the work of the 
speculator in their everyday operations. As Hutchinson and Burkitt 
pointed out, Douglas also anticipated the growth of a highly centralized, 
processed and transport dependent food network based on maximising 
profit.123 Instead of long term instability and inevitable war, it was 
necessary to adopt a system whereby ‘each country meets its own 
subsistence needs (and) international trade can be conducted in mutual 
co-operation.’ (Hutchinson and Burkitt 1997:72)  
The practical organisation of self sufficient agriculture would be left to 
the Agricultural Guilds, who would assume complete responsibility for 
production, breeding, quality control and all aspects of the trade as a 
whole and who would receive a ‘Just Price’ in return. This not only 
encouraged production necessary for the requirements of the nation, it 
also meant that work was carried out with dignity and inbuilt 
craftsmanship. This approach had been put forward by an earlier work 
of A.J. Penty124 but also referred back to the output of William Morris 
and John Ruskin which it seemed the Fabian Society had discarded as 
‘outmoded’. In fact even the Fabian Society seemed to find the mood of 
the after War conducive to re-considering its pragmatic world view, with 
the re-issuing of Tracts on Robert Owen, William Morris, Charles 
Kingsley and John Ruskin. The reprinted Tract No. 182 of 1922 by 
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C.E.M Joad125 emphasised Owens words of 1834 that ‘as long as 
master contends with master, no improvement either for man or master 
will be possible. There is no alternative, therefore, but national 
companies for each trade. All trades shall first form associations or 
parochial lodges, to consist of a convenient number for carrying on the 
business.’ (1922:26) in the same year, G.D.H. Cole produced the 
definitive Fabian Society tract126 on Guild Socialism as a redefinition of 
Socialism incorporating an extension of democracy to incorporate 
industrial control. Instead of nationalisation of the land, Cole advanced 
the view that ‘we believe the right way of running an industry is to hand 
it over to be worked by the people who know the best possible way of 
working it efficiently.’ (1922:12-13)  
Capitalism stood in opposition to ‘a gradual reversion to localism, to 
smaller-scale production, to meet the gradual demands of the consumer 
for goods of a higher quality.’ (1922:16)  
Localism also stood as the only sustainable way forward for Britain, with 
Capitalism only a temporary phase. Penty commented that the revival 
of small scale agriculture would also assist in dealing with sustained 
high levels of unemployment, meet the pressing need for a better diet 
and increase the health of the population. The lesson of the War is that 
‘we had a larger percentage of physical inefficient than any other 
country at war.’ (Penty 1921:74) The notion of the decline in the health, 
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or vitality, of the stock of the nation is also used by Penty as one of the 
defining reasons for the rebalancing of the economy with agriculture at 
the core. The role of the ‘new peasantry’ will be to act ‘as a reservoir 
from which the towns replenish their stock.’ (Penty 1921:75) Whilst 
Capitalism might be highly efficient in the production of goods in doing 
so it undermines the nation state. Thus, people need to act and return 
the land ‘to the principles of justice, honesty and a fair dealing.’ (Penty 
1921:75) The notion of ‘Agriculture first’ in Guild Socialism has to be 
understood as the creation of a society from the foundations, the idea of 
being based upon a ‘real’ set of needs and not the illusions of 
Capitalism.  
This sense of not being vulnerable to forces of Capitalism is found 
across political discourse in the early 1920’s. The search is for some 
way of living which is beyond economic forces or which cannot be 
subservient to them. Given the many changes in the British and World 
economies by 1923 this sense of vulnerability was heightened by a 
widespread conception that Britain, although the victor, had emerged 
from the War dependent upon the United States and in debt to that 
nation for the foreseeable future. Penty and Cole conveyed that 
substantial questions needed to be addressed about ‘progress’ if it is 
only expressed through continuing industrial development. If material 
prosperity is elevated as the main driver for Society, then it is seen that 
only selfishness underpins economics.  
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For Cole, economic arguments are in reality moral arguments as to 
what sort of society is desirable. Penty (1921:99) argued that there is a 
decline in both ‘collective morality’ and ‘simultaneously with it personal 
morality has suffered a decline.’ We might reach the point of starvation 
because our thought processes are impinged by a dependency upon 
machinery. To quote Penty in his introduction to his 1921 work, ‘a 
general consensus is growing up that the present order is doomed.’ 
Once again, there is the evocation of former times from which to seek 
some sense of how to return to the fundamentals of life. At the heart 
was an ‘updated’ interpretation of a Mediaeval Society with a simple 
religious understanding based on the motto of ‘they shall maintain the 
fabric of the world and in the handiwork of their craft is their prayer.’127 
Anti Capitalism? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This amalgam of anti – Capitalism with the need to find some earlier 
configuration of Society in which men were afforded more dignity was 
something which interested both Left and Right political discourses. 
In a work published in 1923 the landowner and agriculturalist 
Christopher Turnor128 concluded that in the last one hundred years all 
the political parties had failed to support rural Britain and had fallen prey 
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to a town based view of the world which had ‘made Agriculture its cat’s-
paw  (and) traded mercilessly on its ignorance.’ (1923:9)  
He attributed the primary responsibility for the failure to develop home 
food production to the Conservative Party which, he alleged, had since 
1840 only courted urban support and had treated its own loyal rural 
supporters ‘with a neglect amounting to contempt’ (1923:19) In similar 
vein, his dismissal of the Liberal Party –‘no first hand acquaintance of 
rural affairs’ (1923:19) was coupled with what he perceived as their 
opportunistic approaches to rural voters by mounting successive Land 
campaigns. Of the Labour Party, Turnor identified that Socialism 
generally had a real problem with the ‘peasantry’ in that they formed 
part of the ‘great bulwark of private property against revolution.’ 
(1923:22)  
That one might find an authority on rural affairs to be so critical of all 
political parties for ignoring domestic food production is not unduly 
surprising but it is important to note that Turnor was part of a group of 
agriculturalists and politicians who were influential both before and 
during the 1914 – 1918 War. The sense of frustration and betrayal that 
Turnor showed in 1923 was one which was widespread amongst that 
group and was an amalgam of a number of fears for the future of Britain 
(or, more commonly, England)  
Turnor was a member of a loose alliance of those in the early 1920’s 
who felt a deep sense of betrayal by both the Conservative Party and 
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government generally allied to fear of Bolshevism. They doubted that 
democracy would be strong enough, or even the right system, to 
withstand socialism.  
Turnor had advocated the formation of a new ‘National Party’ in an 
earlier work published in 1911129 and had been part of significant 
political movements during the 1914-1918 War. He had been a member 
of the British Worker’s League which had developed out of an attempt 
by many ‘socialists’ to show that patriotism was more important than 
ideology. An important figure in the formation of the movement was 
Blatchford, assisted by some Fabians and H.G. Wells. Blatchford 
advocated a Socialism in wartime ‘which was characterized by 
economic nationalism, imperialism and patriotism’ (Dorril 2007:39) in 
ways which had changed little from his earlier work (Chapter 2) but 
which formed a bridge with British fascism (Chapter 9) 
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the British Worker’s League grew 
on the back of a nationalistic, non – socialist and uniquely English 
approach to post war reconstruction.  In the ‘Coupon Election’ 130  the 
League put forward candidates with the new title of the National 
Democratic and Labour Party. In 1911 the earlier move for a ‘National 
Party’ had been on the basis of asserting agricultural primacy, arguing 
that such neglect  was responsible for many of the current ills. The 
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former Conservative Prime Minister Bonar Law had stated that ‘the 
granaries of the Dominions should supply the working man with 
breadstuffs’ (Cooper 1989:7) meaning that he had little interest in 
domestic agriculture. For Turnor and others that approach typified the 
Conservative contempt for agriculture. 
The frustration expressed by Turnor in 1923 is an indication of the 
extent to which the Conservative Party had struggled to adopt a 
consistent approach to agriculture since the advent of the ‘Great 
Depression.’ Agriculturalists had failed to be convinced by what might 
be beneficial when it came to Tariff Reform and when such a policy had 
been adapted to favour colonial agriculture, had become fearful of the 
competition from countries with an abundance of cheap land. Turnor in 
1923 was also expressing widespread rural frustration in that when the 
Government had belatedly become involved in food production in 1917 
there were promises made to farmers that agriculture would never 
again be neglected.131As the Act was repealed after only six months, in 
what has become known as the ‘Great Betrayal’, the anger of Turnor 
and other agriculturalists is understandable.132 Turnor wrote that ‘the 
city hangs around the countryman’s neck when famine or revolution 
threaten, and forgets its most solemn protestations or governmental 
pledges in five minutes – as soon as the danger has passed.’ (1923:35) 
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Whilst many self congratulatory works had been penned on how 
successful Government food administration had been from 1916 to 
1918, there had been only a comparatively small increase in the 
amount of arable land cultivated during the War. Much of the ploughed 
up land had been on poor soil and whilst the harvest was boosted for 
1918, such land would have needed considerable investment for longer 
term fertility. The financial incentives for farmers had been implemented 
in such a way as ‘to encourage farmers to grow oats, a cattle food, 
instead of human food as intended.’ (Cooper 1989:54)  The notion that 
agriculture was to be rewarded for its ‘war effort’ did not seem 
convincing to farmers, when many had expended much effort in 
resisting Government ‘meddling’ during the War.  
The dilemma for agriculturalists such as Turnor was that State 
intervention would never be in the interests of landowners. Whilst 
Turnor had been part of the Conservative re-think of agriculture before 
the War, he was now regarded as being the main proponent of a 
nostalgic back to the land approach. He was seen as embodying ‘a 
nostalgic quest for national stability and national safety.’ (Cooper 
1989:56) and expressing a view of society not in accord with practical 
politics. In short, as Cooper wrote, he was now ‘a crank.’ (1989:56)  
 
Turnor put much effort into the proposed Rural Party in order to 
advance the rural interest and to act on behalf of the wider society by 
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countering the imminent threat of revolution. Socialists were now 
‘seeking a revolution, a bureaucracy and a dictatorship’ (Turnor 
1923:42) on the grounds that industrial democracy and Capitalism are 
incompatible. Turnor’s argument was that democracy cannot work in 
the cities, but only in the countryside because it is where people know 
each other and there is no party politics. Instead, there can be the 
consensual emergence of ‘good people’ and ‘leaders’. Landowners, 
farmers and farm workers can build unity on the back of common rural 
identity. The main aim of the Rural Party would be to act against the 
interests of the City and create a society of balance, albeit one which 
based on the primacy of agriculture as ‘national welfare demands that 
our land shall be as productive as possible.’ (Turnor 1923:61) 
What is critical, however, in the 1923 work of Turnor133 is outlined in the 
Chapter entitled ‘The Only Hope’. The view is expressed that existing 
Political Parties and the NFU have betrayed agriculture and the task of 
the Rural Party is therefore pressing and vital. It is stated that ‘in the 
realm of politics reason has no sway. Only force counts. Remember 
that. It is everlastingly true. ONLY FORCE COUNTS. Free Trade has 
sheltered and fostered the foreign trade of our cities at our expense. It 
is going to be our turn now.’ (Turnor and Gilbert 1923:56-57)  
The phrase ‘our turn now’ in 1923 seems prescient in terms of the many 
organisations from the Right which attempted to incorporate motifs of 
the ‘rural’ or ‘soil’ or ‘Englishness’ into their calls for action in the 1930’s. 
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The work offered up a vision of a society on the brink of a much more 
substantial collapse. The rise of the Rural Party will be to promote ‘a 
return towards the conditions of the beginning of the last century.’ 
(1923:77) This back to the land movement is at one level practical – to 
avert starvation – but of greater importance is the need to go back to 
our grandfathers because ‘they believed in something real; and that is 
essential; for unless a people have faith they must surely perish.’ 
(1923:83)  
The work concluded that ‘A people must have one King, one Church 
and one Law before they can live together as a community with comfort 
or happiness or safety. To believe anything else is to suffer from the 
illusion of progress that has poisoned our idealists for so long a time.’ 
(1923:84) 
The State as the Real Enemy? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The ties between Guild Socialism and Turnor can be clearly seen in 
respect of the restorative role of religion and a respect for pre Capitalist 
formations. There is also an important additional point which starts to 
emerge from both these perspectives and that is the notion of 
deployment of natural resources. Penty advocated that the use of 
machinery should be limited to the extent that labour should be utilised 
instead, but appended an even more important point in that such a 
limitation acknowledged ‘the exhaustion of natural resources which 
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follows its unregulated use.’ (Penty 1921:89) Penty highlighted oil 
supplies using the topical example where ‘we are engaged in a war in 
Mesopotamia to secure another source of supply.’ He concluded that ‘it 
is sheer folly, to say the least, to commit ourselves to methods of 
production and transport that depend upon supplies that are limited.’ 
(1921:89) The consequences of moving away from a ‘natural’ approach 
to living would be higher rates of diseases and a diminution in fertility as 
a consequence of trying to maintain production levels through the use 
of artificial fertilizers. 
These particular perspectives arising from both Left and Right positions 
share anti – Capitalist stances but also offered critiques of the modern 
world predicated on the belief that it was necessary to look at the 
assumptions which underpin liberal notions of ‘progress’. Included in 
that are attacks on democracy: for the Guild Socialists with a view to 
broadening its scope to avoid centralised state control and for Turnor to 
avoid being ruled by town based politicians under the control of Finance 
Capital. Both use earlier forms of Englishness to underpin their vision 
and both place food growing and self sufficiency at the centre of 
societal priorities. Whilst the image of the ‘golden age’ had been 
important to the Radical and Socialist perspectives before 1900, it 
seemed as if a more determined effort was now being made to 
appropriate native and natural role models. Particularly, there was a 
move towards an appreciation of how a powerful moral force might be 
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able to counter capitalism. Linehan134 noted how the Tudor State was 
deployed by forerunners of the Fascist movement with ‘its objective of 
national integration through authoritarian centralised government’ 
(2000:14) and incorporating restrictions on money and a planned 
economy. The decline of the Tudor State had ushered in ‘individualism, 
‘class-egotism’ and free-trade laissez faire internationalism’ (2000:15) 
and the primacy of the market over the national interest. The most 
obvious manifestation of that lay in the decline in agriculture, with the 
British Union of Fascists evocation of the 1815 Corn Laws ‘ideal of a 
self supporting agriculture and its goal of stimulating domestic 
production.’ (Linehan 2000:16)135 
The idea of a central force had been a component part of the thinking of 
many of those associated agriculturalists who asserted the primacy of 
the landowner and of the aristocracy. Lord Lymington136 saw such 
people as having a responsibility to govern which originated from the 
‘natural order’ of things. The State was in a sense a competitor to such 
interests, a jealous rival who attempted to undermine them with burdens 
of legislation and taxation. The feudal system understood the nature of 
life through an understanding of the rights and obligations of private 
property, and the imposition of death duties constituted no less than a 
form of confiscation. Lymington summed up this by referring to ‘the 
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political evils (which) have been caused by over-indulgence of talk 
about the rights of man.’ (Lymington 1932:55)   
In order that ‘duty’ may carried out and the ‘competitor state’ be 
overcome then the concept of the strong man appeared attractive as a 
possible solution. Linehan noted the early fascist preoccupation with 
Thomas Carlyle as an opponent of materialism and who, it is 
suggested, supported a ‘Hero-King’ who ‘would revive the old 
aristocratic virtues of duty, responsibility and service and thus provide 
an alternative to the contemporary parliamentary ‘age of government by 
mediocrities.’’ (Linehan 2000:16)137 
In terms of  much of the political analysis of the early 1920’s the 
evidence for the ‘mediocrities’ can be found in the conduct of the war 
itself, the failure to deal with the Irish question effectively, labour unrest 
and imperial decline.  
In ‘Culture and Society’138 Williams noted the point made by Carlyle that 
‘with the completest winning of democracy there is , nothing yet won – 
except emptiness and the free chance to win.’ (1967:73.)139 The 
population, which has become unduly mechanical, requires the 
imposition of a sense of order in which those who should govern will 
‘make themselves an active and responsible governing class.’ (Williams 
1967:81)  In essence, the Fabian position of the scientific and 
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managerial leadership of society – ‘the sphere of the brain working 
professional will be a great one’ (Webb 1920:15)140 shared much of the 
vision of Carlyle, in that order is prized above all. Before the War this 
vision had been challenged by Hilaire Belloc in The Servile State who 
had noted that the prospect of the State running things ‘appeals to the 
tidy minded bureaucrat who is one main type of social reformer.’ 
(Williams 1967:187)  
Belloc identified another ‘golden age,’ before the Reformation, when the 
Guild system was working towards a comprehensive scheme for a fairer 
society. Goods were produced to meet the needs of the populace; 
balance was brought about through responsibility. His prescription for 
the future was based on ‘small self governing communities of individual 
property owners’ (Coker 1921:199) who would co-operate with other 
such bodies to create a pluralistic democracy. This was advocated in 
order to challenge collectivism through ‘Distributivism’ and to move 
away from a state of ‘mere Capitalist anarchy.’ (Belloc 1912:198) 
In The Country and the City Raymond Williams noted the many 
attempts to evoke the sense of Old England by moving back to 
particular eras. In identifying the prevalence of such imagery Williams 
wrote of the ‘successive Old Englands to which we are confidently 
referred but which then start to move and recede.’ (1973:12.) Looking 
back at different times and different values fits well with the period 
immediately after the War given the scale and the nature of wartime 
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destruction. As Williams wrote it is always a ‘traditional’ society which 
emerges in these imaginings, one which possesses qualities which 
might be seen as natural. It is not the precise nature of that imagined 
society which is important but to be aware that it is a ‘particular kind of 
reaction to the fact of change, and thus has more real and more 
interesting social causes.’ (1973:35.) The key component is always the 
‘idealisation of feudal and immediately post – feudal values.’ (1973:35.) 
The simplicity of these apparent societies is expressed both in a natural 
sense of order and hierarchy but also the centrality of land ownership. 
Industry is confined to that which agriculture needs to function and 
transport and distribution systems are limited and local. However, there 
is no accompanying appraisal of what was produced, how it was 
distributed and what constituted the diet of the citizen. Indeed, there is 
very little in the analysis which shows an understanding of how such a 
society worked. It is a critique primarily about capitalism and its 
tendency to be unstable, divisive and favouring finance over production.  
Conclusion 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
It is possible for anti-Capitalist analyses to be part of Left and Right 
political discourses. In many respects, this is much easier from the 
Right as although the Fabian Society had an interest in re-issuing works 
on figures such as William Morris in the immediate post war period, it 
still resolutely ploughed on with schemes for a managed Capitalism. 
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Indeed, it was the clear vision of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in 
proposing that the State take over the centralized purchase of food and 
raw materials, as had happened in 1917, that was one of the reasons 
why Oswald Mosley joined the party in 1924. The ILP advocated a 
Central Committee on production which would seek ways of ensuring 
the most rational approach to agricultural and industrial output. 
Many on the Right appreciated the imagery of the Feudal Society but 
had a heightened fear of Bolshevism and a distrust of democracy. 
Whilst accepting that the old feudal values could not be realistically 
brought back under Capitalism they were attracted to the possibilities 
offered by a strong man, who might be able to overcome economic 
forces.  
Williams (1973:36) termed this ‘the offensive against democracy in the 
name of blood and soil’ which was the product of the ‘persistent rural – 
intellectual radicalism’ in Britain. It is worth recollecting the demand of 
Christopher Turnor that force is required in order to assert the rural 
interest, but there was no real sense of who that should be directed 
against.  
However, it is clear that in the four years after the War that the figure of 
Mussolini became important to some people.. The formation of fasci in 
Italy from 1919 ‘was a campaign by landowners and commercial lease 
holding farmers to put a definitive end to working class agitation and 
organisations by force’ (Morgan 1995:36) and this was based on a 
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desire to counter any socialized agriculture. By 1921 this had been 
incorporated into Fascist Land Policy which asserted a type of local 
agrarian democracy outlined in Turnor’s work of 1923. Indeed, the local 
organisations were predicated on a system of agrarian syndicalism 
which created a ‘national community of all producers through 
corporations of workers and employers’ (Morgan 1995:45) thus 
encompassing the aspirations of both Guild Socialism and the Rural 
Party. 
The inter war period was characterised by the somewhat hesitant rise of 
the Labour Party and the decline of the Liberal Party but was essentially 
a Conservative period in British life. The period up to 1924 was one of 
profound crisis and various attempts to think about the country in ways 
which ‘required the inculcation of ‘integrating myths’ that would 
contribute something positive to social solidarity.’ (Webber 1986:57)  
Whilst there was general level of confidence on the Left that Capitalism 
could be ‘managed,’ many of those participating in the political 
discourse saw the War as an indication of moral bankruptcy, saw 
Capitalism as being inimical to the national interest and therefore 
sought to advocate a return to earlier, self sufficient models. The 
Conservative Party sought to incorporate such views but at the same 
time developed an essentially pragmatic non ideological approach to 
government. 
 On the Right, therefore, there was a tendency for those who saw 
themselves as being outside that emerging consensual approach to 
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start new Political Parties, to be attracted to Fascism or to see 
themselves (and agriculture) as being somehow ‘above’ politics. 
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Chapter Six 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Food and Agriculture 1923 – 1939: The Conservative Party 
‘I see barns falling, fences broken; 
Pasture not ploughland, weeds not wheat.’141 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Introduction 
Both this and the following chapter concentrate upon changes in the 
mainstream political discourse in the interwar period. By the mid 1930’s 
these changes had resulted in an important shift in the perception of 
food and agriculture and had created an apparent consensus on the 
role of agriculture within a managed Capitalism. However, such a 
consensus further marginalised ideas about food self sufficiency, 
resulting in many advocates of the need to increase domestic food 
production or back to the land becoming increasingly attracted by 
utilising non democratic methods. 
The Changing Party 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Conservative Party in the interwar period went through a number of 
changes in the composition of the Party in the country and in Parliament 
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involving a reduction in the influence of the landowning interest. This did 
not result in the wholesale acceptance of the merits of Capitalism but 
the gradual development of an understanding of how Capitalist and 
National interests might be brought together.  
Nevertheless, as far as the Labour Party was concerned, the 
Conservatives were the friends of the farmer if not the landowner. Philip 
Snowden made the point in the House of Commons that ‘agriculture 
has always been the pampered darling of the party opposite (in Moore 
1991:344) and even after the Second World War Tom Williams wrote of 
farmers that they ‘helped keep the Tories in power and the Tories did 
little to relieve the depression of the industry.’ (1965:115) 
The assumed link between landowners and the Conservatives was not, 
in fact, as great as Labour asserted. Even as early as 1923, Parliament 
was dominated by factory owners, business interests and lawyers142 
The House of Lords was more influenced by the landowning interest but 
most of the major debates on agriculture took place in that House, 
rather than the Commons, and there landowners and farmers were 
treated as being ‘experts.’ The NFU had the aim in the early part of the 
interwar period of trying to exempt agriculture from political discourse, 
pursuing a principle which was established at the time of their 
foundation in 1908. This was an approach designed to ‘lift politics out of 
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agriculture, and uplift agriculture above politics.’ (Self and Storing 
1962:42)143 
Anthony Eden in 1947 looked back at the interwar period recalling that 
‘we are not a Party of unbridled, brutal capitalism, and never have been. 
Although we believe in personal responsibility and personal initiative in 
business, we are not the political children of the laissez faire school. We 
opposed them decade after decade.’ (Glickman 1961:136)144 
Reasons for Intervention 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In respect of agriculture, it was those Conservatives in the National 
government who intervened in the sector more than the short lived 
Labour Administration by introducing measures of protection on the one 
hand and strengthening the producer cartels on the other. From 1924 
onwards the Conservative Party developed a view of agriculture in 
which ‘economic progress replaced social stability as the watchword of 
the party’ (Cooper 1989:72) but in doing so adopted often contradictory 
positions on the role of the State. Above all, at the beginning of the 
period, the wish was to operate at arm’s length from agriculture, and 
move away from the wartime model of co-operation. Moore (1991:359) 
identified the ambiguity of the Conservative position at the time: 
‘although they detested direct control, they wanted the Ministry of 
Agriculture to intervene decisively in farming affairs.’ It was also the 
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case that there appeared to be no feasible way of intervening in one 
sector of the farming industry without ignoring the claims of another. 
In the 1925 House of Lords debate on the Agricultural Tribunal of 
Investigation145 Lord Bledisloe146 made the point that the NFU had 
never asked for either special treatment or a subsidy and that other 
industries such as coal, steel and shipbuilding would have equally valid 
claims for State assistance. Whilst the Labour Party saw the 
possibilities of an industrialised agriculture as offering greater outputs 
from larger farms, the Conservative Party concentrated upon the sector 
as offering a market for the products of British industry. In the search for 
‘expert’ opinion the Conservatives were prepared to utilise the expertise 
of many of the new producers who were becoming household names – 
ICI, Ford, Massey Harris, David Brown and International Harvester.147 
The ‘experts’ offered up the possibility of an expansion of domestic food 
production through larger farm sizes using large scale agricultural 
machinery, specialisation of output and the application of artificial 
fertilisers to increase yields. It would be fair to say that both of the major 
parties bought into this narrative; though for the Labour Party there was 
an initial unwillingness to acknowledge the big business interests 
involved in the promotion of this approach148. In order for these changes 
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to take place it eventually became the Conservative view that it was 
necessary to shelter under some form of Protection with some 
exemption for the Empire. But at the time of the 1925 Debate neither 
protectionism nor a policy of industrial intervention were politically 
feasible. Whilst it was acknowledged that the previous Labour 
administration had intervened in respect of sugar beet, Lord Bledisloe 
claimed it was only acceptable for a new crop and would be the only 
setting ‘under which there will be any guarantee of securing increased 
production as the result.’ (c.413) 
The grounds for State intervention must be applied with great care in 
that ‘any subsidy on a general scale by which public money is paid to 
men for doing no more than they would do without it, is difficult to 
defend.’ (c.413) The Government may assist in the restructuring of the 
industry, but this had to be at a respectable distance given that the 
Agricultural Tribunal of Investigation had, as with the Royal Commission 
of 1905, rejected the need to intervene on grounds of national security. 
The broader role of the Government as seen by the Conservatives in 
1925 was to assist agriculture by ensuring the continuation of free trade 
and, in what might seem to be something of a paradox, to encourage 
overseas settlement of farmers in the Colonies to ensure maximum 
productive output for this country.  
Influential Conservative thinkers, along with the NFU and the Central 
Landowners Association (CLA), questioned what particular expertise 
any Government could bring in assisting agriculture. In the House of 
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Lords Debate the Duke of Buccleuch argued that the State had only 
ever contrived to place burdens upon farming and land ownership in the 
guise of taxation, death duties and educational and social costs. He 
argued that ‘in the old days the agricultural stock and everything else in 
Britain was miles ahead of that in any other country in the world. That 
was in the days before Parliament began to interfere with agriculture.’ 
(c.433) The State should pull back from anything other than general 
oversight, with the Ministry of Agriculture returned to the staffing levels 
of 1905.  This statement certainly needs to be recalled when 
considering the conversion to active management of capitalism, and 
equally of farming as a capitalist enterprise by the National Government 
only six years later. 
Whilst this might seem to be an isolated voice arguing for an old style 
Toryism (not one recognised by Eden) it is worth noting the conclusion 
of the agriculturalist and historian Lord Ernle in 1925 is that  
‘nothing seems more certain in politics that British agriculture will 
be neither subsidised nor protected.’ (Ernle 1925:222)149  
The NFU had also shown their resistance to state interference when 
they had boycotted the National Council of Agriculture in 1924. In doing 
this, the Union had tried to forestall any rival to their own authority but 
also had signalled that they wanted no return to wartime interference. 
For the Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin the NFU was 
‘selfish, unconstructive, greedy and ungrateful.’ (Cooper 1989:69) 
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What was prized above even NFU involvement in the interwar period 
was the amenable agricultural expert. Whilst Christopher Turnor was 
initially welcomed but then ostracized as the political implications of his 
agricultural advice became clear there were a small group of ‘experts’ 
who were courted by both the Conservative and Labour parties. In the 
1925 House of Lords debate Lord Ernle, the most prized of experts 
(and, above all respected as the historian of farming as well as an 
administrator in World War 1), framed the debate in very precise terms 
in arguing that there needs to be ‘a very clear distinction between an 
agricultural policy framed in the interests of the industry and a national 
policy towards agriculture framed in the interests of the nation.’ (c.441) 
This distinction occupied the attentions of all parties in the interwar 
period, but in 1925 Lord Ernle concluded that no intervention was 
required on purely agricultural grounds. The industry could simply move 
out of cereal production and move into grassland production and sell 
fresh meat and milk into the domestic market. To do this, it simply had 
to follow sound agricultural practice without external assistance. In 
considering the alternative approach advocated by the ILP and the 
Labour Party – Land Nationalisation – Lord Ernle saw that Government 
control of agriculture in the national interest would have to be replicated 
in all the other main industries of the country and was consequently 
undesirable, unfeasible and costly. 
Earl De La Warr, speaking for the Labour Party in the Debate, saw any 
talk of subsidy as ‘representing the failure of private enterprise’ (c.438) 
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and thus providing the grounds for Government intervention. He 
proposed a return to World War 1 structures with the County 
Agricultural Committees assuming local interventionist roles to 
implement national policy objectives. Lord Harris, in summing up the 
debate for the Government, rejected any assertion that private 
enterprise had failed and accused the Labour Party of really saying that 
it is farmers who have failed, thus implying that any intervention was 
‘anti-farmer’. 
In this one substantial House of Lords Debate in 1925 are to be found 
the establishment of a number of clearly stated but obviously 
contradictory positions. Lord Bledisloe, previously courted by both the 
Liberal and Labour Parties, believed in farmers being businesslike in 
order to increase their productivity. In addition the Conservative Party 
had a wish to see more people settled on the land in units which most 
people would have seen either as uneconomic or constituting state 
sponsored unfair competition to farmers. The Conservatives, no more 
than Lloyd George, still maintained an appreciation of the virtues of land 
settlement in maintaining ‘old’ England. Perceptions of what constituted 
‘businesslike’ farming were difficult to define, let alone how Government 
might assist. 
For the Conservative Party what stands is the principle put forward by 
Bonar Law in 1923 that ‘agriculture must lie on an economic basis’ 
(Brassley et al. 2006:190) This position was further strengthened by the 
1926 White Paper on Agriculture which re-iterated the positions of no 
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protection and no subsidy. However, the White Paper stated that 
‘agricultural policy should aim to maximise food output and provide a 
reasonable livelihood for the greatest number of people.’150  
The Conservative policy of non intervention could only be sustained if 
agriculture were somehow to transform itself or for there to be some 
possibility of a transformative outside element to be introduced. The 
latter appeared to be possible given the extent to which the suppliers to 
the agricultural industry offered apparently risk free and  scientific 
increases in yields and the utilisation of currently marginal lands by the 
application of artificial fertilisers. Mechanisation offered both reduced 
labour costs, whilst offering higher wages to those who remained, and 
higher productivity per worker. Farm sizes would have to be increased 
and inefficient smaller operators absorbed into larger units. Thus 
farming might be saved by these new and transformative 
developments. 
In other words, although political discourse had rarely felt confident with 
agricultural matters, it was now being assisted with an argument that 
there was nothing special or different about agriculture after all, it was 
simply an industry like any other. As an ‘industry’ it suffered from a lack 
of capital investment which meant that expensive new equipment could 
not be afforded. Cooper (1989:97) noted that the effect of agricultural 
policy developed by the Conservatives from 1926 ‘was to give a 
disguised subsidy to manufacturing industry.’ 
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This is a critical change in that State involvement (i.e. public money) 
could be justified largely on the grounds that it brought together the new 
sector of science and technology and the old industry of agriculture. 
Given the prospect of unlimited increases in productivity offered by 
industrial farming this contributed to ‘a profound transformation of the 
central assumption on which the Conservative party’s agricultural policy 
was predicated.’ (Cooper 1989:76)  The Labour Party Conference in 
1926 had reached very similar conclusions by adopting ‘a vigorous 
constructive policy [to] achieve the threefold ideal of better farming, 
better business, better living.’ (Williams 1965:73) Tom Williams, later 
Minister of Agriculture in 1945 commented in his autobiography it was 
an attempt on the part of the Labour Party ‘to find a halfway house 
between the Tory extreme of protection and the Liberal one of free 
trade.’ (1965:73) Williams does not explain why it was necessary to 
occupy this halfway house, but it is worth noting that both the major 
parties adopted the mantra of ‘business’ around the same time. 
Given that the possibilities of science and technology were ‘without limit’ 
then intervention by the State did not have to be overly concerned with 
artificial targets for increased output – the discourse was influenced by 
the assumption that food output would be maximised because only the 
profitable crops would be planted. The role of the State was ‘to 
encourage and materially assist the industry to organise itself more 
effectively.’ (Brassley 2006:155) and confined to interventions in 
drainage, science and education, marketing and the provision of credit. 
In return farming had to be more businesslike in ways which were 
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largely specified by the new breed of experts who were no longer 
academics or researchers but much more likely to be employed by 
supply companies. For the Conservative Party nobody in the farming 
industry had in any way ‘failed’ but needed reorganising in such a way 
that the State operated with discretion and, at the same time, opened 
up a market for suppliers. By the time of the National Government the 
Conservatives had also appreciated the advantages of the 1931 
Marketing Legislation and tapped into the sentiment that consumers 
were losing out by virtue of the operation of middlemen who artificially 
increased prices. 
A Consensus? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Both the main political parties were starting to agree on a core set of 
policies by the mid 1930’s, despite the Labour Party maintaining the 
policy of land nationalisation. Both parties justified state intervention 
based on elements from their own philosophies and pasts. However, 
that they did so meant that some of the profound contradictions of 
farming policy were not brought out in mainstream political discourse. 
The measure of consensus did, however, attract particular opprobrium 
from both those inspired by Fascism, especially the ‘successes’ of 
Mussolini and the possibilities of autarky, by the emerging Organic 
movement and by those arguing for rural revival through a return to ‘old’ 
values. 
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The mainstream discourse could agree on the aims of ‘promoting 
economic growth and profitable investment for industry, a goal pursued 
uncompromisingly at the expense of social dislocation.’ (Cooper 
1989:98) For many critics such a focus on economic growth was also 
based on not understanding the natural qualities of the soil and on the 
importance of maintaining balance in the countryside. (see chapter 9)  
Secondly, the pursuit of economic growth and industrial farming would 
have profound implications for rural life, certainly involving considerably 
more depopulation. Although Labour did endeavour to mitigate the latter 
through the Land Utilisation Act the powers granted by that legislation 
effectively offered little by way of increased land settlement and it 
consequently largely failed in the aim of rural re-settlement. 
The most profound contradiction that both parties had to work through 
was that of the operation of Capitalism itself. The call was for agriculture 
to operate with stability and certainty at a time when capitalism itself 
was in considerable turmoil and unable to offer either of those virtues. 
In addition, agriculture was required to be businesslike when it was 
generally agreed that it needed sheltering from the operation of the 
market system. British agriculture was unable to operate in an 
international market except in respect of horticultural and perishable 
crops; consequently, it needed sheltering from other countries, even 
those Colonies who were part of the ‘family’. 
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In an important House of Lords debate in 1928151 The Labour 
spokesman Earl De La Warr put forward what was in effect the taking 
over of the import trade from commercial interests on the grounds that 
Capitalism had failed  and had placed the National interest at risk. 
Whilst he criticised the Conservatives for their policy of protection, De 
La Warr argued that there was another way to safeguard the national 
economy. The example he used was the meat import business and the 
dominance of particular suppliers – ‘three quarters is controlled by the 
American Meat Trust and by the Vestey interests.’ (c.282) He posed the 
question: ‘are we prepared to let her [United States] financiers have 
control from the very source of one of the staple foodstuffs of this 
country?’ (c.282) 
In reply Lord Bledisloe, although not supporting the motion, 
acknowledged that agriculture was in crisis and vulnerable to foreign 
control. It was finance that dictated matters, not agriculture and he used 
the example that this country had just had the best harvest for some 
thirty years ‘yet there is not a single crop that we have raised this year 
in England that will show an appreciable profit ...... except sugar beet, 
which is artificially supported by Government money.’ (c.296) 
The solution for Bledisloe is to somehow remove agriculture from the 
political debate altogether, to treat farming as outside of political 
discourse. In the Debate Lord Harris states that although the Debate is 
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about agriculture it is in reality much broader: ‘it is an economic 
question, a trading question, and possibly a political question.’ (c.300)  
Once the National Government has gone beyond the Imperial 
Economic Conference of July – August 1932 [the Ottawa Conference] it 
is also aware that the Empire no longer wishes to operate as some 
offshore food supplier to Britain, and repository of surplus agricultural 
labour, and that imperial rationalisation dictated by the mother country 
is not possible. From that point on the policy of Protection becomes a 
‘vital element in this emergent economic nationalism’ (Cooper 
1989:160) of the Conservative Party. 
 As a manifestation of that spirit of Nationalism Walter Elliot is appointed 
as the Minister of Agriculture in September 1932. Elliot had been an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Guild movement after the war (chapter 5) 
and had been attracted to the possibility of starting a new party. Elliot 
took as his starting point the ‘total breakdown of the market and the 
world economy’ (Cooper 1989:162) and concluded that it was not 
possible to protect the National interest without there being some 
intelligent direction present.  
He regretted that in the period after the War the opportunity had been 
missed to create ‘a permanent Coalition Party’ (Dorril 2007:46) He had 
also worked with the ILP in 1926 along with Mosley, Keynes and other 
‘experts’ and been involved in some attempts to form a ‘Young Party’ 
under the auspices of Beaverbrook in 1929. Further, Elliot had been 
involved in the creation of the United Empire Party in 1930 but had, like 
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many others, drawn back in the face of Conservative hostility.152 
Throughout 1930 there were profound discussions in both the Labour 
and Conservative parties about the future of Capitalism and 
Democracy, given the real possibility of economic collapse. Dorril 
(2007:142-143) recorded that Harold Macmillan warned that such a 
collapse would ‘lead to a breakdown of the whole party system. No 
other single party will form a Government and there will be a cabinet of 
young men.’ In such an atmosphere Oswald Mosley advanced the 
possibilities of either national, European or imperial self sufficiency in 
agriculture (chapter 9) but attracted little support despite working closely 
with many possible defectors from the main parties. Elliot remained in 
the Conservative Party and advocated that  
‘some conscious direction and intelligent anticipation of the economy 
was essential to national welfare and survival.’ (Cooper 1989:163)  
Capitalism had not just failed in respect of agriculture, but more 
generally and was about to be replaced not by ‘a cabinet of young men’ 
but by intelligent management of national resources in a corporatist and 
business led State. 
Having inherited the Agricultural Marketing Act, Elliot saw that the 
system of producer cartels had enough of the flavour of independent 
Guilds to become a workable future for agriculture. Once protection 
measures had been introduced this created the possibility of a business 
led (and, therefore, businesslike?) system of cartels where production 
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levels were controlled in a ‘closed’ loop. Cooper pointed out that the 
consequence was that agricultural policy ‘moved away from 
parliamentary accountability’ (1989:169) altogether.153 The Times154 
referred to this as not farming from Whitehall but a ‘new experiment in 
local self government.’ In a corporate system, the NFU became the 
agency which both administered and arbitrated the process. Tom 
Williams noted one weakness of such a form of organisation, that it 
lacked any consumer focus and checks and balances. In his 
autobiography Williams portrayed the work of Elliot as offering no 
coherent plan for the long term, an ironic comment given that the 
Conservative Party ultimately removed Elliot for being a too coherent 
advocate of the corporate state. Williams characterised the 
Conservative policy as consisting of ‘a stubborn unwillingness to value 
the industry properly as part of our national economy (1965:115) and 
criticised Conservative adherence to the doctrinaire at the expense of 
practical politics. 
Elliot ultimately took the logic of domestic production to one of 
preferring autarky and this proved a step too far given that it put at risk 
relationships with friendly countries. Elliot was then removed from his 
post in 1936 when he was replaced by the much more amenable 
William Morrison who remained until early in 1939. The legacy of the 
Marketing Acts of 1931 (Addison) and 1933 (Elliot) remained in that the 
producer cartels and the NFU took over effective control of the most 
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significant sectors of agriculture, working closely with the Government 
but allowed considerable autonomy.  
What protection and tariffs achieved from 1932 onwards was only a 
slight reduction in the volume of food imports, principally in respect of 
vegetables and fruit. However, the major change, and an outcome not 
wished for by Elliot, was that of a rebalancing between foreign and 
empire imports. In overall terms, foreign imports in 1937 were at 70% of 
the level they were in 1929-30155 and there had been significant 
reductions in food imports from foreign countries in respect of wheat 
and meat. The main changes in British agriculture were increases in 
protective foods, chickens and milk production but despite the 
advantages conferred by protection Britain was still largely dependent 
on imported foodstuffs and animal feed. What had happened was the 
consolidation of the industry into larger conglomerates both in the 
production and distribution sectors. Burnett (1989:260) noted that by 
1939 the Co-operative Society, Lipton’s, Home and Colonial and 
Maypole Dairy ‘controlled almost half of the nation’s grocery business.’  
There were similar developments in respect of other sectors including 
Tate and Lyle, Lever Brothers and Spillers, all companies which 
benefited from growing subsidies during and after World War 1. 
 The growing awareness of nutrition and the poor state of health 
revealed by a number of surveys156 also affected the Conservative 
Party and encouraged those elements of the Party who saw State 
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intervention as an appropriate way to bring about social change. The 
remarks of Harold Macmillan in 1936 are important to note 
‘Toryism has always been a form of paternal Socialism.... The 
Conservative Party has always been dominated by money and the 
City.... a party dominated by second class brewers and company 
promoters – a Casino Capitalism – is not likely to represent anybody but 
itself.’157 
For all the political discussions in Labour and Conservative circles, and 
the apparent sharing of collectivist sentiments, the overall outcome of 
Government action in the interwar period was to bring about little 
change in British agriculture.  It only constituted around 4% to 6% of the 
Gross National Product in this period and employed around the same 
percentage of the workforce. The total agricultural area in 1931 was 
29.9 million acres, only a slight reduction on the 1870 -before the 
Depression - figure of 30.41 million acres.158 After all the intervention of 
the interwar period, wartime changes and the politically committed 1945 
Labour Government the total agricultural area in 1948 was slightly 
below that of 1931 at 28.79 million acres. The efforts of Labour and 
National Governments in the early 1930’s in respect of agricultural 
policy were in the end the same efforts and the same policies which 
were deployed in respect of all the main industries of Britain. McCrone 
(1962:39) identified that the quotas and the tariffs ‘were not of great 
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importance to British agriculture.’ On the other hand, the Marketing 
Boards were critical in encouraging the industry to rationalise which was 
‘a rather polite term for what was really the establishing of a monopoly’ 
(1962:39.) Whilst it might be the case that increases in production follow 
from the setting up of such boards, it is necessary to understand that in 
the interests of maintaining or increasing farm incomes and agricultural 
wages, which were other Government objectives, it was possible that 
supplies could be deliberately limited. The NFU took on the role with 
some enthusiasm, knowing that they were not tied into artificial targets 
for outputs, but adjustments made in order to keep supply and/or prices 
at ‘acceptable’ levels. The NFU took on a role which had a ‘direct link 
with regulation, whereby representative interest groups ensure some 
responsibility for the self –regulation and disciplining of their own 
constituency in return for privileges offered.’ (Cox, Lane and Winter 
1986:475-6) 
The Conservatives introduced further legislation in respect of sugar in 
1936 and extended the wheat subsidies to oats and barley in 1937 
which added to around a dozen marketing boards which had taken 
advantage of the legislation to control their sectors.  In addition, 
Commodity Commissions were set up to organise the payment of 
subsidises and deficiency payments. The 1937 Agriculture Act also 
introduced a new set of measures designed to improve the soil through 
the application of lime and other improvers. 
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Conclusion 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The overall achievement of the Conservative Party by 1938 was to have 
rid itself of the dangerous tendencies of Elliot and have consolidated the 
Acts of 1931 and 1933. For Tom Williams such a policy ‘consisted of a 
stubborn unwillingness to value the industry properly as part of our 
national economy’ (1965:115) owing to being too doctrinaire. However, 
the Nuffield Foundation Report published after the Second World 
War159 concluded that ‘by 1938 the State was assisting all the principal 
branches of agriculture, but the absence of any basic principles by 
which the assistance was determined led to the feeling that the policy 
was one of expediency and that the assistance was probably of only a 
temporary character. This tended to lower confidence rather than raise 
it.’ (1960:19-20) 
For Williams, the Conservatives were ‘too doctrinaire’, for the Nuffield 
Foundation, it was ‘the absence of any basic principles’ that was the 
important factor.  What constituted the outlook of both parties was that 
they over emphasised their own legislative or policy influence. 
Mechanization was not as established as some of the efforts put into 
place by Elliot might suggest, farm incomes continued to be low and 
capital investment incapable of being deployed to increase efficiency. 
Farm prices reached a low of 77 in 1933 (1927-9 = 100) and had only 
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risen to 90.5 in 1937 (Nuffield Foundation 1960:18) Above all, what was 
not happening was any move towards self sufficiency. Despite 
subsidises farms remained in poor condition and this constituted one of 
the main elements in the critique of both rural revivalists and the 
Organic movement which was that underlying soil fertility was declining 
owing to either neglect or artificial fertilisers. Of paramount importance 
was that by 1938, for the entire public subsidy and the industry self 
regulation, very little increase in production had been secured and a 
series of measures had been adopted whose sole purpose was to 
regulate supply and demand rather than increase production. Indeed, 
by the end of the interwar period, the Conservative Party had decisively 
rejected any possibility of food self sufficiency160 in a speech given by 
the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain which asserted the primacy of 
manufacturing. 
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Chapter Seven 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Food and Agriculture 1923 – 1939: The Labour Party.  
‘A large percentage of working class children are growing up 
under – nourished, ill – clad and ill – shod’161 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Introduction 
The inter war period saw the emergence in agricultural politics of a 
whole new range of contributors to the political discourse, most of 
whom were concerned with the promotion of farming as a business. 
Indeed, it was the first time that one could speak of the farmer, a food 
producer, as a particular entity and that had important political 
repercussions in the relationship between farming and the State. 
Hobsbawm (1990:201) wrote that after World War One ‘the old landed 
aristocracy and gentry abdicated.’ The consequence of that was the 
transfer of around one third of farming land to owner occupiers162 in a 
change so substantial as to amount to a transfer not seen since the 
Norman Conquest.163 Hobsbawm identified that ‘the curious thing about 
this virtual revolution in landownership is that hardly anyone noticed it at 
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the time, except the tiny percentage of the population professionally 
concerned with agriculture and the real – estate market.’ (1990:201) 
This transfer came about because of the repercussions of the ‘lost 
generation’ of those who died in the War and the selling up which took 
place in the immediate post War boom. In addition, the fear of Socialism 
was so great that selling to ones tenants was regarded as preferable to 
having the land nationalised. What was not the case was that the 
change had happened as a result of political pressure of the type 
envisaged by the Radicals (chapter 2) or the efforts of Lloyd George. 
The political implications were that concerns were now focussed on the 
issues of practical farming, rather than landownership, with an attendant 
emphasis upon levels of productivity and marketing. Secondly, a whole 
range of new influences were brought to bear whose interest in farming 
was primarily commercial – selling feedstuffs, chemicals, fertilisers, 
farm machinery and tractors – but who sought political control as well. 
Thirdly, the rise of the farmer was accompanied by the rise of the voice 
of the farmer as a distinct entity in the shape of the National Farmers 
Union. (NFU)  
These changes were reflected in the political discourse to the extent 
that the Conservative Party had to ensure that it moved away from a 
defensive posture and consider a range of practical questions about 
farming and rural policy. Whilst the interwar period is often portrayed as 
one in which a consensus emerged, it is rather more the case that both 
of the main parties were adjusting to becoming managers of an 
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increasingly Capitalist endeavour, albeit one which constituted only a 
small part of the national Economy. 
However, it should not be assumed that the rise of farming as a 
business meant the decline of those arguing for food self sufficiency or 
‘back to the land’. The opposite was the case; with a reaction from 
those who resented the spread of Capitalism into the affairs of the 
countryside. In turn the application of business methods to farming led 
to concerns that the soil itself was threatened.  
Emerging Labour Party 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Despite Conservative dominance, much of the political discourse of the 
inter war period emerged from the Labour Party which discovered ways 
in which it could match the ‘business like’ mentality of farmers and the 
NFU by introducing new factors which provided justifications for active 
State intervention in farming policy and practice. It managed to bring 
that about whilst still maintaining a policy of land nationalisation and 
being treated with considerable contempt by the NFU and 
representatives of landowners. In the two brief periods of Labour 
Administration164 measures were introduced which were significant for 
establishing the practicalities of intervention. 
The discourse which Labour maintained was not based on the active 
pursuance of land nationalisation as a political act but one which was to 
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be pursued in the national interest. From the early 1930’s the Labour 
Party used the growing evidence of the poor ‘state of the nation’ to 
justify intervention in agriculture to achieve social objectives. The British 
Medical Association (BMA) work of 1933165 and the joint BMA / Ministry 
of Health Conference of 1934166 built upon earlier works which showed 
that British people, especially the working class and the elderly, were 
generally unhealthy and poorly fed167. The work of Fenner Brockway168 
highlighted the human stories behind poor nutrition, but combined such 
stories with detailed analysis of the realities of the diets of the poor. 
Brockway noted that ‘the low quality of the food which is being eaten 
undermines the health of entire families.’ (1932:17) and paid particular 
attention to the plight of rural workers. The work illustrated the bringing 
together of two facts which showed the pressing need for Government 
intervention; firstly that rural workers, who were not eligible for 
unemployment benefit, were being laid off on account of technical 
progress in agriculture, and secondly, that they, like most of the working 
class, were desperately in need of the protective foods which they 
should be growing. The representative of the National Union of 
Agricultural Workers that Brockway interviewed argued that agriculture 
was not in decline, just not meeting the people’s needs. The Union 
representative made the point that ‘farming cannot be expected to act 
as the sink of the industrial unemployed’ (1932:80) and that agriculture 
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can only go through revival through the production of an output that 
people can afford. The interviews conducted by Fenner Brockway were 
supported by detailed budgetary breakdowns which showed the 
dependence upon bread and sugar in the working class diet. By the mid 
1930’s such a limited work was eclipsed by the large scale 
investigations of the International Labour Office, (ILO)169  John Boyd 
Orr,170 McKillop and Mottram171 and McCarrison.172 All of these works 
focussed upon two principal factors; that certain foods had more 
nutritive value, so that ‘calories’ alone did not convey what the body 
needed to protect and help safeguard health. The second was that it 
was possible in an objective manner to specify exactly what the food 
needs of the body were, depending upon age and occupation. To an 
extent Boyd Orr built upon the BMA work but also used the American 
‘Stiebeling Standard’ which had been developed by the U.S. Bureau of 
Home Economics after the First World War. Such works also 
emphasised that both the percentage of income spent on food, and the 
healthiness of the diet obtained, varied greatly by social class. Boyd Orr 
worked out in great detail the extent to which consumption levels of 
specific foods had to be increased to reach an acceptable standard. 
The deficit in the working class diet was still most pronounced in 
respect of fruit, vegetables and eggs and these were all products which 
British Agriculture was well capable of producing. The national drive 
towards the understanding of the importance of nutrition was also 
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reinforced by the efforts of the League of Nations from 1935 onwards. 
The work of the League culminated in the Hot Springs Conference of 
1943 which declared that ‘the goal of freedom from want of food, 
suitable and adequate for the health and strength of all peoples’ was 
achievable. (Potiphar 1945:85) 
In the Left Book Club edition The Condition of Britain, the authors, as 
the title implies, attempted an overall ‘health of the nation’ summary. In 
respect of the implications for agriculture they concluded that ‘no one in 
his senses can doubt that, as far as the technique of production is 
concerned, these increases in supply are easily procurable’ and the 
problem is therefore ‘one of demand, and not of an inability to produce 
enough.’ (Cole and Cole 1937:132) Whilst the authors acknowledged 
that diets had improved since 1918, they noted the clear evidence that 
such an improvement is not evenly distributed and that for many it is still 
the case that ‘existing supply falls short of what ought to be regarded as 
a tolerable minimum of nutrition.’ (1937:139) 
By 1937 the Labour Party had arrived at a justification for a national 
agricultural policy to improve infant mortality, lower rates of death 
through heart disease and improve child health. However, that 
conception of agriculture, which was accompanied by a confidence that 
the State could successfully administer such a policy, took some time to 
emerge. 
Such an appreciation was close to one in which agriculture was part of 
the health service, producing healthy and affordable food for the 
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population. Given the Fabian tradition of the Party the presentation of 
an approach whereby the Government could intervene to administer 
such a policy and could measure outcomes was perhaps a more telling 
reason for State intervention in agriculture than the mere ideological 
pretext of land nationalisation. 
However, the Party had also been trying since 1918 to find a way in 
which to intervene in the detail of farming, given that it had maintained a 
free trade stance on the grounds that it ensured that food was priced as 
cheaply as possible. There was also an acknowledgement that the 
working class diet had improved since the 1920’s because the 
‘cheapening of food enabled the British people as a whole to improve its 
standards of consumption despite the world slump, and helped even 
many of the worse off sections of the working class, above the level of 
the unemployed on relief, to prevent their standards of living sinking 
even when their earnings were reduced.’ (Cole and Cole 1937:267)  
The Labour Party in the interwar period kept to a policy of land 
nationalisation knowing that it was seen by most farmers (and certainly 
the NFU) as an attempt to bring about State control or ‘farming from 
Whitehall.’ For those who had opposed limited State intervention in the 
First World War it served as a constant reminder of the dangers of State 
interference and for the Conservative Party it meant that it did not have 
to try too hard to appear to be the friend of the farmer. For most of the 
period, it was generally assumed that the NFU and the Conservative 
Party had common interests.  In reality, the NFU was treated with some 
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contempt by most of those involved with agricultural matters, at least 
until 1933 when the Marketing Acts started to give the union a clear 
administrative and policy purpose.173 Viscount Linlithgow, whose report 
had initiated the marketing process, spoke of his dealings with the NFU 
as a ‘long and sanguine struggle.’ (Cooper 1989:78) 
The wish of the Labour Party to avoid association with ‘cranks,’ meant 
that they lacked agricultural expertise. Whilst a figure such as Kropotkin 
was widely respected for the detail of his work and had shown how 
British agriculture might be organised, the overriding quest for 
respectability meant that he was sidelined. Indeed, anyone who 
appeared to have detailed knowledge of agriculture was suspected of 
not pursuing the interests of the industrial working class and this was 
compounded by the virtual absence of the Labour Party or effective 
Trade Union organisation in the countryside. Griffiths (2007:217) wrote 
that ‘Labour was strongly influenced by the belief that only 
agriculturalists could speak with authority about agriculture.’ 
Until the mid 1930’s the result was a preoccupation with the interests of 
the working class consumer174 and a wish to oppose any proposed 
intervention to assist agriculture on the grounds that it would increase 
food prices. Hence the appropriation of the earlier slogans about 
‘stomach taxes’ and a collection of ideas which concentrated on the 
farmer and / or the landowner requiring pampering whilst working 
people would be made to pay. 
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The Labour Party covered up for its lack of agricultural policy by largely 
importing one from the Liberals, with the three dominant agricultural 
policy figures in the interwar period all being recent Liberals – Lord 
Addison, Noel Buxton and Josiah Wedgwood.175 On a practical level, it 
meant that the Party could concentrate on some of the implications of 
the Land Question whilst largely ignoring the rhetoric of land 
nationalisation. The possibilities offered by the rise in interest in Guilds 
or alternative forms of rural enterprise (Chapter 5) were soon cast aside 
once Labour had assumed office for the first time. 
The emphasis shifted from questions of how might nationalisation be 
carried out to how might the State invest in agriculture, either to bring 
about change or to meet social objectives such as land settlement. The 
difficulty to reconcile was to try and make agriculture more efficient (less 
labour required) but bring about more smallholdings (more labour on 
the land.) This contradiction was exposed in the 1934 pamphlet How 
Labour Will Save Agriculture which proposed that another 0.5 million 
people could be settled on the land in order to bring about a prosperous 
countryside.   
The Labour Party in government in 1924 ensured that it made good on 
the promise to agricultural workers by the restoration of the Wages 
Board but placated farmers by ensuring that no minimum wage was 
specified. Their intervention in agricultural matters was confined to the 
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sugar beet industry where it introduced measures to develop a national 
sugar industry on the grounds that it was a product of national strategic 
importance.176 It was also an attempt by the Labour Government to 
show that it had some understanding of agriculture and could intervene 
strategically.177 But it was a ‘one off’ in that it was State finance being 
used to create a virtually new industry rather than sort out an existing 
and declining sector. What it was supposed to illustrate was how 
Labour could intervene responsibly when required but in no way was it 
offered as a national model. The ILP commented at the time that ‘the 
idea of a self contained Britain was ‘absurd’’ (Griffiths 2007:236) Sugar 
beet was not the first in a line of products which would constitute a 
move towards national self sufficiency, the real intention was to gain 
credibility with farmers, who reacted with indifference. The justification 
for the ‘strategic’ nature of sugar was that it comprised a high 
percentage of working class consumption, but it did not address the far 
more pressing issue of deficiencies in protective foods. 
The 1929 – 1931 Labour Administration introduced two significant 
measures which combined a continuation of the ‘Land Question’ and a 
new approach involving active Government intervention and, more 
importantly, public money. Griffiths described much of the Labour 
programme of this period as being concerned with the question of how 
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to make ‘capitalist agriculture work more effectively, rather than 
reconstruction it on socialist principles.’ (2007:232)  
The Labour Government delayed any announcement on food policy 
until it had been in office for over a year, with such a move being made 
on August 1st 1930, the final day before Parliament went into recess for 
nearly four months. The future agriculture minister Tom Williams 
excused the delay on the grounds that the mission of the administration 
was one of taking responsibility for the complete breakdown of 
Capitalism. The Parliamentary statement was made by Philip Snowden, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who outlined the chosen Labour 
approach in the opening paragraph; ‘the urgent need for reform in 
methods of marketing and production in order to take advantage of our 
valuable home market’ in order to bring about ‘prosperity in the 
industry.’178 
 
This was to be done by offering ‘certain powers to large scale 
commodity organisations initiated by producers themselves for the 
marketing of home produced agricultural products, and protects such 
organisations form the disruptive action of minorities.’  
The cereal industry was not dealt with, ostensibly because of the 
forthcoming Imperial Conference but also because the Labour 
Government was beginning to take the view that it was a part of the 
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industry that could be allowed to decline even further. When the 
Chancellor was challenged in the House of Commons by Basil Peto 
M.P. that there was no mention of the dumping of overseas produce on 
the British market, he replied that improving marketing and presentation 
of goods would go some way towards enabling the home producer to 
compete. In the subsequent Parliamentary debate on agriculture, led by 
Chris Addison the Minister of Agriculture,179 it was emphasised that 
much of the difficulty facing British agriculture came down to ‘one of 
organisation – of processing, marketing and so on.’  Addison outlined 
the extent to which he considered that farming was ‘the only industry in 
the land where you have not had the collective application of capital’ or, 
further ‘it is the only case of any great industry where you have not had 
a collective assembly of science, skill and organisation to develop the 
industry.’ The speech is dotted with notions of ‘machinery’ ‘science’ 
‘management’ ‘marketing’ and, above all ‘large scale.’ In an interchange 
which identified the essence of agricultural policy not just in 1930 but 
until the end of period in study, Hansard recorded the following 
interjection and Ministerial reply; 
[An HON. MEMBER: “Who has got to pay?] The nation. 
Alongside notions of State sponsored reorganisation and efficiency 
embodied in the large scale farm Addison offered a Liberal notion of self 
supporting smallholders who, he argued, had been more successful 
than had previously been recognised. The Conservative agricultural 
                                               
179
 HC Deb 13 November 1930 vol. 244 cc1891-2006 
146 
 
spokesman Walter Guinness interpreted such proposals as being 
designed to bring about an influx of smallholders on farms torn apart to 
meet their needs whilst at the same time introducing the ‘experiment of 
factory farming.’ Guinness identified the ‘political’ nature of the 
proposals by asserting that ‘Large scale management, except for such 
a political purpose, can surely only be justified if farmers are inefficient 
at their job,’ followed by the recorded interjection of “So they are.” 
Guinness echoed the position of the NFU by concentrating not on the 
detail of the proposals but on the slur on the reputation of farmers, 
based upon the assumption that the State could enable better 
production through an industry restructuring which, according to the 
Opposition, would result in nationalisation. 
The Labour Party had not emphasised land nationalisation, indeed it 
had outlined an approach which was to become the alternative – public 
money into farming in return for specified national outcomes. At no time 
did the proposals suggest that the end result might be greater national 
self sufficiency or even more production at all, the emphasis was upon 
restructuring and efficiency. 
 In the debate on the Wheat Bill introduced by the subsequent National 
Government in 1932180 the Labour agricultural spokesman, Dr. Salter 
was critical of the proposed measure on the grounds that it ‘was 
wasteful and uneconomic’ and stated that ‘you cannot possibly stop the 
progress of social and economic evolution by Government edicts or 
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Bills.’ (c. 983) He spoke approvingly of large Soviet farms (300,000 
acres) and the large numbers of tractors in Canada, the United States 
and the Soviet Union and was clear in identifying that Britain should not 
concern itself with wheat production because it could not possibly 
compete. 
 
The Labour narrative only developed when the mid 1930’s provided 
updated and overwhelming evidence of poor nutrition and lack of 
national effectiveness and health. The structure outlined by Addison 
then changed in a crucial way in that certain items (which conveniently 
could be produced equally by small or large scale enterprises) deemed 
to be ‘protective’ foods could be supported through public expenditure. 
The questions of free trade and protective measures for domestic 
production were therefore avoided and the emphasis placed upon the 
fact that British farmers may be good at growing produce, but knew little 
about marketing, grading and attractive packaging. This narrative 
allowed another ‘party’ – the middleman – to be scapegoated as the 
cause of the preference for foreign produce.  
This represented a bold attempt to appeal to both producers and 
consumers and offered the possibility of interventions which would 
protect British agriculture without  higher consumer prices. With the 
1931 Agricultural Marketing Act incorporating ‘the formation of 
producers’ organisations to guarantee quality and control prices’ 
(Griffiths 2007:242) the interests of consumers could only be protected 
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through substantial amounts of public money. The model for this form of 
intervention had been established by the Linlithgow Committee of 
1923181 which had investigated the operation of the retail and 
distributive trades in order to ascertain the reasons why retail prices 
were so much higher than those which the farmers obtained. Collective 
marketing was proposed in order that British farmers might have greater 
marketing power and that more attention paid to the presentation and 
grading of produce. 
That Labour took to this enforced Capitalist intervention represented the 
failure of attempts to bring about co-operation in farming as had been 
done in the cases of Denmark and Ireland. The 1931 Act was followed 
by another in 1933 brought in by the National Government which 
strengthened the earlier Labour measures. It was the second Act which 
added powers of compulsion in order to ensure that a minority of 
producers did not subvert the system and also imposed import quotas 
in an attempt to boost the home industry. Self and Storing (1962:88) 
described the result of the two Acts as ‘statutory producer controlled 
marketing monopolies’ in the context of the beginning of ‘the modern 
period of state intervention, assistance and control.’ (1962:18) 
In 1931 the NFU had pointed out that improvements in marketing were 
of limited value unless accompanied by import quotas, a factor which 
was acknowledged by Clement Attlee who worked on the detail of the 
proposals on behalf of the Labour Party. He was opposed by the 
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Chancellor, Philip Snowden, on the grounds that the Party remained 
committed to free trade and that import quotas would lead to increases 
in public expenditure at a time of Labour enforced austerity. Golant 
(1973:329) made the very telling point that ‘there is very little socialism 
here.’  
Indeed, whilst it might have been appropriate to try and convince 
members of the Labour Party that it involved state control that was far 
from the truth. Some branches of the agricultural industry would be left 
to reform themselves, impose minimum and maximum prices and 
possibly increase production but in no sense did the Labour 
Government indicate any commitment to increasing national self 
sufficiency. Golant (1973:327) wrote of ‘feelings of helplessness and 
timidity’ in the face of depression as an expression of the major failings 
of Capitalism. 
In introducing the bills on marketing and land utilisation the Labour 
Government relied upon its imported Liberal values in preference to any 
that it might drawn up from its own theoretical possibilities. In 1922 J.H. 
Thomas had pointedly left off the land from the nationalisation 
possibilities choosing instead to re-affirm the centrality of free trade to 
‘Socialist’ thinking about agriculture – ‘free competition, the law of 
supply and demand, with a just wage and a fair profit.’ (1922:55.)  
It was asserted that produce was always going to be cheaper under 
free trade, with Thomas claiming that any form of protection brought 
about higher profits at the expense of the consumer. He also firmly 
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ruled against trusts or producer cartels on the grounds that they would 
‘exploit the public in order to maintain high prices and big dividends.’ 
(1922:178) Earlier, Ramsay Macdonald182 had emphasised his 
commitment to land reform rather than nationalisation and to promote 
the idea that greater working class affluence would ‘give [an] 
opportunity for maintaining many of these small “peasant” and hand 
industries which alone can surround people with individuality and 
distinction.’ (1920:163) 
In examining the Labour Party in the interwar period it is important to 
note that land nationalisation is maintained as a policy throughout, but 
that in terms of practical politics there is a general adherence to Liberal 
principles, superseded by reliance upon managed State intervention 
The land question dominated thinking, as illustrated by the proposal 
introduced by Philip Snowden in 1931 to introduce land valuation as a 
means of taxing all land, a proposal not pursued by the National 
Government that followed. In addition to the ideological emphasis upon 
nationalisation there was another approach, which was that landlords 
were failing to maintain the land in productive order, and the State had, 
therefore, to assume direct control of land.183 Manton noted that ‘this 
economic critique, which showed that landlordism, either actively or 
simply by default, retarded the efficiency of farming, was central to 
Labour thinking.’ (2006:256.) A concentration upon ‘lack of productivity’ 
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or ‘inefficiency’ meant that ‘any method that could be guaranteed to 
boost productivity could be advocated without recourse to 
nationalisation.’ (2006:256.) Some  ‘farming' experts’, notably C.S. 
Orwin184, maintained that land nationalisation was still necessary in 
order for a national and rational policy to be pursued. The line of 
argument being that agriculture, alone of all industries, ‘has not 
developed along the large scale lines of other industries, which can 
thereby attract capital awaiting investment, offer opportunities to labour 
and reduce the cost of commodities and services to the public.’ (Orwin 
1942:25)  
Protection and Planning. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The developing Labour narrative of offering the prospect of large scale 
intensive production brought about by state expenditure aroused the 
interest of the NFU and many of the commercial interests in 
mechanisation, fertilisers etc. who would otherwise have stood in 
opposition. Here is the prospect of the Labour Party tentatively working 
towards a central view of agriculture which is a corporate endeavour, a 
partnership based upon enhancing efficiency. That is not tied in with 
any perception of greatly increased output, but more one of emulating 
other (Capitalist) enterprises, that is to increase profitability. Hugh 
Dalton (1935:157) noted that ‘a Labour Government must be prepared 
                                               
184
 The Tenure of Agricultural Land. Orwin C.S & Peel W.R. Cambridge: University 
Press 1925 and restated in Speed the Plough. Orwin C.S. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books 1942 
152 
 
to spend money freely on reorganising agriculture’ but added that to 
spend too much on acquiring land rather than improving land would be 
a folly. In this regard, Dalton would have been aware of earlier attempts 
by the Fabian Society to ascertain just how much nationalisation would 
have cost, given there being no national land register from which to 
provide an estimate.185 Thus, he argued to maintain an emphasis upon 
nationalisation ‘will create in the countryside a sense of unconvincing 
irrelevance.’ (1935:159) 
When the National Government moved to impose duties on food 
imports in 1932 and strengthened agricultural marketing the year after, 
the Labour Party also reconsidered the matter of Protection for 
domestic agriculture. Clement Attlee in 1932 welcomed protection 
provided that it was ‘temporary’ in nature and was only ‘acceptable 
where it was clear that an industry would be run efficiently, in the 
interests of consumers and producers, with control “by the community in 
the interests of the community”’ (Griffiths 2007:249) 
The Labour Party then developed another strand of thinking in respect 
of agriculture, which was the role of planning. Stafford Cripps 
emphasised this aspect in a Labour Party pamphlet of 1934186 in which 
he identified the key issue as being rampant individualism of  farmers, a 
factor which inhibited both planning and co-operation. Whilst such an 
appreciation of the merits of planning might be considered an 
appropriate ‘Fabian’ policy, the need for the Labour Party to develop 
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such a policy was arguably more influenced by the enthusiasms of 
Walter Elliot, the Agriculture Minister in the National Government. In 
what Cripps no doubt thought was a compliment to the farmer he noted 
that he ‘has subjugated to his will the great forces of Nature’ and with 
State assistance that can be built upon and so ‘the prospect of wealth 
and plenty is almost unbounded.’ (1934:3.) All that the farmer needed to 
give up was the need to chase profit, once that was out of the way then 
his skills would flourish. Cripps looked back on Labour Marketing 
legislation as a good piece of work which had subsequently been 
distorted by Capitalist values.  
In another pamphlet that year187 George Dallas appealed to the farming 
interest by indicating that they were being fleeced by big business, 
wholesalers and other vested interests – ‘in the face of large scale 
distribution he was absolutely helpless.’ (1934:8.) Stafford Cripps again 
appealed to the public to ensure that food production could be 
increased in writing that ‘today the people realise that science has so 
far won its conquest over nature that there is no need for scarcity.’ 
(1936:77) Scarcity which was, in the view of Cripps, brought about by 
the wish of Capitalists (aided and abetted by the National Government) 
to ‘bring about scarcity creation and an unlimited desire to exploit 
consumers in all countries.’ (1936:72) 
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The former Agriculture Minister, Christopher Addison published a 
pamphlet in 1937188 which again emphasised that farmers needed 
planning to help them alongside practical schemes such as improved 
drainage, water supplies and the availability of cheaper credit in order to 
mechanise farms. He summed up Labours’ ‘practical’ policy as offering 
‘an assured place in the home market with a just price guaranteed to 
him, for good produce that the land is suited to produce.’ (1937:7.) The 
mechanisms were a National Agricultural Commission, national 
ownership, fair rents, guaranteed prices and control of imports. The 
conclusion of the pamphlet was that ‘it is abundance that we want, not 
scarcity.’ (1937:10.) The key to abundance was to assist farmers to 
understand how they had been farming to the best of their ability but 
had not had the benefits of scientific advances that could accrue 
through co-operation with the State. In 1924 the then Agriculture 
Minister Noel Buxton had offered up the prospect to farmers that ‘with 
the help of science he need scarcely set any limits to the yield of the 
land. Better business will dispose efficiently of the better yield.’189 
There is a clear change of tone, and the development of a much more 
confident approach, in the Labour Party around the mid 1930’s. It is 
clear that from being unable to voice any practical suggestions for 
farming (for fear that ignorance would be revealed) the Party had now 
shifted the ground significantly by emphasising the narratives of 
                                               
188
 Labour’s Policy for Our Countryside. Addison C. London: Labour Party 1937. Note 
the subtle change in wording to ‘our’ countryside. 
189
 Labour Looking After Agriculture: Better Farming: Better Business: Better Living. 
London: Labour Publications Dept. 1924. Introduction by Noel Buxton) 
155 
 
planning, food and nutrition and the consideration of farming as an 
economical and functional activity190. Above all, there was a ‘discovery’ 
of the benefits of science and technology. Instead of castigating 
landlords for being idlers191 there was now an emphasis upon how 
productive farmers could be if so enabled.  
The 1937 Labour Party pamphlet192 ‘HOUSEWIVES! LOOK AT THIS! 
claimed throughout ( and in capitals) that food prices were increasing 
owing to Government incompetence and that it was official policy to 
make the poor pay more for food. It was claimed that’ ONLY 
THROUGH SOCIALIST PRODUCTION CAN THERE BE ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY’ and that Labour would make sure that ‘agriculture ... be 
re-organised and re-equipped and set on its feet.’ 
Once the doctrine of free trade had been shelved, the Party also 
emphasised the nationalism of encouraging home production for as 
long as it could not be accused of preferring dearer food as a result. 
The chosen methods of avoiding that eventuality were to deploy public 
resources either in direct subsidises or in tariffs, grants and scientific 
and technical education. In return, farmers could be assured of a good 
income if producing in the national interest. 
Planning would not mean ‘Farming from Whitehall’ but the 
establishment of national objectives, the implementation of which would 
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be determined locally and with representation from both the NFU and 
farm workers unions. The end of free trade was a time when ‘the 
startling realization of Britain’s economic weakness at the onset of the 
great depression forced an uneasy recognition of the general 
weakening of its imperial power and the need to build up economic 
defences.’ (Woodcock 1974: 168) The Labour recognition of the 
limitations of free trade in the context of imperial decline meant an 
emphasis upon a national agricultural policy for the first time. 
 
The pamphlet ‘Why Not Develop Britain?’193 claimed that of the £650 
million spent on food each year, only £250 million made its way to food 
producers. With a sound national plan ‘home food production can be 
increased by £200 million a year within 10 years’ and this would create 
considerable rises in rural employment. The pamphlet stated that ‘we 
don’t supply more ourselves because we have never tried.’  
In attempting to analyse why this was the case the Communist Party194 
identified the vested interests in land, finance and marketing as having 
impeded agricultural development but criticised both Labour and 
Conservatives for having created further sectors such as the fertiliser 
and chemical industries and Marketing Boards which in turn were 
becoming barriers to increasing domestic production at affordable 
prices. Whilst the Labour Party may not be too concerned at criticism 
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from the CPGB it is worth noting this general line of argument was 
developed extensively both on the Left and the Right. In the run up to 
the Second World War, and also during the conflict, any concerns that 
Labour might simply have used public money to create another 
generation of entrenched capitalist interests were not to be actively 
considered. Indeed, the farming industry was given carte blanche to 
make the transition to a ‘public good’ or being ‘part of the social 
services’ not through the acquisition of ‘higher motives’ but by public 
money.195 That public money was required arose out of the realisation 
that once the sources of ‘cheap food’ garnered by British expansion had 
started to cost more, or even become unavailable at any price, then the 
‘real’ cost of feeding the British people would have to be faced.  
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Chapter Eight  
Administrative Triumph. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
‘It is within the wit of man to find an alternative to competitive 
private enterprise with market prices as a means of obtaining and 
distributing food, to replace economic by human laws, to 
substitute managed for automatic provisioning of the people.’196 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Introduction 
R.J. Hammond began his three part history of the ‘Food’ volume of the 
History of the Second World War with the above quotation from William 
Beveridge which expressed the sense that ‘rational’ administration 
could find a better way of not just running society in wartime but of 
ensuring a fairer society (1951:337-338). There was little actual 
shortage of foodstuffs in 1917 when it became imperative for the State 
to intervene; it was rather the case that working people felt the system 
as it stood was not working and this was expressed in a sense of 
militancy which threatened morale. 
Beveridge wrote those words from the viewpoint of 1928 and afforded 
considerable importance to the somewhat brief period of ‘rational’ food 
administration from 1917 but also extended such an experience to 
assert that it would be possible to ‘replace economic by human laws.’ 
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This chapter examines the interplay between the market and the 
‘rational’ administrator in the context of rearmament and the growth of 
civil service administration of both the food and agricultural industries. 
Above all, it is this interplay which explains the specific development of 
agricultural policy and the further marginalisation of food self 
sufficiency. 
The language of Beveridge accorded with many of those who had 
advocated food self sufficiency in that it asserted the need to move 
away from the operation of a market society, and had common ground 
with many of those who portrayed agriculture as being ‘different’ or 
apart from a capitalist economy. But the notion of ‘managed 
provisioning’ showed a quite formidable sense of self confidence in that 
it moved away from asserting that agriculture is different to indicating 
how and by whom it could be run more appropriately. Hammond 
(1951:4) contrasted the period of ‘business as usual’ for most of World 
War 1 when ‘interference by Government in an existing system of 
private trade, or resort to exhortation and sumptuary prohibition ....were 
alike ineffective, not to say disastrous’ with the assumption of control 
over production and distribution of food from 1917. It is clear also for 
Beveridge that the dismantling of state controls and the return to the 
market after the ‘Great Betrayal’ of 1921 meant the doing away with of a 
rational and principled approach to food which might have benefited 
both the British farmer and the British consumer.  Hammond also noted 
that control was easier to impose when there was already a degree of 
organisation in place so that the dependence upon imported food ‘not 
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only made its effectiveness greater, since ships and ports provided a 
ready –made bottleneck at which the Government could lay hands on 
commodities.’ (1951:4) 
Even at the level of the individual consumer it was possible to ensure 
that through the State , nationally and locally, it was possible to ensure 
that rationed goods were provided to retailers on a guaranteed basis 
when national rationing began in July 1918. It is important to appreciate 
the significance of what was a brief experience of food control, given 
that it not only brought about an allegedly rational distribution of food 
but it also incorporated an attempt to ensure that consumers were 
treated fairly, with price controls and taxes on profiteering. Exhortations 
to private businesses having been perceived to have failed to deliver a 
reasonable supply of foodstuffs, State intervention was seen as a force 
for good. But, it is necessary also to point out that State intervention 
was costly and that as soon as world prices started to rise in early1921 
it was necessary to move away from the commitment that had been 
made to domestic agriculture through the promises embodied in the 
1920 Agriculture Act. Cuts in government spending also became 
necessary in order to pay for the War, and Parliamentary debates at the 
time showed a level of anger at the breaking of promises to farmers but 
balanced with an appreciation of the fact that Government should not 
interfere in the market in peacetime. It should therefore be possible to 
close that episode of State control with the epitaph that it brought about 
‘a brief hour of administrative triumph in an unaccustomed field’ 
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(Hammond 1951:7) and gave confidence to the nation that it could be 
reproduced in a future conflict if necessary.  
For many on the Right, and for many farmers, the retreat of the State 
was appropriate despite the fact that they expected it to provide cheap 
long term credit, protection from retailers and, above all, to restrict 
imports. If it was not possible to obtain such benefits without the State 
insisting upon accountability in return, then it seemed as if most farmers 
and landowners would prefer self management to the possibility of 
prosperity and increased production. Farmers also observed that whilst 
the State could indulge in policy U turns, they required more stable 
conditions than political expediency could deliver. As for the lesson 
which might have been learned about food supplies – undue 
dependency upon imported food – it is worth noting that Germany was 
considered by many agricultural experts to have lost the War through its 
undue dependence upon home production. Although the agricultural 
sector was larger than that of Britain, farm sizes were smaller and 
detachment from world trade resulted in a lack of foreign currency. 
Collingwood (2011:27) noted the work of Friedrich Aereboe in 
concluding that Germany would have been better off participating in 
world trade and that ‘agriculture should have been scaled down, freeing 
up workers for industry to produce manufactured goods for export which 
would then, in turn, have paid for increasing imports of food and 
consumer goods.’ In other words, the British model of free trade could 
carry the structural weakness of being dependent upon imported food 
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and having a declining agricultural sector because it was more efficient 
than protection.  
The Conservative Party and many on the Right moved in the 1920’s to 
challenge the orthodoxy of free trade and saw a role for a limited 
amount of protection as a temporary measure for certain industries, 
including agriculture197. However, as has been seen in Chapter 6 
Stanley Baldwin resisted a wholesale change of policy. J.M. Keynes in 
his Yale Review article in 1933198 commented that free trade was an 
‘economic doctrine which a rational and instructed person could not 
doubt.’ (1933:755.)  
For Keynes, what followed from that was that ‘policies which sought to 
interfere with the ideal international division of labour were always the 
offspring of ignorance out of self interest.’ (1933:755.) The Government 
White Paper of 1926 also confirmed the position that no compulsory 
controls over production, no subsidises or intervention on the grounds 
of national security were justified, thus restating the conclusions of the 
1905 Commission. This refusal was embodied in the statement that no 
case had been made which ‘would justify the expenditure necessary to 
induce farmers in time of peace to produce more than economic 
conditions dictate.’ (Williams 1965:112) However, one exception had 
already been made, that of sugar which was subject to ‘temporary’ 
intervention from 1925. 
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The Example of Sugar 
What is important to evaluate is the fact that in respect of one food 
product, sugar beet, successive Governments from 1917 onwards 
attempted to intervene in the production, organisation and distribution of 
a ‘new’ product based upon an assessment of strategic dietary 
requirements of the population in wartime, vulnerability to imported 
foods and a perceived need to revive agriculture in a specific 
geographical location. A detailed consideration of the sugar industry 
between the Wars also highlights the methodologies employed by the 
Civil Service and how this impacted upon the markets and also served 
as a study for the ways in which the British Government might have 
pursued a policy of food self sufficiency.  
Even before the outbreak of War in 1914, sugar had been identified as 
the key strategic foodstuff, given its prominent place in the working 
class diet. A Commission was appointed in August 1914 with the ‘power 
to purchase, sell and regulate sugar supplies on behalf of the 
Government.’ (Hammond 1962:3)  
Despite the ability to intervene in the market, the Sugar Commission 
was unable to replace European sugar with supplies from Java and 
Mauritius. Problems with distribution meant that in 1916 supplies were 
running at around 60% of pre war levels and this brought about the first 
approaches to establish a rationing scheme. The way in which Civil 
Servants approached this matter is significant given that throughout 
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1916199 the official line was that rationing was not an option. The 
Ministry of Food had certain clear administrative preferences, but 
needed to resolve the question of whether an individual or a household 
should be registered with a particular retailer or be given the opportunity 
to spend the ration with any retailer. The critical difference lay in how 
sugar supplies should be distributed, with there being a difference 
between provisioning a retailer with a regular clientele and responding 
to customer purchasing patterns. The War Cabinet in May 1917 were 
presented with a comprehensive approach or a simple initial model with 
the clear expectation that they would choose the latter. As Hammond 
(1956:431) made clear the substantive matter was that the Ministry 
really wanted to establish Local Food Offices as their first priority, a 
component which was common to both schemes.  
Rationing was due to commence on December 31st. 1917 but was 
thought to be unable to deal with any matters such as households 
moving and displaced persons. It was therefore concluded that what 
was required was a Central scheme which could accommodate change 
and this new arrangement was approved in October 1917. As 
Hammond wrote ‘the task was begun of covertly transforming the plan 
already announced, in such a way that every consumer would be 
brought on to the central register.’ (1956:432) 
This interaction between the civil service and politicians could simply be 
dismissed as an attempt to put together workable solutions in a difficult 
                                               
199
 Until the advent of the Coalition Government of December 1916 
165 
 
wartime setting, but the significance is twofold. Firstly, the introduction 
of rationing required measures both for the consumer and the producer 
and was dependent upon Government establishing and working 
through the Sugar Commission and purchasing both openly and 
covertly sugar on the world market. The losses which were incurred by 
state trading after the War then contributed to a perceived need to 
introduce a sugar beet industry into England. Secondly, it is clear that, 
notwithstanding the exigencies of wartime, political decision making in 
what is considered to be a technical area (such as agriculture) is heavily 
dependent upon the Civil Service. Sugar provided an example of both 
administrative dependency and the ‘sub letting’ of an issue into a 
technical arena hidden from much political accountability.200 
As an illustration of that fact despite the Cabinet having initially 
approved a simple scheme, then a national scheme, what was finally 
implemented was a local scheme owing to the failure to resolve the 
detail of national operation. Consequently, a month after the Cabinet 
approved the national guidelines; local schemes were ‘officially 
sanctioned and encouraged.’ (Hammond 1956:434) William Beveridge 
wrote that ‘the Ministry of Food made it’s .... reputation by putting 
accidentally into practice one system of rationing while it was formally 
engaged in devising a different system.’ Hammond (1956:434) noted 
whilst being ‘publicly committed to a third.’ From the introduction of 
rationing it followed that the British Government intervened in the 
market to such an extent that major shifts in the production of sugar, 
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especially from the West Indies, took place. In turn, this meant detailed 
negotiations with the International Sugar Committee. The other 
implication was that the expertise of the private sector was incorporated 
into the Government process through the operation of the Sugar 
Commission, to the extent that Civil Service relied upon the statistics 
provided and the reaction of industry experts to the practicality of 
certain solutions, with the assumption that decisions made would not 
commercially benefit the companies concerned. 
The boom which followed the end of the War led to substantial 
increases in world sugar cane prices and as a consequence of the 
slump that followed, the British Government was left with a large supply 
which had to be sold off at lower prices. The lesson, it seemed, was not 
that Governments should refrain from playing the market; instead it 
brought about a sense of resentment at the undue ‘rigging’ of the 
market which was largely attributed to American and Cuban subterfuge 
and the unreliability of International trade regulation. 
The promise made to attempt an increase in home production of sugar 
beet was therefore predicated on the assumption of an unfair market, 
abuse by larger suppliers and a need to provide some assistance to the 
arable farmers of Eastern England. When in 1924 the import duty on 
Non Empire sugar was reduced, the very small Sugar beet Industry 
requested Government assistance for a temporary period of time. How 
small the industry was can be seen in the Written Answer provided by 
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the Minister of Agriculture in 1925201 that showed only 7,011 tons of 
production in 1922, 13,281 in 1923 and 23,761 in 1924202. 
 In Parliament the question of sugar imports became the subject of a 
number of debates and even played a major role in consideration of the 
Finance Bill. Sir W. Mitchell - Thomson203 asserted the need for 
domestic support on the grounds that ‘submitting to the unrestricted 
market manipulations of the producers was not Free Trade, but 
madness.’ (c.317.) 
What is largely ignored in the debates is that tariffs which were raised 
during the War had already been in operation for some while and were 
set at a level ‘that permitted of substantial discrimination in favour of 
home – grown or colonial supplies.’ (Hammond 1962:5) That is, 
conditions had already been altered in favour of sugar beet growers. 
Thus is illustrated one of the defining sequences of Government 
intervention designed to bring about agricultural change; the 
intervention fails – the market is at fault – further intervention – 
unintended market consequences – further intervention. In terms of the 
British Sugar (Subsidy) Act 1925 the intervention was time limited to 
seven years with a reducing subsidy level during that period. The other 
consequences of the legislation are well illustrated by the contributions 
of MP’s Maclean, 
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‘I do not see why the 45,000,000 people in this country should be taxed 
to provide the problematical 100,000 people with £30,000,000 in wages 
(c.393.) 
and, Lyle,204 
‘There can be no logical justification for protecting a special industry in 
this country against an already established industry’ (c.396.) with the 
additional point that it is one which is ‘employing thousands of men 
directly and indirectly. (c.395.)205  
Maclean further remarked that each job will cost the State more than 
double the average wage and as this is supposed to be an 
entrepreneurial country, why is any intervention required? In the months 
after the passing of the Act there were many questions in Parliament 
about foreign labour employed in the sugar beet factories, use of 
foreign equipment, involvement of foreign capitalists and the granting of 
a building contract to an American company. All these amounted to a 
‘British jobs for British workers’ paradigm which has some 
contemporary resonance. 
In addition, there was claimed to be specific agricultural benefit to the 
efforts to promote sugar beet growing which is it that increased 
agricultural employment and that beet had a special cleansing effect 
which was good for arable rotation systems. The time limited subsidy 
was eventually accompanied by a reduction after negotiations with 
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sugar refining interests and ultimately a quota agreement was imposed 
on both industries in1933. By that time, it had become clear that the 
industry was not performing in accordance with the somewhat 
unrealistic expectations and another Sugar Committee was set up by 
Parliament to consider the future of the subsidy.  
The three person body split with the Majority Report arguing that there 
was no justification for any continuation.206 The Majority framed the 
argument in a clear manner; ‘the sum of several millions per annum on 
an industry which has no reasonable prospects of ever becoming self – 
supporting, and on the production of a crop which, without that 
assistance, would at present sugar prices, be practically valueless.’ 
(Hammond 1962:7)207 
Even in terms of the provision of a secure supply in wartime, the sugar 
subsidy was adjudged to have failed completely attracting the label 
‘haphazard and inequitable’ (Hammond 1962:7) from the Majority 
Report. 
Not only would the maintenance of imports offer greater security in the 
long run, the recommendation was that the State should not support the 
industry as the farmers concerned would be better growing other crops. 
The Minority Report identified clear agricultural benefits and 
emphasised that other industries which the refining process required 
benefited from the building of sugar beet refining, notably limestone, 
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coke and coal, although it noted that these products had to be 
conveyed around the country to where the factories had been sited. 
Hammond noted drily that ‘the very economic inefficiency of the whole 
process of obtaining sugar from beets was turned into an argument in 
its favour.’ (1962:8)  
In the Parliamentary Debate which followed the Report208 Christopher 
Addison, who had launched The Marketing Act when Agriculture 
Minister, referred to the sugar beet subsidy as ‘a conspicuous example 
of what should not be done when public money is provided in 
abundance (c.1301.) 
This was not a statement of principle, but an indictment of how it had 
been administered. British farmers had in ten years approached the 
productivity of European farmers with decades of experience, but were 
let down by the administration of the industry. The subsidy was high 
owing to the quotas which had been agreed with large sugar refining 
interests, meaning that factories were not fully productive. The country 
had only been able to provide a small percentage of domestic sugar 
supplies, wages were poor, many jobs were seasonal, gains to 
shareholders were high but – in a clear statement of the Labour Party 
position – Addison then stated that ‘we regard the sudden cessation of 
this growing as a thing which would not be politically or industrially wise 
or practicable.’ (c.1307.) Therefore, the country cannot stop, we 
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appreciate the benefits but ‘we object exceedingly to the continuance of 
this payment of public money’ (c.1307.) 
Mr Amery (Conservative) characterised the difficulty facing Parliament 
as being that the question of sugar ‘has been complicated and be- 
devilled in a whole jungle of mystifying make – believe ever since the 
day we started protecting the production of sugar in this country and 
decided that we must pretend that we were not protecting it.’ Further, ‘if 
the sugar subsidy is not working in the sense that the crop is ‘practically 
valueless’ then does this bring into question why we persist in spending 
£20 million a year on steel, or £200 million to develop a motor car 
industry?’ (c.1313.) 
Amery also posed the question which must arise from the Majority 
Report, which is that if sugar can never be made self supporting209, can 
any agricultural crops? 
Amery concluded, like Addison, that the country must continue to 
protect sugar, despite the difficulties, because only 5% of sugar crops 
worldwide are produced under free trade conditions. It was not a free 
trade product and that should be recognised by using public money to 
increase efficiency.  The bulk of the contributors to the Parliamentary 
Debate represented constituencies in Yorkshire or Lincolnshire who 
grew or refined sugar beet and who commended the wisdom of the 
scheme, the efficiency of the farmers, the importance of the crop to 
                                               
209
 The argument being that in a rigged market Britain cannot make sugar beet pay 
under any circumstances. 
172 
 
arable rotation and the fact that, soon, no further subsidy would be 
required. Mr. Lennox Boyd (Conservative) used the security argument 
in noting that Germany produces 95% of their crop as against 30 – 35% 
in Britain and it is for that reason that the subsidy should continue. H. 
Samuel blamed the Labour Party – ‘they would turn this uneconomic 
and costly industry into a quasi – national institution’ and, ‘they would 
make it into a public corporation and tie this millstone round our necks 
in perpetuity’ (c.1357.) 
In reply, Tom Williams for Labour stated that ‘I am satisfied the whole 
scheme from beginning to end has been one long ramp’210 (c.1383.) 
and then voted to continue the £3 million pounds a year subsidy. 
The final two contributions showed the degree to which this one crop, 
which is illustrative of how much of the agricultural discourse was 
conducted between the Wars, produced strange political contradictions. 
Samuel proposed that one should vote for the measure but noted that 
Labour would behave in an even worse fashion and a future Labour 
Agriculture Minister declared it a ‘ramp’ and voted for it as well. 
Indeed the subsequent Government White Paper211 rejected the 
Majority Report on ‘sound’ agricultural grounds and proposed a further 
reorganisation, which brought about the setting up of the British Sugar 
Corporation, an independent oversight body, more quotas and 
additional duties.212 A ceiling on production was also imposed in line 
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with international agreements which started in 1931. Prior to the full 
implementation of the new measures, there were further modifications 
made in the light of the International Sugar Conference of 1937, which 
made producer countries pledge to make every effort to ensure efficient 
production methods. 
The Broader Lessons 
The close analysis of sugar has been undertaken in order to examine 
the situation when successive Governments undertook to intervene in 
an agricultural industry on strategic grounds. The initial concern was 
that of security, underpinned by recognition of the importance of sugar 
to the working class diet. The intervention was intended to be temporary 
and, importantly, to cover so many contingencies that few understood 
the detail of the scheme. Once started it had a certain logic which 
meant that other interests had to be bought off (Tate and Lyle for 
example) and at one point increased subsidises were being paid in 
order to reduce production. It also seemed impossible to withdraw 
funding for a crop that the Majority Report assessed as ‘practically 
valueless.’ 
There is also the position that the Government claimed to be 
undertaking all of this intervention on behalf of the consumer, either in 
ensuring continuity of supply or lower prices. Only in the late 1930’s, 
when the public started to perceive that virtually all the agricultural 
industries were run by Cartels with complicated and opaque funding 
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arrangements, does there appear any prospect for independent 
consumer representation. 
Sugar beet showed the way in which any Government that had wished 
to move towards a policy of food self sufficiency would have been 
constrained by a market economy. That is not to say that the 
methodologies chosen were the only possible ways of doing things, but 
is to make it clear that once the State felt that it had a role, then market 
intervention was necessary. 
The Labour Party, despite a long term commitment to nationalisation 
had seen that as a ‘land’ issue, rather than considering what 
mechanisms would be required to decide what crops, what quantities 
and at what prices goods would be sold. One of the reasons why the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society kept its distance between itself and the 
Labour Party on food and agriculture matters was a wish to protect how 
it ran its’ operations and to guard against increased prices. The main 
reason why detailed consideration was not given to the level of output 
that might have resulted from nationalisation was that the Party had at 
the core a belief in rational administration, largely arising from Fabian 
self confidence. Secondly, it was assumed that domestic food 
production was so low under present market conditions that 
Government intervention must improve matters. The Agricultural 
Marketing Acts also rested upon the assumption that if agriculture was 
being unduly dominated by retailers then intervention on behalf of 
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farmers would act as a corrective. The State had a duty to intervene 
simply because farmers were being disadvantaged by slick retailers. 
The Further Development of State Intervention 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
It may seem unlikely, given the narrative of the sugar beet industry, but 
within political discourse the depression of 1929 – 1932 is seen as firm 
proof of the need to intervene in both agriculture and industry generally. 
It seemed possible to retain a belief in free trade (as the Labour Party 
did) but also acknowledge the need for ‘temporary’ protection or to 
ensure that the Empire is treated more favourably. Intervention by 
Government is then justified in order to bring about organisational 
change through Marketing Acts either voluntarily (Labour) or through 
compulsion (National Administration.) Land reform was introduced in 
order to encourage larger farms whilst, at the same time, using public 
funds to encourage smallholdings. Subsidises were provided to bring 
about improvements through increased use of fertilizers, exemption 
from taxation introduced in order to boost production and grants given 
to improve land drainage or infrastructure. Whilst there are some 
elements in common with protecting other aspects of British industry, 
many of these moves reflected that agriculture being different. It was 
not simple intervention that was needed, but complicated and subtle 
movements which could not be understood outside of a specialist few 
‘experts’ or administrators. Winters wrote that ‘agricultural policies in 
nearly all industrial countries raise prices, redistribute income 
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regressively and towards a small section of society, and impose 
economic costs both at home and abroad.’213 This is certainly true of 
the period from 1931 through to the outbreak of War in 1939 and 
Winters is correct is portraying agricultural policy as being an ‘endless 
and uncertain game’ (1993:11.)  
As evidence of that, by 1939 there are seventeen Agricultural Boards in 
operation, all operating according to the specific requirements of their 
trade and all requiring the specialist knowledge of the NFU, leading 
farmers and administrators. Not one has the specific brief to increase 
food production. 
Murray (1975:28) wrote that by 1939 ‘public opinion was becoming a 
little restive about the granting of restrictive powers to groups of 
producers’ coupled with awareness that 2.7 million acres of agricultural 
land had gone out of production since 1918. Was sugar beet a success 
given that it had since 1925 cost £42 million Pounds in subsidy and a 
further £21 million in rebates? Output had increased214 but constituted 
‘some 16% per cent of the country’s pre – war annual requirements’ 
(Murray 1975:32)215 The sugar beet subsidy for the last year before the 
War (1938 -39) was eclipsed by that of wheat deficiency payments 
(£9.3 million Pounds) and fat cattle payments (£4.3 million Pounds)216 
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Overall, for the period 1936 -9, ‘British farming supplied some 30 per 
cent., by wholesale value, of the country’s annual peacetime food 
requirements.’ (Murray 1975:39) For Tom Williams this figure was low 
because not enough public money had been invested owing to ‘a 
stubborn unwillingness to value the industry properly as part of our 
national economy’ (1965:115) by an overly doctrinaire succession of 
Conservative led Governments. 
Williams may have perceived the ‘doctrinaire’ minds of his opponents 
but the whole edifice can also be analysed on the basis of undue 
interference in the market. Robbins’ account of the Great Depression217 
portrayed agricultural support as being the effort of the Government 
under political pressure to support an industry which should have been  
left to adjust to market conditions.  The Government wish to bring 
‘order’ into agriculture did little other than raise prices, reduce 
competition and delay moves into more profitable areas. Robbins 
argued that ‘an association of producers with statutory powers to 
exclude competition is not necessarily the best judge of the interest of 
consumers.’ (1934:139.) Supporters of intervention were characterised 
by Robbins as pursuing ‘the rationale of the mysterious adjustment of 
supply to demand’ (1934:141) at the expense of the consumer. He 
wrote that, ‘it is all very well for the dilettante economists of wealthy 
universities, their tables groaning beneath a sufficiency of the good 
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things of this world ... to say ..“Food is cheap enough, Charabancs are 
vulgar. The railways are admirable. We have enough of plenty. Let us 
safeguard security”’ (1934:142)218 
When Governments did intervene in agriculture, Robbins argued that 
there was no reasonable limit, given that the State ‘will be driven to 
adopt closer and closer control if the schemes are not to break down 
from evasion of their rules’ (1934:144.) The ultimate expression of 
intervention was that of planning, of being rational and maximising 
control over the productive apparatus. Robbins wrote that ‘we may not 
all be socialists now, but we are certainly (nearly) all planners.’ 
(1934:145)  
For him, a Right Wing Government might still plan but at the same time 
acknowledge the rights of private property, but this would not last –
which led him to the conclusion that Socialism and Planning are, in the 
end, the same. In respect of agriculture, Robbins pointed out that giving 
each industry the right to govern itself is not even planning because it 
will result in a much more chaotic situation, not stability. 
Robbins alluded to the enthusiasm for planning and managing 
capitalism in response to the recent publication of works such as Land 
and Life: The Economic national Policy for Agriculture219 in which the 
authors acknowledged that some control of imports was required and it 
was necessary to increase home production through State intervention. 
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J.M. Keynes wrote in the Yale Review of ‘the penetration of a country’s 
economic structure by the resources and influence of foreign capitalists’ 
which required a ‘greater measure of national self sufficiency and 
economic isolation.’ (1933:2) 
This line of argument saw that free trade was either outdated, not 
working properly or inherently flawed. Keynes wished to present a 
balanced argument in which he was persuaded of the merits of further 
intervention, having moved on from adherence to free trade. 
‘I have become doubtful whether the economic loss of national self – 
sufficiency is great enough to outweigh the other advantages of 
gradually bringing the product and the consumer within the ambit of the 
same national, economic and financial organization’ based on the belief 
that ‘decadent international but individualistic capitalism  .. is not a 
success.’ (1933:3) 
Clearly, Robbins did not accept that line of argument describing a 
(national) plan as ‘being the centralised disposal of the factors of 
production’ (1934:153) which did not permit the functioning of a free 
market. 
The importance of this debate for agriculture was critical but in many 
respects by 1933 the process of State intervention was difficult to bring 
to a halt, as evidenced by the sugar beet industry and by the fact that 
virtually all agricultural sectors were run by industry bodies by 1939. 
With growing evidence of the nutritional deficiencies in the working 
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class diet, Astor and Rowntree220 shifted the basis of the 
interventionism by identifying that although the country was no longer in 
recession, British agriculture should still be subsidized ‘but only for 
nutritional reasons and in the name of efficiency.’ (Wilt 2001:49) This 
linked State intervention in agriculture with the need to grow ‘protective’ 
or ‘nutritional’ crops for people not currently benefiting from them. 
They argued that there should be clear limits to the amount of help in 
order that foreign trade can increase and the country continue to import 
food and raw materials, especially from the Empire. In their later 
publication221 Astor and Rowntree shifted the ground by portraying 
security as the dominant issue and although still wishing to limit 
intervention nevertheless wanted to see the State assume the 
responsibilities of the various Marketing Boards in order to operate in 
the interests of the consumer. Despite these shifts in the raison d’être 
for intervention, Robbins’ would undoubtedly have still asserted that 
capitalism constituted ‘a much more flexible mechanism than the 
collectivist alternatives.’ (1934:155) 
The official consideration of the problems of food supply in wartime 
began as early as 1933 and there was a clear linkage between food 
policy and re-armament.222 The Interim Report on Food in 1933 went 
over the old ground of the procedures developed in World War 1 but did 
not suggest any immediate change in policy. There was no requirement 
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for food stockpiling or increased domestic production and little 
consideration was given to the suggestions of those such as Viscount 
Lymington that food self sufficiency would improve security. The move 
to Empire, rather than foreign, imports appeared to ensure that there 
would be continuity of supply during wartime223 and there was a sense 
of confidence that the administrative procedures could be re-activated, 
if necessary. Neville Chamberlain occupied the post of Chancellor of 
the Exchequer from 1931 – 1937 and acquired a reputation for financial 
prudence whilst at the same time carrying out a programme of re-
armament through increased borrowing224.  
One central principle was maintained all the way through the 
development of strategy, which was that there should be ‘no major 
change in the existing peace – time agricultural policy in advance of war 
solely for defence purposes.’ (Murray 1975:46) 
Whilst it was acknowledged that more food could be produced there 
was a broad consensus that the cost of that would be too high and 
would result in a loss of export markets. More importantly, there would 
be a loss of Political Capital in that it was assumed that any reduction in 
food imports would alienate allies. The detail of what would become the 
wartime policy of ploughing up and the switch to foods for human 
consumption was accepted by 1936225 and William Beveridge was 
brought back to oversee aspects of food policy and rationing.226 Despite 
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the increase in the number of subsidies and marketing arrangements 
the growth in the expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture was modest 
in the run up to wartime. It would therefore be incorrect to assert that 
Government intervention was only predicated upon defence 
considerations. But the unintended consequence of State sponsored 
control over most agricultural sectors was that it had created composite 
bodies capable of assuming a more interventionist role in the event of 
War. 
From 1938, the Food and Agriculture ministry’s developed the working 
assumption that even after any War there might be a need for 
permanent agricultural programmes to ensure a certain national level of 
production. From 1936 the Cabinet and the attendant Committees 
received regular and (as it turned out) accurate estimates of how 
production might be increased in the event of war. In 1937, it was 
estimated that 1.285 million acres of grassland could be ploughed up, 
wheat output increased by 26% and potatoes by 38%. (Murray 1975:53) 
The realisable gains were comparatively easy given that livestock 
production was a very inefficient way of producing food for humans as 
well as consuming a high percentage of imported foodstuffs. In 
February 1937 the urgency of enhanced planning and control was 
emphasised by virtue of the Cabinet requesting a move away from 
‘palliatives aimed at maintaining farmers’ returns (which) were no longer 
adequate in the face of growing dangers.’ (Murray 1975:38) From 1937, 
and especially in respect of the Agriculture Act 1937 and the 
Agricultural Development Act 1939, wartime planning was explicit in the 
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legislation. However, Murray noted that it was considered important not 
to alarm the public. In year one of any war it was thought that imports 
would remain at the same level with the ‘growth of the belief that there 
would be no serious shortage of shipping.’ (Murray 1975:55) Whilst the 
scientific verity of moving away from animal proteins was generally 
accepted, the Cabinet anticipated public pressure for animal protein. 
In respect of planning for any anticipated war, the prevalence of 
agricultural marketing bodies and other fora for joint working between 
civil servants, farmers, landowners and the NFU provided the illusion of 
action. A significant number of scientists felt that they were being 
excluded from such planning, especially in relation to their advice on 
vitamins where they considered that the deployment of ‘vitamin science’ 
could be introduced much faster than increased production227. 
Agricultural output had, in fact, increased little since 1918 and 
increasingly, farming in Britain had become a process for turning 
imported feeding stuffs into livestock products. There had been little by 
way of capital investment and State encouragement in drainage and 
fertiliser application had been patchy. Encouragement had been given 
to the developing Organic movement throughout the 1930’s by the 
reality of poor soil fertility in Britain and dust bowl events in the United 
States. For all the State intervention in agriculture, once wartime 
planning had commenced it became clear that what had occurred was 
‘the re-balancing of the state and the private sector;’ in which ‘controls 
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replaced ‘free’ markets.’ (Barling et al.2002:28)                                      
In what might seem to be an affirmation of Robbins’ work, what had not 
happened was increased capital investment; change into more 
profitable areas of farming and more efficient farm units. The State was 
now in a position to control food production and to supply narratives as 
to why it might do so in the shape of nutrition and security in time of 
war, but had achieved little to bring about real change. This was 
revealed in two significant events in 1938 and 1939; the Kettering 
Speech of Neville Chamberlain and the East Norfolk by election in 
January 1939. Chamberlain in the Kettering Speech228 made it clear 
that to produce more food would endanger the farmer and lead to 
possible starvation. Although the Agriculture Minister, Morrison claimed 
in Parliament that the Prime Minister had been ‘misunderstood’ the 
remarks were widely seen as a put down for farmers and somewhat 
contradicted assurances being given elsewhere. Morrison claimed that 
Chamberlain had only highlighted the’ more extreme’ version of self 
sufficiency and what he really mean to say was that ‘there was no 
prospect of this country being starved out because we had lost control 
of the sea.’ (Wilt 2001:102)The NFU repudiated the assertion that it 
sought self sufficiency and considered that Chamberlain had cast doubt 
upon their loyalty. A chain of events was set in place whereby the 
Government withdrew support from its own candidate in the East 
Norfolk by election of February 1939. On the eve of the poll, the 
Agriculture Minister was replaced by Reginald Dorman Smith who, in 
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almost perfect summation of the interwar period, had just finished as 
the President of the NFU and was a former member of the English 
Mistery229. 
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Chapter Nine 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
On the Edge 
‘The Past is a strange land, most strange.’230 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The notions of the restoration of the Guilds and rural revival in Chapter 
5 represented part of the reaction to the First World War. This chapter 
examines the responses of many on the Radical Right231 to both the 
War itself and the perceived decline of Britain. Whilst those who 
advocated a return to the land or a simpler, more moral life, can be 
dismissed as ‘anti-modernists’ there were more important underlying 
aspects to their position, which has not been sufficiently appreciated. 
The First World War was conducted using much of the latest science 
and technology in order to produce mass slaughter enabled by the 
accelerated deployment of mechanisation. The Fascist J.F.C Fuller 
called it ‘the military apotheosis of the Industrial Revolution.’ (Linehan 
2000:261)232Whilst the trenches represent an almost simple human 
level of conflict, that combat was enabled by the development of a 
range of efficient new technologies. One argument from the Radical 
Right was that the availability of that technology was indicative of a 
society where agriculture had already gone too far away from a ‘natural’ 
state of affairs, in line with the remark of Viscount Lymington [later the 
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Earl of Portsmouth] that ‘modern farm machinery is permissive of 
evil.’233  R.G. Stapledon, an Agricultural writer, academic and 
researcher wrote that towns appealed only to one part of the human 
character and have ‘accentuated the tendency to act and think, not as a 
free and independent entity, but merely as part of the herd.’ (1944:6)234 
In the interwar period, many previous societies were evoked (The 
Tudors being a particular favourite) in a manner similar to that 
previously encountered in Chapter 2.The question of being too 
mechanized, and lacking in human values, became an important 
element in the development of both the Radical Right political position 
and Organic agriculture. The notion of an organic society found favour 
in the revival of the concept of the Guild, which carried with it the idea of 
a balanced and self governing society. However, it is important to note 
that ‘balanced’ in this context means the maintenance of a ‘natural’ 
English hierarchy and does not incorporate democracy. 
The second component of the post War analysis on the Radical Right 
was that whilst the many that have died for “King and Country” were 
rightly mourned, those who survived the conflict became a force to be 
feared. This originated not just from the Russian Revolution in 1917 and 
the various ‘near misses’ from all over Europe, but also the perception 
of the growing industrial and political power of the newly enfranchised 
working class. There was to be no sense of reassurance generated by 
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the Government which introduced substantial tax increases and cuts in 
public spending from 1919 in order to pay for the War. When threatened 
by possible widespread industrial action in the autumn of 1920, the 
Government introduced an Emergency Powers Act and assumed 
wartime levels of control. Instead of comforting the Right this raised the 
prospect of a more intrusive State prepared to extend ‘emergency’ 
powers.  The Radical Right also appreciated, some years before the 
Labour Party, the implications of the changing relationships with the 
Colonies and why the colonies might not always be coming to the aid of 
the mother country. AJP Taylor (1965:150) noted that ‘it had been 
assumed that for years after the war Great Britain would gain from 
monopolizing the raw materials of her colonies.’ More importantly, the 
Colonies were determined to introduce a much greater measure of self 
government in order to pursue their own self interests. Other ‘British’ 
interests such as Ireland and India went through changes in the 1920’s 
and 1930’s respectively which illustrated the decline of the British 
Empire. 
In the context of all these anxieties, the Radical Right asserted the 
existence of traditionally British or, more appropriately, ‘English’ 
traditions. The logic of this was to emphasise native traditions, with a 
view to heading off allegations of copying an ‘alien’ philosophy from 
Europe. Linehan (2000:14) wrote that the search for such a lineage 
would ‘become a highly subjective exercise in invention and take the 
fascists on an imaginative journey deep into the British past.’ At the 
heart of that journey was the concept of self sufficiency, both in the 
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narrow agricultural sense and as the symbol of a proud, independent, 
nation. The Tudor State had given way to the ‘’bourgeois’ financial – 
capitalist class and ....ushered in the hated era of individualism, class 
egotism and free trade laissez faire internationalism.’ (Linehan 2000:15) 
Clearly, a world view based upon such assumptions had little scope to 
participate in mainstream political discourse.  
The resumption of free trade after the War was seen by all the main 
Parties as being essential to the maintenance of economic growth but 
the Radical Right reached back not just to the Tudors but to the more 
recent advocates of Protectionism and national or imperial self 
sufficiency. Being excluded from the orthodoxy of the free trade 
consensus meant that opportunities to set up a new party were 
explored, as happened with both the Rural and National Parties in 
1917/1918. The presumption was that such a Party was needed to 
introduce a sense of order into ‘the chaotic world of individual business 
run for unchecked private profit.’ (Dorril 2007:30) The inspiration from 
agriculture lay in the demands from agricultural experts, most notably 
Lord Milner, who was engaged in an ‘elitist quest for a coalition of the 
best political minds.’ (Thurlow 2000:45)  
The role of the ‘best minds’ was to provide the intellect that Capitalism 
lacked. Given also that Democracy was assumed either to have already 
failed or be incapable of providing real leadership, then the ‘best minds’ 
had to be above politics. This approach was best summed up by the 
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programme of the English Mistery235 which sought to create ‘a sound 
ethical basis for national politics’ based upon ‘principles derived from 
the instincts and traditions of British breeds.’ (2003:339) This equated to 
the elevation of the Aristocracy in place of the elected Parliament 
203:339) although many other agriculturalists, notably Massingham and 
Lord Lymington,236 felt that landowning had become so diversified that 
there were very few remaining landowning leaders who could contribute 
specialist knowledge. This knowledge had to be there in order that the 
leadership could then contribute to ‘a society wherein agriculture took 
priority over manufacturing within self supporting, self governing organic 
communities.’ (Moore – Colyer 2004:359) 
Viscount Lymington argued that it was the essence of being English 
that land had to be held privately and control had to be local. Public 
ownership could not be considered as a viable option owing to the fact 
that ‘neither by soil nor character are we fitted to be socialized farmers.’ 
(Massingham ed. 1945:165)237  
Archibald Hurd (1925:48) saw the ‘war against Capitalism’ being waged 
by the Labour Party as being part of an attempt to impose public 
ownership on landowners when if it had not been for their ‘high sense of 
public duty’ things would have been even worse in the countryside. 
Stapledon (1944:189) noted that landowners had diversified their 
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interests but this arose ‘out of public spiritedness and a desire to take 
an active part in big business.’ The implication was that if the national 
interest demanded it, then these people would return to agriculture, 
particularly if not burdened by the actions of financiers or, to use the 
more widespread term, usurers. 
If land was held in common, this would not only have agricultural 
consequences, but would represent the most serious restriction on 
personal liberty yet seen in Britain. Farming by ‘diktat ‘would be a step 
backwards, leading to a reduction of the food production of our native 
soil and a further increase in our dependence on supplies of food from 
overseas.’ (Hurd 1925:53) 
By 1924 the perspectives of the Radical Right had indentified that 
private ownership was essential, the State should only intervene if the 
consequence is to increase personal or local responsibility and 
production would increase substantially if agriculture were left to 
landowning leaders. In addition to those principles, one also had the 
formulation of sets of ideas about the condition of the soil and/or 
humanity, incorporating notions of a fundamental cultural and national 
decline. Webber (1986:56) wrote of the perception on the Right of ‘an 
internal ‘malaise’ – a lack of national vigour and purpose.’ This was also 
expressed as a sense of spiritual confusion arising from the alienation 
of people from their native soil and village. Rudolf Steiner238 wrote that 
Capitalism brings economic analyses to the fore and denies the 
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essential humanity of all people, but especially the working class who 
are ‘convinced of the ideological character of spiritual life; but the 
conviction renders them more and more unhappy.’ (1943:25) 
In respect of agricultural implications, experts such as Stapledon 
appeared to remain ‘above’ politics. Shaw and Chase wrote that 
‘agriculturalists, largely political innocents, were drawn to the prospect 
of authoritarian government because it alone seemed likely to deliver 
the kind of reforms to farming practice they desired without the 
anathema of collectivisation.’ (1989:136)  
That perspective was illustrated by Stapledon (1935:304) who saw 
himself ‘as a man who has not studied public affairs, and who has a 
distinct antipathy towards everything that savours of politics, and who 
scarcely ever reads a political speech.’ None the less, Stapledon can 
still assert that ‘as a matter of fact I believe that there is a great deal to 
be said for ‘narrow’ nationalism’ (1935:251) or ‘I cannot begin to 
understand either the international position or high finance, but least of 
all can I understand why either should be permitted to dominate this 
country’s attitude towards the land.’ (1935:252) 
Stapledon was no marginal figure; as an advocate of Ley Farming he 
provided a very practical way forward in terms of storing and releasing 
fertility and played a leading role in influencing policy in the Second 
World War. Shaw and Chase suggested that this apparent innocence is 
far from the case and the bringing together of the rural and the technical 
was based on a use of the past ‘in reactionary, right wing ways.’ 
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(1989:129) It is the context for the technical which is important to note, 
in that the use of any improved or scientific method of farming is 
deemed to be acceptable only in an imagined rural setting. Once it is to 
be utilised in a capitalist or collectivist setting then it cannot meet real 
national objectives. 
In any consideration of the nature of the Radical Right it is necessary to 
note the appropriation of many perspectives from the Left. Linehan 
(2000:30-34) noted the importance of the work on eugenics of HG Wells 
and Sidney Webb and the involvement of the latter ‘in the creation of a 
new supra- class party of ‘national efficiency’, whose aim would be to 
acquaint every sphere of British life with the principles of efficiency.’ 
(2000:31) The later work of Robert Blatchford, particularly his 
denunciation of the Left in the First World War, made an important 
contribution to a sense of hyper nationalism.  
From 1919, however, what became important was that, whatever the 
British traditions, Mussolini was bringing about an apparent 
transformation of Italy by incorporating many of those values and 
offering firm leadership. 
This practical example of agrarian change in Italy took place in a 
specific political context239 arising out of the ending of the First World 
War and the first application of a democratic franchise. Owing to the 
system of proportional representation it was difficult to identify a clear 
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winner of the 1919 elections240 but substantial advances were made on 
the Left by the PSI,241 a party which then refused to participate in any 
moves towards coalition. The party did, however, exert a measure of 
control in some parts of Italy and utilised that in order to follow the 
process of building the Local State as an instrument for socialist 
transformation. Morgan wrote that it ‘used its local government powers 
to ‘expropriate’ the propertied classes through high taxation and support 
of consumer and producer co-operatives’ (1995:32.) In the light of the 
severe financial crisis of 1920, the Fascist reaction was largely 
predicated upon local and rural reaction to the threat of ‘imminent 
revolution.’ Harold Goad wrote of Italy having to stave off ‘alien ideas 
imported from Germany via Russia.’ (1926:310)242 
The development of agrarian fascism was in opposition to ‘the socialist 
goal of a collectivised agriculture’ (Morgan 1995:37) and managed to 
bring together both landowners and small producers in some of the 
Italian provinces. As the agricultural policy of Mussolini developed in the 
1920’s it incorporated increased land ownership,243 land reclamation, 
control of production levels and the replacement of Independent 
agricultural Trades Unions with Syndicates, which had the ‘beneficial’ 
effect of lowering wages.244 In all areas of social, economic and political 
life the Fascists in Italy were ‘working to erode the bases of pluralist 
society’ (Morgan 1995:68) and to build up the Corporatist State. In July 
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1925, after severe difficulties affecting the Lira, Mussolini launched the 
Battaglia Del Grano (Battle for the Wheat) which involved the imposition 
of import duties on wheat, scientific and technological programmes and 
equipment grants. The aim ‘was to increase Italy’s production of wheat 
and cereals to the point of self – sufficiency’ (Morgan 1995:98) with one 
substantial exception, which was the acknowledgement by Mussolini 
that ‘self - sufficiency’ had to be enhanced by Colonial acquisitions. 
Until Italy was in a position to colonise productive neighbours, then it 
could only be a proud independent nation if it could satisfactorily feed 
itself. To a very large extent this goal was achieved, in respect of wheat, 
by 1930 but such was the power of the producer syndicates that 
consumers had to pay high prices. More importantly, such was the 
distorting influence of the incentives and duties that production of other 
significant crops declined over the same period. 
From 1928 Mussolini ‘encouraged’ rural settlement on the grounds of 
the enhanced moral and physical attributes of country living and looked 
to increase domestic food production through the scheme of bonifica 
integrale; land reclamation. Whilst more recent writers have seen the 
drive towards ‘ruralism’ as part of a move to divert attention away from 
increased industrialisation in Italy, at the time such a  policy was 
greeted with enthusiasm in Britain by many on the Radical Right. Not all 
MP’s were as enthusiastic as the Conservative member, Viscount 
Lymington in the House of Commons debate on Agriculture245 
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‘Yes, it would be better to have a Mussolini organising the agriculture of 
this country than to see it go to ruin, as it is doing to-day. It wants 
leadership, a clear balancing of the differences between arable and 
pastoral agriculture, getting them in a sane light, and going through with 
it with bravery, courage and singleness of will and purpose.’ (c.953) 
In a number of debates in both the Lords and the Commons, the term 
‘Mussolini’ became shorthand for decisive action or showing leadership, 
especially in the 1920’s. In the same debate in 1930, R.A. Butler 
backed up Lymington and said that 
‘Agriculture has waited some 84 years since the repeal of the Corn 
Laws to get equitable treatment from the towns and from the House of 
Commons. Entirely brushing aside all the arguments about one party or 
another, it is time that we had active administration at the Ministry and 
some remedying of the price to the farmer in the extremely difficult 
circumstances in which he finds himself at the present time.’ (c.958)  
In the Unemployment debate in 1931246 Lloyd George said of Mussolini 
that ‘He is reclaiming 5,000,000 acres of land,’ followed by the 
interjection recorded by Hansard - [An HON. MEMBER: "So could we!"]   
Indeed, the principal topic of the debate was finding ways of creating 
work, through land reclamation and rural reconstruction, both 
acknowledged as Mussolini precedents. Lloyd George again spoke in 
another Unemployment Debate in 1932, 
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‘The "Times" has already been advertising what Signor Mussolini is 
doing in the way of reclamation. He was opening yesterday a town built 
upon a waste swamp which has been reclaimed. Italy is a poor land. It 
is a poorer land than ours. That is what he is doing. He has shown 
courage. He is facing his difficulties. He has reclaimed hundreds and 
thousands—and, I am not certain that there are not millions—of acres. 
He has put, at any rate, hundreds and thousands of people upon the 
land. In Germany they are going to take 1,300,000 acres in East 
Prussia alone in order to settle the population upon the land where 30 
per cent of the population is already on the soil.’ (c.1309) 
 
The contributions recorded here are from mainstream political 
discourse, although Viscount Lymington did subsequently resign his 
seat on the grounds that Parliament was ineffective.  Many on the Left 
saw Italy as offering little by way of example, being substantially less 
industrial than Britain. In reply, the Radical Right would indeed point to 
the fact that rural reconstruction through the primacy of agriculture is 
the desired end; therefore Italy does provide an example.  
The implications of the Italian ‘experiment’ were more broadly applied 
than simply to agriculture. Harold Goad, who gave an influential lecture 
on the Corporate State to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
1933, had written in1926 that such a State fitted the bill in Italy in that it 
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did not have a democratic tradition and, before Mussolini, had fallen into 
‘the hands of a political class, consisting mainly of profiteers, agents, 
journalists and briefless barristers.’ (1926:311) 
Goad offered a definition of Fascism as ‘government by the aristocracy 
of patriotic devotion; the rule of the country by those who care most and 
think most and work most for the country.’ (1926:311) This rather useful 
definition is noteworthy in two important respects; that it corresponded 
closely to the working definition of good government which had been 
encountered in the writings of the Right and the ‘agricultural experts’ 
and, secondly, it suggested a way forward out of Capitalist crisis. 
The favourable treatment of Mussolini by many agriculturalists declined 
after the accession to power of Hitler, despite the apparent commitment 
of the National Socialists to food self sufficiency. Collingham (2011:28) 
wrote that it was not self sufficiency which was being pursued but the 
creation of a ‘food economy which would provide the basis for military 
action.’ Many agriculturalists of the Radical Right had contact with the 
German Agriculture Minister Walther Darre247 and expressed an interest 
in German agricultural revival through the setting up of the Reich Food 
Corporation248 and the accompanying policies of autarky.  There was 
also an appreciation of the merits of German policies on racial purity, 
with Viscount Lymington wishing to see an alliance of white peoples in 
order to take part in the German experiment of ‘constructive racial 
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regeneration.’ (Griffiths 1983:321)249 Rolf Gardiner250 wrote of ‘how 
hope can be given to a defeated and degenerate nation by sacrifice and 
singleness of mind working outside of the normal bureaucratic 
standards; how the regeneration of Hitler’s Germany was made 
possible beforehand by a few pioneers.’ (Griffiths 1983:321)251  
Christopher Turnor toured Germany and wrote appreciations of German 
(and Italian) agriculture252 and Viscount Lymington lectured in Berlin in 
1939 praising the moves made towards food self sufficiency. There 
were, however, a number of contradictions in the appreciations of Italian 
and German agriculture. Firstly, for all the talk of ‘blood and soil,’ 
Germany was utilising a degree of mechanisation that many on the 
Radical Right opposed in Britain. Secondly, there was an appreciation 
that ‘self sufficiency’ for both Germany and Italy actually meant that 
there was an inbuilt need for expansion into Eastern Europe or North 
Africa, a precedent set by Japan invading Manchuria in 1931. In the 
case of Italy, the leadership role attributed widely to Mussolini was 
replaced by one of an appreciation of his warlike propensities. By 1935 
(after the invasion of Abyssinia) the tone had changed to 
‘I hear that this is what Signor Mussolini told the Chamber of Deputies 
last year: War is to man as maternity is to woman.… I do not believe in 
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perpetual peace; not only that, I consider that it depresses and 
negatives the fundamental virtues of man, which only in bloody effort 
reveal themselves in the full light of the sun.’ (c.2714)253 
In addition, it was clear that Italian agriculture was struggling despite, or 
because of, the State encouragement and subsidy, resulting in 
shortages and high prices for consumers. 
Thirdly, whilst national regeneration was  to be welcomed and 
authoritarian government seen to be the best way of restoring the 
traditional order, the examples of the Fascist states contradicted the 
carefully constructed narratives about the natural order and Englishness 
and the discovery of the ancient virtues of village life. The vision of 
authoritarianism was founded on the emergence of natural leaders, not 
the imposition of State control. Massingham analysed the National 
Socialists254 as having ‘played upon a certain hysteria and distortion to 
which the German character is prone’ and quoted Hayek in asserting 
that the absolute State ‘was the creation not of the Prussians but of the 
Socialists’  (1945:2.) In his view, Socialism had entered Germany and 
laid the foundations for State control because as a race they did not 
possess the individuality of the English. Massingham saw everything; 
concentration camps, mass executions, as the ‘consequence of the loss 
of the person in the mass and the State, of free will and individual rights 
in the collective consciousness, of the timeless rural values in 
industrialism.’ (1945:3) 
                                               
253
 Mr George Lambert M.P. debate: HC Deb 31 July 1935 Vol. 304 cc. 2689 – 2781. 
254
 After the War. 
201 
 
Writing shortly after the 1945 Elections, Massingham observed that the 
‘Hitler situation’ was already present in Britain, as shown by the present 
mass psychology. The Socialist foundations of Britain were laid long 
ago with the result that ‘our people are not thinking in terms of self help 
and personal responsibility, but of social services and security which 
can only mean the authoritarian state’ (1945:5.) The situation in Britain 
was unchanged from the 1930’s in that agriculture was still not the 
paramount industry, the country was still too urbanized and too 
motivated by commercial considerations: ‘We betrayed and deserted 
our agriculture by the Enclosures and  the ‘workshop of the world’ 
fetish, and it at once took the egoistic form of laissez – faire 
individualism’ (1945 5-6.) 
Finally, many on the Radical Right simply ignored that they had 
previously been sympathetic to or had even supported Fascism before 
the War. Whilst it had been widespread to appreciate the leadership 
skills of Mussolini and see some hope in the shape of the National 
Socialists in Germany, many on the Right seemed to forget just how 
enthusiastic they had been. In respect of the ‘home grown’ variety of 
Fascism, many had an ambiguity towards English fascism and, in 
particular, to Oswald Mosley and his circle. 
Oswald Mosley had absorbed much of the Guild Socialism of G.D.H. 
Cole from his time with the ILP and had left the Labour Party once it 
had rejected his ideas for National Regeneration and Planning. At times 
he seemed to share the Radical Right position on agriculture. However, 
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the analysis of the CPGB255  is worth remembering - that the Blackshirts 
‘emerged from the heart of the Labour Party and the ILP’ (Dorril 
2007:205) and many on the Right shared that view and were suspicious 
of Mosley. Mosley might best be described as being too eclectic in his 
beliefs for many on the Right. 
Stephen Dorril wrote of Mosley’s ‘romantic nostalgia for a rural past 
(which) found favour with Nietzschean Tories of the organic movement, 
who feared modernity and cosmopolitanism, and dreamed of a pure 
and spiritual national revival’ (2007:250.) The difficulty for many on the 
Right was that he also favoured the rapid modernisation of Britain, 
having argued for the industrialisation of agriculture when he was the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Mosley claimed that his plans 
resolved any town – country conflict through the idea of national 
harmony, sacrifices made by all in the national interest.256 Henry 
Williamson257 saw that ‘the British Union [of Fascists] had the most 
supportive agricultural policy, with increasing stress placed upon the 
‘moral’ advantages of rural life.’ (Dorril 2007:417) and Mosley constantly 
stressed the need to stay in touch with the soil for the benefit of the 
health of the English race. But his equal attachment to the 
modernisation of British industry, including the creation of large 
industrial farms, made him somewhat untrustworthy to many 
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agriculturalists. By the time that the British Union of Fascists produced 
its first comprehensive agricultural policy (1938) the BUF was 
somewhat in decline and the attention of many agriculturalists had 
turned to wartime preparation. Jorian Jenks, the BUF agriculture 
spokesman who wrote the policy, started from the position that ‘no 
serious effort has yet been made to develop the full productivity of our 
soil,’ and that Britain continues to indulge in ‘manufactured goods for 
food’ which is ‘a dangerous assumption indeed at a time when there is 
a world -wide trend towards self –sufficiency.’ (Jenks 1938:3)258  
The explanation for such British neglect was to be found in the influence 
of those involved in trade and finance using their power over politicians 
to bring about a situation in which ‘agriculture has been sacrificed, not 
because farming doesn’t pay, but because its activities might interfere 
with the flow of tribute to Mammon.’ (1938:4.) The human cost of 
agricultural neglect was identified as an empty countryside, malnutrition 
in the towns, and a lack of security. Are we ‘to degenerate slowly into a 
community of town bred, undernourished weaklings, a parasite nation 
dependent for its very existence upon the charity of international 
financiers, upon the goodwill and forbearance of other and more virile 
countries?’ Jenks asked (1938:5)  
Jenks dismissed the ability of the main parties to restore agriculture, 
given that they were prey to either finance capital or false 
internationalism. Only the BUF had the strength to put Britain first by 
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taking on the forces of International finance with the aim of creating ‘a 
self reliant Britain within the framework of a self sufficient Empire.’ 
(1938:7.)259 The BUF also captured the essence of the Radical Right 
position by promising an ‘agriculture first’ policy, doubling home 
production and employing half a million more people on the land. Jenks, 
however, showed commitment to ‘intensive agriculture’ in pursuit of 
those aims by asserting that ‘the resources of the soil are almost 
endless if intensive methods can be applied under the stimulus of a 
progressive policy’ (1938:7.)  
This policy would be overseen, not through democratic accountability, 
but by the Corporate State which would offer agriculture self governing 
status if it operated in the national interest. Unlike the current half 
hearted Marketing Boards, the self governing authorities would 
comprise farmers, farm workers, consumers and the State itself. The 
key item in the BUF policy was cheap agricultural credit, a demand 
which had been present on both the Left and the Right since the great 
depression of the 1880’s. The BUF envisaged that it would be brought 
about by breaking the powers of International finance, which other 
parties had failed to do. The policy document ended with the 
proclamation that ‘Conservatism is the servant of Finance; Socialism 
has capitulated to it.’ (1938:15) However, it is worth noting that many on 
the Left analysed the same ‘vested interests’ in international finance as 
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also being the principal reason why agriculture failed to prosper.260 In 
wartime the CPGB also reflected that it was big business which had 
allowed agriculture to decline, because it was in its interests.261 
Christopher Addison in a Labour Party pamphlet of 1926 entitled Why 
Food is Dear pointed to the actions of financiers and speculators. Jenks 
and the BUF rarely explicitly referred to Capitalism and did not analyse 
it as a system, but instead concentrated on financiers as if their actions 
were different from how ‘honest’ people operated. In an earlier work262 
Jenks (and co-author Taylor Peddie) had written that ‘agriculture is the 
natural foundation on which the whole national economy should be 
based’ and that ‘agricultural produce is the truest from of wealth that 
exists.’ (1935:13) The soil is from God and represents ‘the agency 
through which He provides man with his daily food.’ (1935:42.) 
Taylor and Peddie had earlier written a work entitled The Economic 
Mechanism of Scripture263 which looked to the scriptures in order to 
inform economic theory and practice and which attempted to build a 
specifically Christian approach to trade.264 Taylor and Peddie wrote that 
the adoption of a Central Reserve Standard would enable ‘real wealth’ 
to be deduced and then be distributed equitably in order to generate 
better consumer purchasing. This would make sure that ‘the farmer 
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would be assured not only of sufficient currency to finance his 
operations, but also of a market for his produce when offered for sale.’ 
(1935:20-21.) Agriculture would prosper because it is the principal 
component of real wealth, thus it would follow that it would make 
‘agriculture the agency for the restoration of national prosperity, and 
thus re-establish it in its rightful place as the most important industry in 
the country.’ (1935:24.) The authors then presented a fairly orthodox set 
of measures (marketing, housing, smallholdings, agricultural authorities 
etc.) for rural revival which can only work if economic reform is 
implemented. The perspective on the position of the Colonies is of 
interest in that the authors recognised that economic nationalism was a 
growing force across the world and that ‘even our Dominions, whose 
loyalty to the Mother Country is unquestioned, made it clear ... that they 
were not prepared to sacrifice their own manufactures in order to 
provide markets for ours. In other words, they preferred THEIR 
conception of national self sufficiency to OUR conception of 
international trade.’ (1935:37.) The ‘answer’ was home trade; 
agriculture as the primary industry, increased purchasing power for 
consumers and minimal international trade through barter. 
 
The references to international finance or to usury are coded, and often 
not so coded, statements about so called Jewish influence or 
conspiracy. Rolf Gardiner in 1933 contrasted Britain and Germany in 
the following terms; ‘one [is] championing the values of earth and bread, 
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the other cleaving to the advantages of commerce and usury.’ (Griffiths 
1983:146) Britain could ensure a useful future if it ‘returned to our own 
English religion which was nurtured in the soil of our land until 
supplanted by alien, neo – Phoenician ways.’ (1983:146)265 Taylor and 
Peddie had earlier quoted the Bible to show the ‘financial dodges of the 
Israelites.’266 
There was also a coding involved in the soil itself where a contrast is 
implied between those who have a sense of identity and rootedness 
and those who ‘wander.’ Viscount Lymington in Famine in England in 
1938 wrote that back to the land was the only way of dealing with 
‘scum’ and ‘aliens’ in the cities, who lacked roots. The casual anti-
Semitism of many on the Right267 meant that it was not left to Fascists 
alone to single out the alleged ills of Jewish financiers and contrast that 
with the degree to which Christianity268 was rooted in the native soil. 
The linkage between God and the soil was of particular importance in 
the setting up of the Soil Association by people (many of whom were 
unapologetic or slightly apologetic fascists) whose ‘belief in a God –
given natural order ensures that they mistrusted any agricultural system 
which ignored the Rule of Return.’ (Conford 2001:96) Massingham 
wrote in 1941 that ‘the development of “scientific” land-forcing based on 
finance is a phenomenon even more terrifying than the savagery of the 
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present war, which is the logical outcome of living for wealth rather than 
for health of mind, body and estate.’ (Massingham ed. 1941: 
introduction: 3)  
Later in the introduction, Massingham wrote of the spiritual return which 
contact with the land brings and concluded that ‘the machine – made 
life will not work; it ends as we are seeing it end – in chaos, massacre 
and a lunacy of domination by evil men.’ (1941:6) For Massingham, 
Germany alone is not responsible for the War (‘all Europe is guilty’) 
because all nations have chased progress which has placed the 
Continent ‘back in the moral world of the Assyrians.’ (1941:9.) In an 
essay in the same work Viscount Lymington made reference to the 
‘ancient wisdom’ of man and nature and called for a system of interest 
free farming because ‘usury destroys wholeness because it demands 
something for almost nothing.’ (1941: Lymington: 28)  
Both during and after the War, the Radical Right developed an 
enhanced sense of spiritual and moral Englishness and elevated ‘the 
soil’ to a dominant position. For Lord Northbourne the key concept was 
that of ‘biological self sufficiency’ which could replace crude economic 
nationalism by unleashing the true creativity of the English nation. This 
analysis followed from the position that ‘trade as the foundation of living 
is nonsense; the net result is nil.’ (1940:62.) Instead, what is required is 
a genuine sense of place, not a ‘recreational and sentimental’ (1940:64) 
one based on leisure. The revival of agriculture also became linked with 
the ability of Britain to defend itself in the event of war. After Viscount 
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Lymington had resigned from the Commons in 1934 he linked the 
essential nature of food self sufficiency with the need to rearm and ‘to 
re-establish English character and tradition.’269 
 
The interwar period saw the development of an amalgam of views 
which brought together, in varying combinations, Englishness, race, 
breeding, religion, paganism, contempt for democracy, fears of 
Capitalism failing, Bolshevism winning and guarded admiration for Italy 
and Germany.  Hobsbawm (1994:124) wrote that the ‘natural alliance of 
the Right between the wars went from traditional conservatives via old-
style reactionaries to the outer fringes of fascist pathology.’  Writings on 
agriculture, especially from the experts,270 often seemed to occupy 
positions on that spectrum whilst claiming to be ‘non – political.’  
This apparent detachment was enhanced because it was widely 
assumed that agriculture was simply too difficult to fit in with political 
discourse. Whilst there were converts in the 1930’s, and many who 
subsequently went on to assist in the formulation of the 1947 
Agriculture Act for the Labour Government, the ‘Socialist’ conception of 
agriculture was confined to state ownership and a market economy. 
Anyone who knew too much about agriculture on the Left, as with 
Kropotkin, had long since been discarded in favour of recycled Liberals. 
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Taking note of the spectrum described by Hobsbawm, many of those 
who advocated ‘back to the land’ or food self sufficiency are hard to 
categorise. For example, the Labour Party exhibited a touching belief in 
large scale industrialised farming which could only be unleashed by 
nationalisation. The fact that the Agricultural Marketing Acts introduced 
by the Labour Government in 1931 acted a spur to the development of 
large ‘agri-businesses,’ the intensive use of chemicals and artificial 
fertilisers and increased mechanisation seemed not to have been 
appreciated, given that ‘State control’ would soon arrive. In the 
meantime, the practical effect of Labour policy was to strengthen the 
position of a number of key companies in a way which signalled the 
development of a capitalist agriculture. How output was increased 
seemed less important than the impact that it might have on the land, a 
position which meant that Labour characterised all those in opposition 
as being sentimental or reactionary. The purpose of agriculture was to 
feed the workers – cheaply. 
Questions about ‘self sufficiency’ did not need to be addressed given  a 
future in which fewer farmers working on larger farms would feed 
substantially more people from within our own resources. Whether they 
fed all of them did not really matter, as long as they fed substantially 
more than present. George Woodcock criticised this aspect of Labour 
policy, writing that there had been little work done on ‘a truly socialist 
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agricultural policy that aims at making full use of the productive capacity 
of British soil.’ (Woodcock 1942:15)271 
The large scale soil erosion encountered in Australia and the ‘dust bowl’ 
in the United States both served to concentrate attention on to the soil 
itself; ‘irresponsible farming had created deserts and caused untold 
human misery through the resulting social dislocation.’ 
(Conford2001:98)  
Conford quoted extensively from the United States Department of 
Agriculture Yearbook for 1938; two significant points being that ‘stable 
civilizations are associated with long familiarity with a given soil; they 
grow out of it and are rooted in it’ and ‘a stable, healthy and vigorous 
civilization demands a proper adjustment of men to the soil, and 
opportunities for them to make this adjustment.’ (Conford 2001:98)272 
Just how serious was the nature of soil erosion was emphasised by the 
publication in 1939 of ‘The Rape of the Earth: a world survey of soil 
erosion’273 which referred to erosion as ‘one of the most vicious and 
destructive forces that have been released by man.’ The authors took 
the view that the threat was greater than that from dictatorships and 
emphasised the USDA point about the decline of civilisations being a 
result of neglect of the soil. 
It is important to understand the significance of how ‘the soil’ and the 
associated questions of fertility entered in to the political discourse. 
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Whilst it is easy to emphasise the links between many agriculturalists 
and their appreciations of Fascism and / or ancient societies274 it is 
necessary to also understand the sense of urgency and danger many 
felt about soil quality and fertility, which is exemplified by the American 
experience. Mainstream political discourse appeared to exclude them, 
given that the Conservative Party vaguely supported back to the land, 
but not with any great conviction.275  In any event, supporting back to 
the land as a social policy showed little understanding of the state of the 
soil itself. The USDA Yearbook statements seemed, even from this 
distance, to posses something of a mystical quality in the way they 
linked the notions of ‘civilisation’ with ‘soil’ and ‘rootedness.’  A.J. Penty 
(see chapter 4) moved from being a member of the Fabian Society and 
an advocate of Guild Socialism to being a Fascist supporter and 
‘writing, as a Catholic, in praise of Mussolini for having created a 
corporate state which was in essence ‘the Regulative Guild State’ and 
demonstrated that ‘Mediaeval ideas still have practical validity.’ 
(Conford 2001:154)276  Whilst not exclusively drawing upon the 
‘mediaeval,’ a number of magazines, notably New English 
Weekly,277placed agriculture in a spiritual context.278 The NEW attracted 
support from those such as Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton who 
looked back ‘to an imaginary time when the Church had been central to 
life, when all had been stable, ordered, hierarchical and traditional, and 
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when every man had known his duties as well as his rights.’ (Griffiths 
1983:59) In addition, one might add, Britain was self sufficient and had 
not been subject to the control of ‘international finance.’ The line being 
articulated by the Radical Right was that international finance, and the 
associated elements of free trade and ‘usury’ not only brought ruin to 
British agriculture [deliberately] but robbed Britain of her soil and, 
therefore, her very essence. The supporting evidence for this was said 
to be the policy of cheap food to go along with low wages and to bring 
about higher profits for the exploiters. This resulted in the exploitation of 
soils all over the world to such a degree only artificial fertilisers could 
maintain artificial fertility, but only in the short term. 
International forces, almost always described as Jewish, were 
conspiring to rob Britain of her fertility both in the sense of the condition 
of the soil, but also of her ‘manhood’. The country could starve either by 
the workings of international trade, through another war or by having 
lost her capacity to use her own soil. When war did actually break out, 
the resulting mechanisation of British agriculture merely served to 
intensify those feelings.  The Right ‘viewed the land as a fundamental 
resource, not only for the production of food, but as a locus of values 
and ways of seeing and thinking worthy of preservation.’ (Moore – 
Colyer 2004:369) and increasingly came to consider that post war 
agriculture would intensify production methods and produce poorer food 
as a result. Many of those fears were to be found in the New Pioneer 
magazine which was launched in 1938 and included many of the figures 
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already encountered in the interwar period279 and which was closely 
allied with the British People’s Party.280 The New Pioneer contained 
what Linehan referred to as a ‘curious ideological mix of the absurd and 
the sinister’ (1983:141) but also published a considerable of material on 
practical organic husbandry. Nevertheless, it was dominated by anti – 
Jewish and anti – war sentiment and tended to place the practical 
material (much of which influenced the founding of the Soil Association) 
in the context of mediaeval imagery. 
Exploiting ‘our’ own soil appeared to make sense from the mid 1930’s 
as the threat of war became apparent. Active Government planning 
commenced in 1935 (see chapter 8) and the Marketing Boards served 
as a template for future intervention. The actions of Walter Elliot as the 
Minister of Agriculture had encouraged corporatist approaches to 
agriculture and he argued in 1934 that such arrangements had ‘already 
developed further in England than is generally recognised.’ (Ritschel 
1991:58)281 That such an approach was not completely acceptable to 
the Conservative Party was shown by the removal of Elliot form 
Agriculture soon after and the wry remark of Walter Runciman, 
President of the Board of Trade that ‘what is now called planning, ten 
years ago would have been called Socialism.’ (Ritschel 1991:59)282 One 
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would have thought that the Radical Right would have welcomed this 
‘conversion’ to developing domestic food production, but most of those 
encountered in this chapter were involved in pro – German and/or anti – 
war movements. The notion of self sufficiency also came under 
interrogation, with the emergence of an approach which noted that 
British self sufficiency always incorporated the Empire. For Germany, 
Italy and especially Japan (the most self sufficient and agricultural 
nation of all) attempted self sufficiency changed into territorial 
expansion. The Royal Institute of International Affairs pamphlet Raw 
Material and Colonies contrasted the strategic self sufficiency of the 
British Empire with the vulnerability of Germany and Japan. If open 
trade were the norm, then each country could make up that deficit by 
means of commerce, but the countries which sought domestic food self 
sufficiency were consciously opting out of ‘normal’ trade by protecting 
agriculture by tariffs and other measures. In a work in 1938, H.N 
Brailsford283 saw the attempt by Germany to create national self 
sufficiency as an aggressive act and one typical of a Fascist State 
‘which arises as the old system of international interdependence breaks 
down, in countries whose industrial development surpasses their 
natural resources and their assured market.’ (1938:66) 
Given that most of the Radical Right ascribed the decline of British 
agriculture to its ‘abandonment to world market forces’ (Moore- Colyer 
2001:189) or Capitalism or an alien conspiracy, then here is the 
countervailing view, which is that trade, properly conducted, is a greater 
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guarantor of peace. Self sufficiency for any national economy is an 
aggressive act – ‘an element of military strength which no Power can 
afford to neglect.’ (Brailsford 1938:67) Thus, the assertion of imperial 
self sufficiency, with trade with ‘foreigners’ being the lowest priority is 
also an aggressive act, given that it encourages war and colonial 
expansion of the part of those nations who lack access to raw materials 
and foodstuffs. Rolf Gardiner, but also later Oswald Mosley, understood 
and sympathised with Germany to the extent that Britain should move 
away from Empire and move towards Europe.284 Gardiner hoped that 
across Europe, but especially in Germany, it would be possible to bring 
about a rural and organic revival given that ‘the radical agrarian wing of 
National Socialism sought national salvation in land settlement and the 
recreation of a strong peasant economy.’ (Moore- Colyer 2001:197) 
Conclusion 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Radical Right in the interwar period pursued different arguments in 
support of rural revival and domestic food self sufficiency. The success 
of the Conservative Party is that it managed to be very close to a lot of 
the rhetoric of the Radical Right but developed sufficient political 
acumen to distance itself from Fascism. The Radical Right showed little 
sense of balance in their views on agriculture, wishing to recreate a 
vaguely realised former England. At the same time, many of the 
arguments used by the BUF were from the Left; the Fascist John 
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Beckett said that ‘my speeches were practically the same as those I 
had made in the ILP, because my change of organisation had no effect 
on my Socialist convictions and policy.’ (Coupland 2005:97)285 The 
Radical Right thought that totalitarian States offered an example to be 
followed as they appeared to represent ways in which Leadership and 
Rural Revival could be realised. As it became apparent that they did not 
(a process which took longer for some than others) there developed a 
greater sense of mysticism intermingled with patriotism. Preoccupation 
with the soil represented an attempt by many on the Right to establish 
themselves in an area where there were ‘truths’ to be discovered which 
transcended the mere superficialities of being ‘political.’  
Eve Balfour wrote in 1943 that ‘if our experience of the last twenty years 
has not taught us sufficient humility to realize that we are incapable of 
ordering our lives successfully in a Godless society, then one is 
tempted to wonder whether as a species we are worth preserving.’ 
(2006:196) In the midst of wartime, Balfour wrote of the imperative of 
Human ecology which ‘demands that we should think less of our ‘rights’ 
and more of our duties to all living things, including each other.’ 
(206:196.) 
Whilst such a work as The Living Soil pointed the way forward to the 
development of organic agriculture, perhaps exemplified by the 
founding of the Soil Association in 1946, it was also clearly a child of the 
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interwar Radical Right. Whilst the Soil Association website notes that it 
was founded in 1946 ‘by a group of far sighted individuals in who were 
concerned about the health implications of increasingly intensive 
agricultural systems’286 it declines to note who those individuals were.287 
The First Council of the Soil Association included H.J. Massingham, 
Viscount Lymington [by then the Earl of Portsmouth] Rolf Gardiner and, 
finally, the Editorial Secretary was Jorian Jenks.288 ‘Survivors’ of the 
Radical Right arguing not for a narrow national self sufficiency but 
having sought refuge in a more seemingly profound mystical pursuit of 
natural laws and the future of mankind. 
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Conclusion 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
‘Ill Fares the Land?’ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In choosing the above for the title of this work, one is aware of the use 
of the first line of the Goldsmith poem by a number of authors over the 
years. It was the 1984 work of Susan George which initially offered a 
possible title for this work, but one also notes the more recent polemical 
work of Tony Judt289 which has kept the phrase in the public 
consciousness. As this study has developed, however, it has become 
apparent that it is necessary to return to Goldsmith, given that his work 
encapsulated much of the political discourse presented here. For all the 
apparent benefits of the involvement of many agricultural ‘experts’ it is 
arguable whether most of the advocates of food self sufficiency have 
developed their positions much beyond the contents of this work of 
1770. 
It is worth reproducing the opening stanza from Oliver Goldsmith’s The 
Deserted Village in full because it articulated the dominant narrative in 
the sixty years covered by this study 
‘Ill fares the land, to hast’ning ills a prey, 
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay: 
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Princes and lords may flourish, or may fade; 
A breath can make them, as a breath has made; 
But a bold peasantry, their country’s pride, 
When once destroy’d, can never be supplied.290’ 
Whilst much of the poem, written in 1770, is personal to Goldsmith it is 
nevertheless the political articulation of the impact of change imposed 
upon the countryside. Whilst wealth might be a transitory blessing, it is 
contrasted with the value of having a dependable population who are 
the guardians of more enduring values. Although often portrayed as a 
lament for a sentimentalised countryside, Goldsmith made some 
specific points in which he identified the nature of the exchange which is 
taking place, 
‘The man of wealth and pride 
Takes up a space that many poor supplied.’ 
In addition, Goldsmith presented a view of the lifestyle which is being 
lost through the presentation of the deserted village 
‘A time there was, ere England’s griefs began, 
When every rood of ground maintain’d its man; 
For him light labour spread her wholesome store, 
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Just gave what life requir’d, but gave no more: 
His best companions, innocence and health; 
And his best riches, ignorance of wealth.’ 
In considering that stanza, one has to be aware of the prevalence within 
the political discourse of the image of the self sufficient individual within 
a self sufficient nation.  For some, this represented all that England 
needed to be, but for others even a partial recreation of the peasantry 
would be better than nothing. 
Whilst Goldsmith is often seen as having written this work as the 
consequence of specific examples of the building of grandiose 
houses291, the following line concentrated upon a more generalised 
view of where the blame lies for the transformation, 
‘trade’s unfeeling train.’ 
The word ‘unfeeling’ contrasts the personal nature of the countryside 
and the benefits of contact with the soil with the importation of a system 
which has the power to create wealth on a scale previously unknown in 
human history but will bring that about by appealing to less desirable 
aspects of human character 
‘Unwieldy wealth, and cumbrous pomp repose; 
And every want to opulence allied, 
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And every pang that folly pays to pride.’ 
Within the political discourse, it is that sense of ‘unfeeling’ which is 
prevalent in that it expressed the fears of a wide range of political 
positions that society is, or will shortly be, unrecognisable as England. 
The material presented here shows just how widespread is the view 
that England  had a better and a more moral past and, above all, a past 
predicated upon human or natural values.  
This line is articulated by a whole range of conservative thinkers who 
are convinced of a profound national decline in every aspect of public 
and private life. Goldsmith may present a vision in which once the 
peasantry has gone – it ‘can never be supplied’ – it cannot return, but 
this study indicates just how often such a demand was part of the 
political discourse. That England was once ‘great’ is a discourse which 
the Left articulated with as much enthusiasm, despite the different 
rhetoric. Annie Besant’s call for a new peasantry and recognition of the 
moral and physical superiority of working on the land accorded with the 
pursuit of higher moral ambition followed by Carpenter and Morris. 
Blatchford called for a ceiling on production and a deliberate rundown of 
international trade in order to avoid dependence on other countries. 
Morris wrote that the demands of the economy produced purely artificial 
constructs which removed men from their natural ways of life. 
Right and Left even agreed most of the time that financiers and 
speculators were the principal architects of this national decline, using 
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the cover of free trade to undermine the national economy. It is they 
who embody the ‘unfeeling’ aspect of trade. 
Role model societies which predated Goldsmith were then evoked to 
portray eras of fair dealing, notably the Tudor State which is praised by 
Christopher Turnor and many others for safeguarding the national 
interest above that of financiers. A J Penty and Hilaire Belloc ‘updated’ 
much of this material with evocations of ‘organic’ societies, self 
contained communities and self regulated industries. The ‘Just Price’ 
and economic systems inspired by biblical teachings offered alternative 
perspectives on Capitalist crises. In this discourse, it is necessary to 
start again and construct new societies based on traditional values 
which ‘we’ have been alienated from by the forces of Mammon, trade 
and financial speculation.  G.D.H Cole wrote that ‘economic arguments 
are in reality moral arguments’ not just at a time of economic crisis but 
after a War on a scale that stood as an illustration of industrial and 
technological might. Turnor warned that future wars would be fought on 
the basis of competition for raw materials, using Mesopotamia and Oil 
as his prime example, and called for a future where the use of 
machinery is curtailed and food produced deploying older and wiser 
technologies.  This line of argument is substantially reinforced in the 
1930’s by an enthusiastic mining of the past by Fascists anxious to 
avoid any imported ‘alien’ philosophies, however attractive they might 
appear to them and however widespread is the admiration for 
Mussolini. 
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Slightly less discerning is the appearance of a mystical grounded view 
of the world which drew upon the metaphor of the ‘land’ to elevate 
consideration of the soil and its characteristics above (or below) all 
other considerations. Jorian Jenks, author of the British Union of 
Fascists agricultural policy and co - founder of the Soil Association 
wrote that  
‘Material acquisition tends to be regarded, not only as an end in itself, 
but as conclusive evidence of human powers and the inevitability of 
human progress,’292 
in a remark which in 1959 recalled the Goldsmith lines of nearly 200 
years earlier. 
‘Just gave what life requir’d, but gave no more: 
His best companions, innocence and health;’ 
 
The emerging Labour Party sought to distance itself from the seemingly 
romantic view of a proud peasantry by seeing itself as a transformative, 
modernist force. In reality, that meant condemning those who wished to 
utilise the soil more effectively as ‘dreamers’ who represented economic 
individualism and whose real aim was to return to ‘rural idiocy.’ Sidney 
Webb was clear that the industrial revolution could not and should not 
be undone and that the fight was to ensure that working people got their 
cut (eventually.) The practical impact of this focus was for the Labour 
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Party to remove contact with anyone with a working knowledge of 
agriculture and to largely welcome the possibilities of technology, large 
farm sizes and the application of as many fertilisers as the ‘experts’ saw 
fit.  
Behind the smokescreen of land nationalisation, the Labour Party 
gradually constructed a policy of a state administered farming and 
partnership with the NFU and agricultural companies – a policy which 
appealed equally to an increasingly pragmatic Conservative Party. 
Labour maintained a clear preference for the advantages of free trade, 
reiterating that position largely on the back of the perceived advantages 
of securing cheap food for the working class and maintaining a position 
which had moved on little from the statement of Joseph Chamberlain at 
the time of the Tariff Reform campaign – ‘why should the British working 
man pay more for their food?’  This has to be seen in conjunction with 
the fact that many on the Left were comfortable with the notion of 
Empire, having moved on little from the view of Blatchford in 1901 that 
‘England is universally admitted to be the best colonising power the 
world has known, and the gentlest and wisest ruler over subject 
races.’293 
A ‘socialist’ agricultural policy escaped the Labour Party (despite the 
repeated insistence upon Land nationalisation) but recalling that ‘fish 
out of water’ remark, such a position was not so much as a result of a 
lack of political conviction but a wish not to be identified with any cause 
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which did not accord with ‘progress.’ Given the unquestioned ability of 
the Colonies and commercial trade from around the world to feed 
working people as cheaply as possible, why spend time on 
consideration of a costly expedition into agricultural matters which 
seemed too complex to understand?  Yet, the Labour Party never quite 
detached itself from the moral superiority of escaping from inner city life 
and shared the Liberal preoccupation with land settlement, but this was 
never extended to an appreciation that such people would then produce 
food. Imaginings of smallholders never extended to a detailed 
consideration of what they might produce and how their subsidised 
state might interact with the production from real farmers. The vision 
was confined to any form of life outside of the main towns and cities 
being more acceptable than membership of the unemployed masses. 
The 1905 Royal Commission represented an opportunity to take stock 
of the possible impact of the dependency upon foreign food. The 
confidence that was expressed in the benefits of trade, particularly the 
dependence of many nations upon Britain, was backed up by the 
supposed continuation of naval supremacy. This was no passing 
expression of military might, it was repeated up to and during the First 
World War and formed part of the narrative from 1935 onwards. Put 
simply, if increased domestic food production was proposed at any time 
during the course of this study, then it was tantamount to doubting the 
ability of the country to defend itself. 
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After the First World War this study presents the evidence that images 
of a rural, self sufficient and moral England abounded after the carnage 
of war. The wish to move away from a world which seemed inevitably to 
be committed to the continuation of trade disputes ending in 
technological conflict allowed a brief opening where even the Fabian 
Society unlocked its shackled imagination. Again, Goldsmith 
characterised the challenge which arose from an urban society. 
‘Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen, who survey 
The rich man’s joys increase, the poor’s decay, 
‘Tis yours to judge, how wide the limits stand 
Between a splendid and a happy land.’ 
In the mainstream political discourse in the 1920’s the question of ‘how 
wide the limits stand’ is given additional force by successive Capitalist 
crises, General Strikes and fear of Bolshevism. From 1924, based on 
the brief experience of food administration in 1917 – 1918, developed 
not so much a consensus, but rather more the adoption of pragmatic, 
interventionist policies which concentrated on food and nutrition. The 
principal impact of the First World War in respect of food policy turned 
out not to be the moral re evaluation of Society’s values which seemed 
briefly possible, but the understanding that administration could be a 
force for efficiency and income redistribution. Every manifestation of 
crisis in Capitalism resulted in greater administrative self confidence 
that economic forces could be overcome. 
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For all the consideration of self sufficiency as an ideal, it is hard to find 
any evidence that those who argued persuasively for such a state of 
affairs had any detailed understanding of what the lauded peasant 
actually consumed.  ‘When every rood of ground maintain’d its man’ is 
largely unquestioned, should such evidence undermine the nature of 
the myth which is at work here. The empty countryside received more 
attention than the empty belly. 
The experience of Ireland in successive famines confirms that truth, in 
that what is notable is the absence of the Irish famine in English political 
discourse in the period 1880 – 1939. This study was predicated upon 
the assumption that the Irish Famine must have influenced thinking on 
food provision, if only within radical and socialist thought. However, 
there seems to be no memory which became embedded in radical or 
socialist sensibility which led to demands for people to be fed 
adequately or to avoid the slightest possibility of such an event 
happening in England. It seems as if it occupied a ‘providential’ position 
where the Irish people are victims of fate rather than politics. In respect 
of this study, it seems that the famine of the 1840’s served more as an 
argument for, and endorsement of, free trade than as a memorial to 
mass slaughter. 
Once the pragmatic coalition of interests develops from 1924 onwards, 
the possibilities of food self sufficiency are marginalised even further. 
Market intervention is enabled by the rise of a confident professional 
administration and justified by both main parties as being ‘temporary’ or 
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in order to bring about a ‘restructuring’. The reorientation of trade after 
the ‘limited’ introduction of protectionist policies and the Ottawa 
Conference did not serve to increase domestic food production. 
Instead, it created a publicly funded set of Marketing Boards who had 
as their main purpose not increased food production but the attempted 
regulation of supply and demand. The example of sugar beet shows 
just how complex, costly and politically ambiguous market intervention 
can be. Nevertheless, there was a sense of confidence that the 
uncertain episodes of Capitalism could be smoothed over by the 
deployment of wise and dispassionate administrators, able to improve 
upon the workings of the market. It was that spirit which brought 
together both main Political Parties not so much in a consensus but 
more in an understanding that they could deliver some examples of 
active government. 
In the end, public money led to a coalition of self interest incorporating 
the NFU, civil servants and successive Governments confident that they 
were ‘doing something’ for agriculture. Given the rearmament effort 
from 1934 such examples of State intervention also served to act as 
War Planning, although the main focus up to 1939 was not on 
production, but distribution and continuity of supply. 
Where nations were pursuing food self sufficiency, such as Germany 
and Italy, then such moves towards autarky were denounced as being 
warlike in intention. In 1939 the Labour Party agriculture expert Lord 
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Addison clearly spelt out why any move towards self sufficiency was an 
identifiably Fascist move. 
The work of Jorian Jenks showed how the British Union of Fascists 
would ensure self sufficiency for this country and, indeed, even raised 
the ( then unlikely) prospect of English food production being tied in with 
a European future rather than the perpetuation of colonial ties. From 
1939, and even more so in the wartime years, the proponents of self 
sufficiency made a significant shift away from their previous discourse 
by identifying that the previous notion of the ‘land’ had been superficial. 
The real question to be faced was one of soil fertility – a preoccupation 
that was both intensely practical and mythical at the same time. But, at 
least after years of flirting with Fascism it seemed to offer a safe ground 
from which to comment upon the follies of the world. The final four lines 
of Goldsmith offer a summary, 
‘That trade’s proud empire hastes to swift decay, 
As ocean sweeps the labour’d mole away; 
While self – dependent power can time defy, 
As rocks resist the billows and the sky. 
There is something profound which is missing from the political 
discourse around food self sufficiency, which was the question posed 
by Kropotkin in The Conquest of Bread. 
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‘But upon what basis must society be organised in order that all may 
have their due share of food produce?’ (1976:40) 
In successive works Kropotkin approached the question of food self 
sufficiency from that premise and, in some detail, identified how the 
latest technology might be deployed to achieve that end. But, the 
important context is the assertion that the provision of food is the 
primary responsibility of society and that such a responsibility is best 
exercised through local, democratic and co-operative solutions. Such a 
position exposes the essential shallowness of much of the political 
discourse on food self sufficiency which for all the deployment of 
agricultural experts rarely goes beyond the recollection of a time  
‘When every rood of ground maintain’d its man’ 
Within mainstream political discourse, Chamberlain in his Kettering 
speech in 1939 rejected the ‘artificial’ aim of producing sufficient food 
and asserted that trade was more important to the long term 
development of the country. For Labour, Lord Addison accepted the 
term ‘artificial’ and described himself as ‘an apostle of the managed 
market’294 and the NFU denounced self sufficiency as a ‘view which has 
never been advocated in responsible agricultural circles.’(Wilt 
2001:111)295 
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That the country was able to respond to the interruptions to food supply 
brought about by the Second World War owed much to the experience 
of administration gained at the end of the First World War, especially in 
respect of rationing. Despite the many discussions in Cabinet as to how 
this might be introduced, there was never any doubt that the market led 
chaos of 1914 – 1917 would be replicated. In addition, the introduction 
of Marketing Boards had resulted in the establishment of detailed 
understandings of the state of each particular crop, which was 
invaluable to the administration of the War Agricultural Committees – 
another model adopted from the First World War. Although the interwar 
period had seen no significant increases in either acreage or output it 
was clearly understood in terms of war planning that rapid increase in 
the output of key crops could be obtained within a reasonable period. 
Similarly, the ability of relatively new suppliers such as Argentina and 
the United States to fill the gaps in supply brought about by the 
curtailment of provisions from the Empire and Europe. The key to both 
increased domestic production and changes in overseas trade was that 
the Government adopted the central role in the operation of the market. 
Farming as an industry was given the reassurance that, unlike after the 
First World War, it now had a place within the economy in which 
increased domestic production followed from the supply of public 
money. Further, the industry was offered a partnership arrangement in 
which the NFU played a critical role. 
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If there were shortfalls, particularly in respect of fresh vegetables, then 
responsibility could be passed back to the individual or the local council, 
hence the critical nature of the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign. 
Increased domestic food production was based on the deployment of 
‘marginal’ land and the utilisation of more large scale and chemical 
farming methods. Ironically, therefore, the biggest critics of such 
approaches were many of those who had advocated food self 
sufficiency for many years previously. Thus, the Second World War saw 
the coming together of the organic movement who directed their 
concerns at the effect of wartime farming upon long term soil fertility.  
However, the ‘Kropotkin Question’ remained unanswered both 
nationally and internationally both in the context of food security and the 
depletion of natural resources.  
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Appendix One. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Royal Commission of 1905 
 This appendix contains some of the detailed pertinent evidence 
considered by the Commission and some detailed later consideration. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Importance of Wheat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Emerging out of the Committee’s consideration of the sources of food 
and raw materials was the central role of wheat and flour. The Report 
[para.34] noted that they are ‘by far the most important articles of 
consumption in these islands’ but it is not consumption alone which is 
important but that ‘we find for those supplies we are more dependent on 
importation from over-sea than in the case of any other foodstuffs we 
have had to deal, inasmuch as we import annually four-fifths of our total 
requirements.’ 
To illustrate the extent of that dominance the Committee looked at 
evidence from the Royal Statistical Society that consumption of wheat 
per head was currently 342 lbs per annum, nearly three times that of all 
meats. In the detailed appendices of the Report there is some 
consideration of increasing domestic supplies but the conclusion in 
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Paragraph 37 clearly indicated that such a move was not given serious 
weight. 
‘We note that  there has been a great decline in the quantity of wheat 
grown in this country during the later decades of the last century, and 
this tendency has gone so far that the acreage under wheat in the 
United Kingdom has decreased by more than one-half in the last thirty 
years. This diminution has been brought about by a variety of causes, 
chief among them being probably the large decline in price.’ 
In addition to the decline in home production it was also noted that 
consumption of bread had increased by 300% since 1870 and the 
conclusion was drawn from this that imports would have increased even 
if British wheat had been more available. Other than a passing 
reference to decline in price, strangely qualified by ‘probably,’ the 
Committee took this matter no further despite contemporary debates 
about the state of agriculture. As the evidence unfolded it became clear 
that not only was the continuation of free trade assumed but at the 
same time the ability of the Royal Navy to guarantee that was not 
seriously challenged. The widespread distribution of wheat imports was 
presented as the strength of British policy. 
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Table 1 
“SOURCES OF SUPPLY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OF WHEAT 
AND FLOUR. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN.” 
  1871-5  1898-1902  1904 
British Colonies and Possessions 
  10.9   19.0   39.1 
Europe 41.4   8.8   25.4 
USA  39.9   62.2   15.9 
South America 
  2.9   9.7   19.2 
Others 4.9   0.3   0.4 
  100   100   100  
  (Adapted from the table in Paragraph 40, p.7of the Report.) 
 
Such a geographical spread showed that in the event of a bad harvest 
or a War (the immediate example being the Spanish – American 
conflict) that a rapid switch of suppliers could take place.  Such a 
confident assertion on the flexibility of supplies was backed up by an 
analysis of Britain written for the United States Navy that ‘her wants, we 
can see clearly, can be complied with in a fortnight from a cabled order 
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at any time of the year. We are, in a phrase, no longer dependent upon 
a fickle climate.’ (Bellairs 1907:79) It was assumed that, such was the 
power of Britain, as the largest consumer of wheat and the dominant 
naval power, that there would be no interruption in supplies. 
In addition the example of Argentina was given as an illustration of the 
importance of emerging suppliers who were able to build up their trade 
with greater speed than British farming had shown for over thirty years. 
Where one might perceive a weakness in this arrangement, that is that 
supplies could be cut off either by obtaining a higher price elsewhere or 
by other disruption in trade, the Committee was anxious to emphasise 
just how important Great Britain was to suppliers. 
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Table 2 
“PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS OF WHEAT AND FLOUR 
SENT TO GREAT BRITAIN. QUINQUENNIAL 1897 – 1901.” 
USA    58.5 
RUSSIA   13.9 
ARGENTINA            23.9 
BRITISH INDIA  47.4 
CANADA   73.8 
AUSTRALASIA   46.8 
(Adapted from table in paragraph 41, p.8 of the Report) 
 
That the United States, an acknowledged world trader, sent 58% of all 
its wheat exports to this country provided a reassurance to the 
Commission that our market was too important to be neglected. The 
fact that an established trading nation or a rising country such as 
Argentina, rather than the ‘family’ members of the Empire, required this 
country showed the adaptability of the supply chain. What the evidence 
did not concentrate upon was the growing competition for supplies 
amongst both nations and new highly technological industries. The 
latter, such as the rapidly expanding biscuit industry, represented also 
the way the demand was growing for particular types of wheat and 
239 
 
guaranteed supply windows for continuous production processes. 
These factors combined t to bring about rises in food and commodity 
prices, even in peacetime. 
The system was therefore determined to be flexible and there was a 
measure of confidence that in the event of difficulties affecting the 
‘mother country’ then supplies would be diverted from other customers. 
It was also assumed that production would be increased further either 
to meet that obligation or as a result of increased prices. The higher 
dependency of British India on the British market, as opposed to 
Russia, was also seen as acting in the British interest given that the 
former would be ‘expected’ to make up any shortfall – a policy which 
was to have serious consequences for India in the Second World War.  
The Commission also observed that one important consequence of the 
wide geographical spread of suppliers was the provision of wheat in an 
uninterrupted chain of supply throughout the year. This factor was also 
utilised in the Report to emphasise the even spread of trade routes and 
the constant level of carriage which resulted in efficient use of British 
merchant shipping. A particularly advantageous factor for Great Britain 
was that supplier nations would often delay, and therefore incur their 
own storage costs, export until particular orders for immediate 
consumption were received. This enabled the level of storage in Great 
Britain to be minimised, leaving what might have been seen as a high 
level of dependency on imports. Given that nearly all British wheat was 
harvested in August or September, the only period of guaranteed 
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availability found in domestic supplies was for up to nine weeks after 
that, considering the limited capacity for long term storage. Some 
comfort was gained by the Commission in the estimation of the future 
for British wheat in the view that 
‘It seems probable that the demand for straw for various purposes must 
always operate to impede the decline in the production of wheat in this 
country.’ [para.66] 
A statement which set out that domestic wheat production will continue 
not in order to meet the needs of the population for an essential 
product, but for the utilisation of a by product  clearly illustrated, rather 
more than any other, how the free trade view of the world saw British 
agriculture. The North American Review compared the state of Britain 
to the maritime empires of the past such as the Phoenicians and the 
Greeks and concluded that ‘no nation has ever drawn its food supplies 
from transmarine territories to anything like the same extent.’(Bellairs 
1907: 77)  The biggest danger that the Commission examined was that 
of a ‘corner’ in wheat supplies where panic may be introduced by an 
apparent or actual interruption of supplies.296 
In the House of Commons Debate earlier297 Seton – Karr M.P. (St. 
Helens c.1119) had foreseen that disruption would not be as a result of 
a ‘political movement at all, but purely a business movement for the 
                                               
1
  A recent example having taken place in the United States, where a ‘corner’ 
organised by Leiter in Chicago had brought about an increase from 32s. Per quarter in 
August 1897 to 56s in May 1898. By June the price had gone back to 31s per quarter. 
Royal Commission para.72. 
297
 January 28
th
 1902 
241 
 
purpose of making money.’ In such a situation the power of the Navy 
would not be the most important factor. Seton – Karr (c.1122) pointed 
out that British vulnerability arose because the ‘whole globe was 
ransacked to supply the breakfast table of the working man.’ 
In respect of any other cereals and foodstuffs, the Commission took 
little interest in either how they were used to feed people or whether 
they might be substituted for wheat in times of hardship. That the 
products concerned were overwhelmingly home produced298 seemed of 
little importance, with the conclusion reached that it was difficult to 
ascertain just how much of each article was used for human 
consumption. Where the vulnerability of other materials was considered 
it was done so in a way which opposed any action on foodstuffs. 
George Whiteley M.P (Yorkshire West Riding, Pudsey) pointed out that 
the loss of cotton would be as great as that of wheat, so why should we 
subsidise agriculture? Why was it a special case?299 
 
Really, a question of the Navy 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In exploring the possible antagonists in Wartime and the likely 
interference in trade that might result, the Commission never seriously 
challenged the view that the British Navy would afford protection to all 
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trade routes for as long as a ‘strong fleet’ was maintained. The Report 
relied on an acceptance of an ‘unquestioned superiority of British sea 
power which would, beyond doubt, prevent any interference with the 
British sea trade.’ (Hurwitz 1968:205) Any possibility that such 
hegemony might be threatened could only be realised if naval 
expenditure failed to be increased in line with maintaining a ‘strong 
fleet.’  Two possibilities therefore remained; either another nation would 
aggressively expand its conventional forces or technological progress 
would result in the formulation of a weapon not easily countered. As a 
North American naval perspective commented, in respect of torpedo 
craft, they ‘have never proved of the slightest utility for attacks on trade 
routes, and have never been able singly to achieve anything against 
moving vessels.’ (Bellairs 1907:74) 
In the House of Commons any speaker who suggested that the Navy 
might not be able to deal with all possibilities was the subject of rebuke. 
The contribution of Colonel Kenyon – Slaney M.P. (Shropshire, 
Newport) illustrated that well in the National Food Supply debate in 
1902 with his statement that the mere suggestion of a blockade or other 
effective action ‘should never come from the lips of Ministers or lovers 
of their Country.’ (c. 1137) 
Running parallel to the assumption about the strength of the Navy was 
an appreciation of just how cheap sea transport had become, assisted 
by technological improvements and the logistical efficiencies of the 
trade of Empire. Even modest storage proposals put to the Commission 
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were disparaged on the grounds of cost, let alone the wholesale revival 
of British agriculture. 
The tone of self satisfaction with which the Commission case aside 
agricultural concerns and supported the ‘free trade and the navy’ line 
was not shared by all who gave evidence.  Parliamentary concerns 
were voiced before the Boer War and increased in the light of the 
experience of a mighty Empire failing to deal effectively with low key 
opposition. Indeed, one of the driving forces behind the setting up of the 
Royal Commission was the humiliation of the Boer War. Even those not 
sharing the ‘humiliation’ tag were ‘no longer confident that it [Great 
Britain] could depend on its safety solely on the strength of its own far 
flung economic and naval resources.’  (Barnett 1985:5) 
Part of the reason for that was that although the British navy was 
substantially strengthened from 1890 onwards, this only brought about 
a similar increase in all the other major powers. The actions of Germany 
in building a substantial number of warships from 1900 led to more 
active consideration of war planning (Offer 1989) and the exploration of 
the available options which included a blockade of Germany and action 
against the German fleet.300  
Thus, whilst the Royal Commission on Food ruled out the possibility of 
an effective German blockade of Britain on the grounds of practicality, 
ethics and International Law, elsewhere in Government the possibility of 
doing that in reverse was being considered.  ‘The navy’s planners 
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gradually came to realise that Britain’s adversaries might not have 
sufficient naval power to safeguard their own economies from disaster 
in wartime.’(Offer 1989:229) The Admiralty Paper [ADM 137/2749] 
referred to by Offer looked in detail at current and projected bread 
prices based upon the relative importance of bread in the working class 
diet. However, in terms of the British risk of blockade the Navy itself, in 
evidence to the Royal Commission, stated that 
‘Blockades are now finished with .... It would not be possible to conduct 
an effective blockade of these islands.’(para. 121) Any historical 
precedents, the action of Confederate cruisers during the American 
Civil War being one, were rejected. The clear statement of the Admiralty 
was that 
‘There would be no material diminution in the supplies of wheat and 
flour reaching the United Kingdom.’  (para. 127) In many respects, this 
was the statement that the Royal Commission had been set up to elicit 
and it was one which was maintained as public policy even after two 
years of war and up to 1939. 
Whilst such self confidence might have been reassuring it is the case 
that Parliamentary concern continued to be expressed after the 
publication of the Report. For some members, the possible vulnerability 
of food supplies owing to unconsidered alliances or technological 
advances is an issue which they would return to in the next few years. 
They remained a minority in that such certainty, along with any 
countervailing evidence from within the agricultural community that 
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domestic production could increase, meant that any question of food 
supplies was questioning the word of the Navy. In broader terms, 
questioning the strength of the Navy was also to question the conduct 
of ‘free trade’ by Britain in that it was the Navy which guaranteed that 
trade in what amounted to a form of insurance. If there were supply 
problems in wartime then one impact would be large increases in 
insurance payments and subsequent rises in prices. It might be that 
even the fear of scarcity would trigger a large amount of hoarding and 
shortages. 
 
 
Would the Working Class Riot? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notwithstanding the confidence exhibited above, the enquiry conducted 
by the Royal Commission of 1905 still spent time considering the 
possible effect of war upon the British working class. In part this was as 
a result of pressure from the person who had done the most to bring 
about the enquiry – S.L. Murray.301 His principal analysis was that the 
major strategic weakness of Britain lay not in the military field but as a 
result of dependency upon imports which would lead to widespread 
social unrest. Britain, it was argued, could be defeated by the actions of 
its own working class not having access to sufficient food supplies. To 
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that end, he established the ‘Association to promote an Official Enquiry 
into our Food Supply in Time of War’ and, from the beginning ensured 
that ‘representatives’ of the working class were included in the body. 
This became the strongpoint of the campaign, given that the presence 
of trades unionists and financiers in the same organisation helped to 
persuade an initially reluctant Government to meet the demand for a 
Commission.  
 The question of the working class diet was narrowed down to a 
consideration of the supply of wheat. 
‘We find that wheat as a foodstuff has an immense preponderance in 
the dietary of the nation as a whole and that this preponderance is even 
more marked in the case of the poorer classes of the population.’ 
(para.165) 
In order to look further into this matter the Commission sought statistical 
confirmation from the Board of Trade and ‘Mr Booth, than whom no one 
has a better right to speak on questions affecting the social life of the 
working classes.’ (para.167) 
Charles Booth gave evidence to the Commission as one who knows 
about ‘the condition of the working classes and their method of living’ 
but also ‘as one interested in ships and shipping. (6179) Indeed, the 
bulk of the evidence given by Booth related to his position as the Owner 
of his own Shipping Company. Clearly, the Commission members did 
not consider there to be an actual or perceived conflict of interest in 
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respect of the importation of foodstuffs. In the questions directed at 
Booth the main concern was to establish whether there would be riots in 
the event of severe dislocation of food supplies. Booth was unequivocal 
that ‘poor people would adjust.’ (6249) citing as an example the Siege 
of Paris. Booth saw the strength and adaptability of the working classes 
as arising from the ability of women to suffer in order to benefit both 
their husbands and family members. He observed that women suffer 
more because they ‘would wish to do so.’  (6235) 
Had Booth been confronted with accounts of the serious bread riots in 
Italy in 1898, which he was not, then he would have no doubt added 
that this was also a national characteristic. 
When challenged to consider if he knew of a single country which had 
so great a dependence upon imports, Booth stated that ‘I believe we 
are absolutely alone in that respect.’ (6261)  
Although the Commission noted his observation that war with the 
United States might create difficulties for the continuation of food 
imports, Booth reassured them that ways and means would exist to 
trade through third parties, as in would not be in the commercial 
interests of the U.S to stop selling into its largest market.302 
Such an ‘ expert’ confirmed not only the preponderance of wheat, but 
also that working class people would not consume cheaper alternatives 
such as oatmeal.  Although it might not have been his intention in 
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stating that, it once again persuaded the Commission that domestic 
production would not meet dietary requirements, even if such a change 
were possible. Critically, the statements from Booth and the trade 
unionists giving evidence303 allowed the following to be inferred 
‘The working classes would be able to adapt themselves to the new 
conditions and would reduce their standard of living to the point 
necessitated by the circumstances’ (para.169) 
The Commission devoted one session from around 50 to hearing 
evidence from S.L. Murray and the working class representatives seen 
as important to the success of the campaign. Having assured them of 
his respectability and wide ranging experience G. D. Kelley from Salford 
outlined three types of working person (skilled, unskilled and casual) 
and explained that each grouping would cope with privation in different 
ways. He introduced an issue previously not considered by the 
Commission; that of the immense burden placed upon Poor Law Relief. 
Thus, he argued that working people would not react strongly to a lack 
of food but would have ‘a very great prejudice indeed’ (8770) at having 
to seek State assistance. Their strong feelings would be inflamed by the 
‘large alien population.’ (8773) who would take ‘their’ jobs by 
undercutting wage rates. Kelley thought that people would eventually 
adjust to the new conditions as long as the Government had stored 
sufficient flour and arranged for fair distribution. Beyond this point, 
Kelley became ensnared in questions of patriotism. 
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It was clear that the Commission preferred the earlier evidence of 
Charles Booth that working people would adjust - Kelley had limited that 
to the skilled working class –and pressed Kelley to state that working 
people would be patriotic above all. Why, he was asked, did people not 
riot in the Crimean War? His assertion that people were better 
organised and more confident now led him not to say that they would be 
better able to resist the declaration of war, but that the working classes 
remained patriotic throughout everything. It would be fair to say that 
Kelley failed to convey many of his concerns as a consequence of his 
perceived need to show ‘loyalty.’304  
 
His evidence petered out amongst musings by Commission members 
as to just how much working people spent on alcohol and the more 
recent vice of football matches. Kelley offered no alternative vision of 
increasing domestic food production and when asked ‘Your general 
idea of a remedy is to store grain?’ replied ‘I know of no better remedy.’  
(8850)  Offer (1989: 225) noted that ‘as moderate and patriotic trade’s 
unionists their warnings of turmoil did not carry conviction.’  
In the Final Report, the Commission was comforted by an assurance 
that even if the price of wheat rose sharply, it would only do so for a 
limited time and would produce a lower concomitant percentage 
increase in the price of bread itself. The question of working class 
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resilience continued to be of concern even though the Commissioners 
did not fully understand the evidence given by Mr. Kelley in respect of 
the differences in the ability to cope between skilled and unskilled 
operatives. Under ‘modern conditions’ there was a confidence that 
working people would cope, citing the lack of riot and sedition in the 
1850’s and an apparent lack of connection between rises in the price of 
bread and increased pauperism. The resilience of working people in 
strike conditions was also used as an illustration of their likely behaviour 
in wartime. Nevertheless, the trade unionists persisted in their 
suggestions of serious unrest brought about by food shortages to the 
extent that  
‘A rise in the price of bread would be so great as to cause serious riots 
or, at least, to cause pressure to be brought to bear on the Government 
to make peace at any price.’ (para. 187) 
In addition, the working class was portrayed by Kelley as being more 
assertive, more organised and more able to affect policy than the 
historical precedents used by the Commission – The Napoleonic and 
Crimean Wars. This brought about a brusque rebuttal in the Final 
Report of there being no factual basis to this - being merely 
assumptions based on an inaccurate understanding of the past. 
Paragraph 188 of the Report was clear that 
‘The teaching of history is against their accuracy, for we can recall to 
mind no instance in which scarcity of work or dearness of food has 
made any one class more than another display a yielding spirit. We 
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believe in their patriotism and in their loyalty to the Constitution and we 
desire to place on record our conviction that the working classes of 
today are no more likely than their predecessors to urge the 
Government, on account of any privations affecting themselves, to 
make an inglorious peace. We believe they are ready to bear with 
fortitude, for the sake of their country, hardships as great as were ever 
borne by their forefathers.’ 
The Commission wanted reassurance and ignored much of the 
evidence put forward by the working class witnesses, none more so 
than B.T. Hall of the Working Men’s Club and Institute Union (CIU)  
from Manchester. The line taken by Hall in evidence was not referred to 
directly in the Final Report but was one which became a major issue in 
the run up to the outbreak of war in 1914. Hall assured the 
Commissioners of the patriotism of the working classes but said that a 
future war would most likely arise as a consequence of ‘some failure of 
diplomacy’ and not out of a direct threat as was faced in the Napoleonic 
Wars. Any possible conflict ‘would be so involved and would be so 
unintelligible and so remote that it would not be possible to put it in any 
way so clearly.’ (9009) this prompted a rare intervention from the Prince 
of Wales 
‘You say working classes ‘can stop the war.’ Will you please explain 
what you mean by saying ‘they can stop the war?’ Hall explained that 
rather than threatening to riot to stop the war, the working classes can 
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now ‘bring the influence of vote and opinion to bear through 
constitutional channels.’(9029)  
It was some while later in the questioning that Hall was challenged 
about this, with the assertion that working class people might be able to 
exercise such a level of political power such a startling one as to invite  
no serious consideration, except this final summation by the Chairman 
who wanted to clarify if Hall had actually said that 
‘The great bulk of workmen would demand the removal of the cause [of 
War] at any cost – even the extinction of Britain as a dominant power in 
the world?’ (9058) a question to which Hall replied with a simple ‘yes.’  
The gravity of such a statement being undermined by Hall’s only 
remedy for avoiding starvation being a reform of the Poor Law system, 
not having considered increased domestic food production at all. 
This section of the evidence is quoted from at length because it stated 
with great clarity the nature of the calculations being made by the 
Commission. It is on the grounds of social unrest that the coalition of 
interests emerges to request the enquiry, it is the addition of working 
class representatives which is supposed to emphasise that point and 
yet the Commission is clear that the risk is not significant. However, it is 
the next paragraph which put such an unequivocal position in a different 
light and which served either as a warning to the Government or an 
encouragement to others urging greater rearmament 
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‘In all that has been said above we have assumed that the command of 
the sea has not been lost, that is to say, that affairs had reached a point 
at which our Navy was no longer able to prevent an organised attack 
upon our commerce, for if that occurred, it would no longer be true that 
we should obtain our supplies without material diminution, or that there 
was no fear of actual starvation.’ 
On the contrary, the suffering caused would be substantial to the 
degree that 
‘There might be produced such serious suffering that the country could 
hold out no longer.’ 
The two final paragraphs presented here form the crux of the analysis 
of food security, which is that there is an unbreakable link between free 
trade and naval power. With an acknowledgement to discussions taking 
place outside of the Commission on Protectionism and to the fact that 
most of those arguing for the setting up of the Enquiry were 
Protectionists, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that no viable 
alternative existed 
 In reaching that conclusion it was able to bear in mind the rather poor 
presentations made to encourage greater domestic food production, 
especially of wheat. The most authoritative witness, R.H. Rew from the 
Board of Agriculture confined himself to a statistical presentation, 
inviting comments from the Commissioners that eradication of waste 
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might go some way to being a solution. When asked whether the Board 
had a view on returning to growing wheat, Rew answered that 
‘No, I am afraid it has not been specially considered from that point of 
view.’  (332)  
When, as an expert witness, Rew is asked if other (home grown) 
products currently used as fodder could be used instead of wheat for 
human consumption he replied 
‘I do not know what the horses would do; but I suppose we should be 
eating horses too at the same time,’ (366) 
The prospect of no barley for the brewing of beer or for the feeding of 
animals served to close down the line of questioning, an occurrence 
repeated when the Commission learned later that such substitution 
would not be acceptable to the working classes in any event. A large 
North Yorkshire farmer later giving evidence305 reinforced the point 
about not increasing domestic wheat production by stating that 
‘I do not see the slightest possibility or likelihood of any greatly 
increased quantity being grown at home.’ (8097) 
Bearing in mind the number of influential people who called for this 
enquiry who did so as a way of either challenging free trade policy or 
simply arguing for British self sufficiency as a good thing in its own right, 
it is clear that precious little encouragement is being given to them by 
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witnesses. Other farming witnesses such as B. St. John Ackers 
explicitly rejected the idea of financial incentives or bounties in order to 
increase wheat production. Farming, he argued, had moved on into 
more profitable areas.  The perception that farming was in crisis is one 
that need to be briefly examined, given that the view of Ackers was 
more widespread than one might expect. Firstly, there was no 
consensus that there had been an agricultural depression, although the 
foremost agrarian authority, Lord Ernle, had both defined it and given 
clear parameters to it. (1873 – 1896)  Whilst it was clear that new land 
overseas was being opened up to a significant extent in the 1870’s and 
that imports were assisted by transport improvements that did not by 
itself amount to a crisis for the British farmer. Fletcher (1973:53) argued 
that such a change ‘inflicted suffering on a particular section of farmers, 
the large corn growers.’  
Many agriculturalists at the time urged British farmers to adjust their 
outputs to meet the new markets which were opening up, citing 
successful examples in Lancashire and Yorkshire. It was the large 
landowners in the South and East of England who were generally 
resistant to such innovation, but they valued their right to manage their 
own land above profit maximisation and, in any event, were sustained 
by investments elsewhere. Certainly, their absence from the witnesses 
examined by the Royal Commission is explained by that need to 
preserve ownership rights, with the expectation that any state money 
would be accompanied by state interference. Given that British farming 
had previously been successful (and Britain self sufficient in food as a 
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result) through concentration of land ownership, it was necessary for 
those landowners to resist any calls for greater efficiency.  Hobsbawm 
(1990:201) saw the British commercial farmer as being too small to 
increase output significantly but too large ‘to subordinate himself to a 
co-operative organization capable of operating on a large scale.’ There 
was no ‘middle way’ such as the co=operative enterprises which had 
been successful in Denmark and which were emerging in Ireland 
through the work of Horace Plunkett306. The second reason why the 
depression did not figure large in 1905 is that there was an 
improvement in profitability through reaping the fruits of market 
adjustment and new farming technology. (chapter 4) 
The effect of any Government action might be to increase wheat 
production but only at the expense of other food stuffs. But St. John 
Ackers put forward an interesting proposition, which was to build up two 
years stock of wheat in order that Home production could be built up 
over two growing seasons to replace imports. In an argument which 
broadened the debate, he stated that 
‘A reserve of food is equally essential to secure peace and to prosecute 
war successfully.’  (8261)  
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A position which is taken up much more widely in the 1930’s in the 
sense of that being self sufficient in food removed one of the causes of 
war – food insecurity. 
 J. Voelcker, the Chemist from the Royal Agricultural Society, did offer 
the prospect of increased wheat yields but undermined his case 
somewhat by his conclusion that the public preferred foreign wheat 
anyway. The only enthusiastic supporter of food self sufficiency307  on 
the grounds of greater rural employment and maintenance of the 
national physique, rather undermined his case (despite an impressive 
collection of statistics) by declaring that he had left farming and was 
now practising as a Dentist. A more considered presentation by the 
practising farmer Alfred Mansell made the case for a strategic policy in 
which the decline in wheat acreage is reversed. Using the available 
figures for wheat imports he stated 
‘We are gradually getting to the point when we shall grow no wheat.’  
(8639) 
Mansell made the only recorded supportive remark for self sufficiency in 
either the Report itself or in any of the transcripts of evidence when he 
argued that the best policy is ‘putting the home grown first. Even at 
great cost? Yes.’ (8652) 
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Report Conclusions 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 The Commission did not spend time on the question of what might 
constitute a ‘strong fleet’ but it nevertheless pointed out the stark 
alternative which might result from a lack of one. It assumed that the 
Navy would recommend the appropriate level and the Government 
would fund it, but if it did not, then it fired a rather timid warning. The 
Commission came up with little of practical use beyond establishing the 
need for more statistics, an exploration of whether additional storage 
might be needed and the possibility of some additional insurance cover 
for merchant shipping in times of conflict. Any questioning of a possible 
role for British farming is confined to the Reservations and Memoranda 
appended by various Commission members. The Statement of 
Reservations by Henry Seton-Karr [pp.95-103] pointed out that the brief 
of the Commission contained the sentiment that ways should be found 
to ‘better secure’ bread supplies. He concluded that 
‘I much regret that more support could not be given to 
recommendations for the encouragement of British farming, and for 
increasing the wheat-acreage of the United Kingdom.’ 
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Appendix 2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 1 “United Kingdom: Wheat Imports. “Thousands of Cwts.” 
Five Year Periods beginning, 
1845    49,400 
1850    82,200 
1855    79,800 
1860              144,100 
1865              148,100 
1870              197,800 
1875              260,200 
1880                                    288,000 
1885                                    280,600  
 (Adapted from Hobsbawm 1990:198)  
On page 20. 
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Table 2  
 
“Approximate % of Food in Working Class Diet which is imported” 
By Calories   % 
Wheat    80 
Sugar    100 
Lard    80 
Cheese   75 
Bacon    66 
(Adapted from Barnett 1985:3)  
On page 24. 
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